



Global Protection Cluster




GLOBAL PROTECTION UPDATE

JUNE 2022



BEYOND TRUCKS

ACCESS THAT PROTECTS



“Having sustained access that builds trust, stays and delivers is the backbone of protection work. It is by being there with active local responders that we build trust with communities, that we can understand and change behaviours, that we can have services to address sexual violence or child recruitment, that we deliver services and follow cases properly, that we send a signal of solidarity and tell the story.”

Despite the glimmer of hope that represented evacuations in Mariupol in May 2022, and the global rallying to keep the Security Council Resolution allowing a lifeline of aid into Northwest Syria, intense fighting continued to cause immense suffering in crises all over the world.

Protection risks faced by communities across the globe continue to shock, unlike anything we reported before – jumping 36% in only one year, leaving 150 million people in need of protection in 2022.

Across operations the images of trucks reaching locations that have been isolated by insecurity, conflict and active siege by authorities and armed groups are like a candle of hope.

These trucks bring more than what they carry, be it food, medical supplies or basic items. They bring a clear message that communities are not left alone, that the world is standing with women, men, girls and boys affected by conflict and disasters. These trucks bring life-saving items and a message of solidarity.

For people living on the frontlines of crisis, access is not an abstract concept. Instead, it grounds their daily reality and ultimately determines their ability to access much needed services and to tell someone what is happening to their community, with the hope that violations stop.

For stubborn protection issues in times of crisis, a complementary approach to access beyond trucks is much needed – an approach that is founded on trust and sustained presence on the ground.

Yet, the past several months have highlighted the crushing range of constraints that are limiting

such quality of access across our operations.

Most protection cluster operations estimate that protection services can reach and be reached on average by 25 to 50% of those in need. Operations in Yemen, Ethiopia, Sudan and Mozambique offer even lower estimates.

This means that across operations, half to three-quarters of people are left to fend for themselves – invisible to the outside world and without the most basic protection and support.

In the second quarter of this year, we report that **sexual and gender-based violence, attacks on civilians, and attacks on education and health were again reported as predominant protection risks across our operations**; highlighting the need to align our protection of civilians and access agenda.

These findings build on NRC's most neglected crisis publication¹, and Education Under Attack 2022 report², highlighting the immense gap between what is possible when the international community rallies behind a crisis, and the daily reality for the millions of people suffering far from the spotlight.

At the GPC, we are committed to keep crises that received less attention on our watchlist. Over the past months, we focused our attention on resurging violence in the DR Congo, violent attacks and mass executions in the Sahel, the glooming famine in the Horn of Africa and the cross-border negotiations in North-West Syria – topics that only made the headlines for a couple of days or weeks.

In this operational reality, we also report on four opportunities that could support reducing protection

risks of people living in conflicts and disasters.

First, in our Mid-Year Protection Resources review³, we see that protection partners are increasingly trusted to stay and deliver and are receiving increasing resources, with 17% of it going to local partners – putting the cluster on the right track to meet the 25% Grand Bargain target.

Second, the recently launched United Nations Secretary-General's Action Agenda on Internal Displacement offers an opportunity to tackle protection challenges and seek solutions with humanitarian action but also in collaboration with and engagement from actors from across the entire UN system and beyond, most notably development, peace and climate experts.

Third, the recent independent review of the Centrality of Protection Policy⁴ brings an excellent opportunity to elevate protection work, further support Humanitarian Coordinators to take on stubborn protection problems and improve coherence of protection responses.

Fourth, the 25th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers offered insightful reflections on how mine action serves as an enabler of humanitarian aid – and a key player in securing access that protects.

Building on these opportunities, we have to support the humanitarian leadership to find better ways to move forward – to shift behaviours, policies and practices in ways that can advance access that protects. Today, we are failing communities we work with and for. We must do better.

In this report, we bring into focus contexts where protection work is being challenged at its foundation due to constraints to access, and how certain protection risks and trends are being exacerbated by these access constraints. We also highlight some of the ways we can collectively strengthen access for protection looking at leverage points across policy and practice dimensions.

CONTEXT UPDATE

The second quarter of this year witnessed a **resurgence of conflict and incidences of cautious ceasefires**. The protection and security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) continued to deteriorate due to intercommunal conflicts and armed group confrontations. In North Kivu Province, the resurgence of a faction of the ex-M23 and the consecutive confrontations with the DR Congo army (FARDC) have caused the displacement of an estimated 55,000 people. In Mali, the security situation remains volatile with increased violence in the Menaka region causing mass displacement while in Moura, approximately 300-500 civilians were killed without any formal investigation into the situation. In eastern Ukraine, the protection landscape is eroded with grave atrocities, potential war crimes and multiple attacks on civilians and their infrastructures. In Mariupol, electricity and water supplies were disrupted impacting over 200,000 people. In Bucha, over 320 civilian deaths were reported in April. Yemen currently is transitioning to a calmer phase—with the temporary two-month ceasefire allowing for greater freedom of movement and a reduction of civilian casualties. On 8 January, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) announced the launch of an UN-facilitated intra-Sudanese political process to design a way out of the political crisis and forge a sustainable path forward towards democracy and peace.

New large-scale instances of forced displacements have been recorded in the last three months. With the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, 7.7 million people have been internally displaced, and 13 million civilians are unwilling or unable to leave their communities due to heightened security risks. Violence also continued to force thousands of women, men and children to flee for safety to Dori, in Burkina Faso after horrendous attacks in Seno Province, causing the death of at least 75 civilians. In the provinces of Ituri, North and South Kivu and northern Tanganyika in the DR Congo the security situation has deteriorated majorly—in April, attacks against civilians living in villages and in the mining squares have intensified. In Myanmar, the number of displaced people since the military takeover has crossed the one million mark. Overall, there were 59.1 million internally displaced people across the world at the end of 2021, 53.2 million as a result of conflict and violence, and 5.9 million as a result of disasters. This is the second highest annual figure in a decade after 2020's record-breaking year for disaster displacement.⁵

Over the past months, **the pernicious intersections between conflict and food insecurity have been further highlighted.** Food insecurity intensified in contexts of active conflict, violence and human rights violations. At the same time, food insecurity itself was seen as a cause of conflict. Cluster operations reported a clear overlap between countries affected by drought and climate shocks and countries enveloped in active conflict, steeped in dire operational challenges and high rates of displacement. In the second quarter of 2022, armed conflict, violence and human rights violations remained the main drivers of protection risks and when looked at together with food insecurity helps us to achieve a holistic understanding of larger deteriorations in the protection landscape.


The repercussions of the conflict in Ukraine reverberated globally - holding the potential to impact food security across borders. As Ukraine and the Russian Federation provide 30% of the world's wheat and barley⁶, production has greatly reduced since the escalation of hostilities, contributing to soaring prices for countries dependent on imports. This vicious cycle particularly impacted countries already steeped in poverty and climate crises, such as in Somalia, DR Congo and Sudan. In April-May, the Horn of Africa has been experiencing devastating droughts with approximately 18.4 million victims, affecting principally Ethiopia and Somalia where humanitarian aid agencies warned that the hardest-hit areas were at the risk of experiencing multiple famines. Continued attacks on civilians have further exacerbated food insecurity in Sudan and South Sudan⁷.

The Central Sahel is witnessing a **rapidly deteriorating protection crisis driving catastrophic food insecurity and compounding protection risks** due to reduced access to livelihoods. In Niger, drought like conditions coincided with deepening conflict in the Tillabéri region, northern Tahoua, southern Maradi and Diffa, leading to population displacements and the disruption of productive activities. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, farmers, herders, fishermen were targeted by the activism of armed groups, their livestock stolen, looted, and crops burdened. Extortion of goods and attacks on markets and other civilian infrastructures remained very common. In Somalia, the intensification of Al-Shabaab insurgency attacks resulted in the denial of access to water points for communities, which led to an estimated 3.6 million people without sufficient access to water by February 2022. With the additional global price rise and resulting food insecurity, protection risks in these countries are spiralling incipiently and at an alarming rate.



Caught in this vicious cycle between conflict and food insecurity, **the resilience of affected communities is increasingly compromised leading to a crushing coping crisis.** The devastating impact of armed conflict, especially with no food on the table, leaves people with no choice but to resort to desperate survival strategies, which are ultimately further harmful to their well-being. Spiralling food insecurity thus takes many shapes—increasing rates of child labour, early and forced marriage, high rates of school dropouts, survival sex, relying on dangerous smuggling routes and risking human trafficking, household debt and high rates of suicide, among many others. From Afghanistan to Nigeria, these negative coping mechanisms are themselves driving increasingly complex protection risks.

FIND MORE INFORMATION IN THE PROTECTION ANALYSIS UPDATES



PROTECTION ANALYSIS UPDATES

74% of 31 Protection Clusters produce regular protection analysis updates based on the Protection Analysis Framework.

Protection Analysis Update provides an overview of top protection risks identified, groups most affected and geographical areas. It informs coordination, programmatic response and advocacy efforts.



PAUs published



PAUs in process

KEY COUNTRY NEWS

In the North-Kivu Province of **DR Congo**, the resurgence of M-23 rebels factions and their confrontations with the army in June have caused the displacement of an estimated 55,000 people, the Norwegian Refugee Council terming it as the “world’s most neglected displacement crisis”.

There are now over 1 million IDPs in **Myanmar**. More than 700,000 people were newly displaced since the military takeover in February 2021.

In April, the Bucha mass killings of at least 320 civilians in **Ukraine** triggered a global outcry. Since the escalation of hostilities, more than 9,000 civilian casualties have been recorded and one-third of the population have been displaced (amounting to two out of every three children). The true human toll of the war, however, could certainly be much higher.

In the same period, the massacre in Moura, **Mali**, of 300-500 civilians occurred quietly, garnering little international attention. It is the worst atrocity reported from a decade-long armed conflict and the UN is still barred from conducting any formal investigation.

In **Burkina Faso**, attacks by radical armed groups have increased since the coup d’état. In June, in the Seno province, approximately 79 civilian deaths were reported that triggered the displacement of over 20,000 people.

In **Niger**, lawmakers approved a bill that clears the way for more foreign troops to be deployed in the country but local dialogue with armed group leaders is lacking.

In **CAR**, juridical trials of international crimes were to finally begin in May but were postponed indefinitely due to a no-show by defence lawyers.

The renewal of the United Nations Integrated Office in **Haiti** (BINUH) is scheduled to take place in July to address increasing armed gang violence and its impact on

humanitarian and human rights needs.

As **Colombia** entered a highly polarised election period, illegal activities by armed actors are on the rise, especially unlawful confinement of civilians. Unemployment levels remain high, and the risks of food insecurity are growing—all contributing to high levels of displacement.

In **Nigeria**, enforced relocations and returns are continuing despite the worsening security situation, currently putting at risk 225,425 IDPs.

As of March 2022 in **Ethiopia**, there were over 329,323 new IDPs north of Amhara as a result of ethnic conflicts and reports indicate that 90% of the displaced are female, children, elderly and persons with disabilities (PWDs).

Between April and May, **Somalia** witnessed a 28% increase in displacement owing to drought, with 33,287 people displaced.

In West Darfur, **Sudan**, 200 people were killed following an outbreak of violence by armed factions. A ceasefire was called for in May.

New waves of displacement in Northern **Mozambique** were recorded in Mizeze, Cabo Delgado province, after the conflict drove from Ancuabe district over the past weeks.

South Sudan’s transitional government is due to wrap up in less than 10 months which has left the protection landscape highly precarious. Intercommunal clashes have been accelerating since February 2022 in the states of Western and Central Equatoria, Jonglei and Unity.

In 2022, the Global Organized Crime Index released by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime ranked **Honduras** 10th among the most violent countries in the world.

The Security Council’s authorization for humanitarian aid delivery through the last remaining border crossing

into **North-West Syria** expired on July 10 and significant uncertainty remains about whether the cross-border resolution will be renewed.

In **Yemen**, warring parties have agreed to extend the ceasefire for two more months. This has had a positive humanitarian impact and civilians are able to resume movement.

A school ban is affecting 1.1 million secondary school girls in **Afghanistan**. Other decrees are barring women from taking part in public and political life.

In **Cameroon**, about 30 villagers were killed in attacks in the Akwaya district of the Southwest region over land dispute between neighbouring communities.

Violence continued to spread in **Chad**, with 52 security incidents caused by non-state armed groups resulting in the death of 128 people in May alone.



EMERGING PROTECTION TRENDS

CRISIS WATCH	WORRYING TRENDS		
DRC	SAHEL	HORN OF AFRICA	SYRIA
<p>The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been the scene of one of the world's longest-running conflicts. In the latest iteration which began in May, its army has been fighting the M23 rebel group, which is waging its most sustained offensive since a 2012-2013 insurrection when it seized vast swathes of territory. Deadly attacks and massive displacements have been reported in North Kivu and Ituri provinces requiring a major scale up of integrated protection response.</p>	<p>An average of 8 civilians are killed every day in attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. This number alone sheds light on the scale of the security crisis in the central Sahel and the failure of counter-terrorism strategies over the past decade to halt the spiral of violence. Mass killings of civilians occurred in Mali and Burkina Faso in May and June, resulting in massive displacement of population in need of life-saving assistance and protection.</p>	<p>Devastating droughts have claimed over 18.4 million victims. The population is at the risk of experiencing multiple famines. Simultaneously, instances of armed conflict are also on the rise in Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan Mozambique and Somalia. The destabilising experience of both armed conflict and food insecurity is pushing the population to the brink of desperation.</p>	<p>The Security Council's authorization for humanitarian aid delivery through the last remaining border crossing into North-West Syria expired on 10 July. It is uncertain whether the cross-border resolution will be renewed. The NWS Protection Cluster estimates that 22 out of the 26 (76%) protection activities currently implemented by 5 UN agencies will be discontinued in the absence of the renewal.</p>









OF CONCERN	GREATEST RECORDED INCREASE OF PROTECTION RISKS IN OPERATIONS	
<p>1. SEXUAL AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE</p>	<p>'Sexual and gender-based violence' remains the most critical protection risks across operations. Every field operation reports sexual and gender-based violence as being amongst top concerns. 81% describe the GBV risk as severe or extreme.</p>	
<p>There has been an increase of 'attacks on civilians and other unlawful killings' compared to the last publication of the Global Protection Update. 72% of cluster operations report the situation as severe or extreme compared to 65% in March 2022.</p>	<p>2. ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND OTHER UNLAWFUL KILLINGS</p>	
<p>3. PRESENCE OF MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE</p>	<p>There has been a slight increase of 'presence of mines and other explosive ordnance' compared to the last publication of the Global Protection Update. 37% of cluster operations report the situation as severe or extreme compared to 38% in March 2022.</p>	
<p>More cluster operations have reported a moderate risk of 'forced family and child separation' compared to the last publication of the Global Protection Update. 60% of cluster operations report the situation as moderate compared to 47% in March 2022.</p>	<p>4. FORCED FAMILY AND CHILD SEPARATION</p>	

PROTECTION RISKS

Based on the results of surveying protection risks in 23 Protection Clusters.

OVERALL RISKS AND CONCERNS	MINOR	STRESSED	MODERATE	SEVERE	EXTREME	N/A or no answer
Sexual and gender-based violence	0	0	5	17	5	0
Psychological/emotional abuse or inflicted distress	0	2	6	14	5	0
Impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, siege and forced displacement	2	0	5	16	3	1
Attacks on civilians and other unlawful killings, attacks on civilian infrastructures	2	3	2	13	5	2
Abduction, kidnapping, forced disappearance, arbitrary or unlawful arrest and/or detention	3	3	5	13	2	1
Theft, extortion, eviction or destruction of personal property	2	3	8	12	1	1
Impediments and/or restrictions to access to documentation, remedies and justice	2	4	9	8	3	1
Presence of mines and other explosive ordnance	5	3	8	8	2	1
Forced recruitment, including recruitment of children in armed forces and groups	4	4	9	9	0	1
Discrimination and stigmatization, denial of resources, opportunities, services	2	4	12	8	0	1
Child, early or forced marriage	1	4	15	6	1	0
Forced family and child separation	1	4	16	4	1	1
Torture or inhuman, cruel, degrading treatment	7	4	10	3	2	1
Forced labour, slavery, trafficking in persons	4	10	8	3	1	1
Misinformation and denial of access to information	6	9	7	3	1	1



AT A GLANCE	SEVERITY OF PROTECTION RISKS AS REPORTED BY PROTECTION CLUSTERS		
 <p>Every field operation reports Sexual and Gender-Based Violence as being amongst top concerns. 81% describe the GBV risk as severe or extreme.</p>	 <p>All operations describe psychological/emotional abuse or inflicted distress amongst the affected populations. 70% rate the risk of distress as severe or extreme.</p>	 <p>26 operations report forced displacement and impediments to freedom of movement. 73% of them classify the situation as severe or extreme.</p>	 <p>Attacks on civilians or infrastructures are occurring in 25 cluster operations. 72% of them report the situation as severe or extreme.</p>
 <p>26 operations highlight abduction, kidnapping, forced disappearance, arbitrary or unlawful arrest and/or detention as a major concern. 57% describe the risk as severe or extreme.</p>	 <p>Theft, extortion, eviction or destruction of personal property is a risk across 26 operations. 50% report the risk as severe or extreme.</p>	 <p>26 operations report impediments and/or restrictions to access to documentation, remedies and justice. 42% rate the risks as severe or extreme.</p>	 <p>Presence of mines and other explosive ordnance is a risk across 26 operations. 38% rate the risk as severe or extreme.</p>

Sexual and Gender-based Violence	AFGHANISTAN	DRC	GUATEMALA	PACIFIC	SYRIA	BURUNDI
	CAMEROON	CAR	CHAD	COLOMBIA	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA
	HONDURAS	IRAQ	LIBYA	MALI	MOZAMBIQUE	MYANMAR
	NIGERIA	OPT	SOMALIA	UKRAINE	BURKINA FASO	NIGER
	SUDAN	VENEZUELA	YEMEN			

Sexual and gender-based violence including the rape of both girls and boys and sexual harassment of peaceful protestors in Khartoum were reported in [Sudan](#). Honduras reported the largest rate of femicide with 110 women murdered in the first four months of 2022. More than 730 GBV incidents were reported in the regions of Tillabéri and Tahoua ([Niger](#)) since the beginning of the year. In the month of April, over 6,200 protection incidents were reported in [DRC](#) with the majority including cases of sexual and gender-based violence, abductions and physical assault. In [Syria](#), women and girls continue to be subjected to increased denial of economic resources and education, movement restrictions, exploitation, forced and child marriage, intimate partner and family violence, technology-facilitated violence, and physical, psychological, emotional, sexual, and social violence. Since May 2021, female-headed households in Gaza remain disproportionately affected by the impact of the military escalation and are in need of assistance to help cover basic needs and sustain their economic autonomy during emergency situations. Around 30% of women and girls faced GBV incidents before or during their displacement in Gao and 27% were raped in IDPs sites in Menaka ([Mali](#)). The exclusion of girls in [Afghanistan](#) from access to school, to social, economic, and protection activities continue to expose them to further risks.

Psychological/ emotional abuse or inflicted distress	DRC	LIBYA	PACIFIC	UKRAINE	SYRIA	BURKINA FASO
	CAR	CHAD	COLOMBIA	ETHIOPIA	IRAQ	MALI
	MOZAMBIQUE	MYANMAR	NIGER	NIGERIA	OPT	SUDAN
	YEMEN	AFGHANISTAN	CAMEROON	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	SOMALIA
	VENEZUELA	BURUNDI	HONDURAS			

oPt faces a severe mental health crisis, which has been exacerbated by recent escalation of violence across the West Bank including East Jerusalem in April 2022. The fear for life, loss of loved ones, physical injuries and wide-spread damage and destruction significantly increased the risk of psychological distress and mental disorders. In **Yemen**, the prolonged conflict and protracted displacement coupled with the insecurity, economic downturn, collapse of State institutions, and declining rule of law have led to widespread psychological distress and mental health effects. A MHPSS Working Group in **CAR** reported that 94% of people in affected localities are in need of psychosocial support. The protracted decade-long crisis in Syria, with airstrikes, shelling, armed clashes and explosive ordnance incidents continue to cause death and injury, displacement, damage to property, and destruction of civilian infrastructure, causing immense psychological distress.

Impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, siege, forced displacement	CAMEROON	UKRAINE	AFGHANISTAN	BURKINA FASO	CAR	COLOMBIA
	DRC	LIBYA	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS
	MALI	MOZAMBIQUE	MYANMAR	NIGER	NIGERIA	SUDAN
	VENEZUELA	SYRIA	CHAD	IRAQ	PACIFIC	YEMEN
	BURUNDI	SOMALIA	OPT			

In **Colombia**, there has been at least 22 mass displacement emergencies in the department of Narino and 11 displacements in the department of Cauca. Intercommunal clashes resulted in the displacement of nearly 200,000 individuals in regions of Sudan: **West Darfur, South Kordofan, West Kordofan and North Darfur**. There are 1.9 million IDPs in **Burkina Faso**, over 60% of whom are children. The main causes of displacement in **Honduras** are restrictions of movement, extortion, sexual violence and land grabbing. Between March and June, around 54,000 new IDPs were registered following fights between armed groups in Menaka. In **Myanmar**, presence of armed actors, curfews, frequent identity checks severely restrict civilian's freedom of movement. The total number of new IDPs as of June stands at 704,000. In **Syria**, restrictions on freedom of movement are reported in 51 percent of assessed communities. From January to April 2022, 80,000 people were newly displaced in **CAR**. Approximately 4,887 individuals have been displaced in **Mozambique** after the attack of villages in Ancuabe district.

Attacks on civilians, killings, attacks on civilian infrastructures	CAMEROON	DRC	ETHIOPIA	MYANMAR	UKRAINE	BURKINA FASO
	CAR	COLOMBIA	GUATEMALA	MALI	MOZAMBIQUE	NIGER
	NIGERIA	SOMALIA	SUDAN	VENEZUELA	SYRIA	LIBYA
	YEMEN	AFGHANISTAN	BURUNDI	CHAD	HONDURAS	IRAQ
	PACIFIC	EL SALVADOR	OPT			

In **West Darfur**, Sudan, at least 217 individuals were killed with a further 134 individuals sustaining injuries between 21 and 22 April in Kreniek and Ag Geinina. For the month of May 2022 alone, 110 schools and 138 health centres closed in **Burkina Faso** due to armed violence. A resurgence of attacks by non-state armed groups against civilian populations in the Sahel has been reported notably killing 79 people in Seytenga (**Burkina Faso**), as well as mass killings in Moura and Hombori (**Mali**). At least 1,700 civilian fatalities were recorded in Ethiopia since the beginning of 2022. More than half a dozen beheadings were reported from the Macomia district of **Mozambique** in May. Attacks on civilians have increased in **Nigeria** with civilians killed as they are going out to search for firewood or other livelihood opportunities. According to Health Cluster in **CAR**, 13 attacks on health facilities were reported from January to May 2022. In the second half of 2022, the number of civilian casualties in **Yemen** have dropped due to the current truce between warring parties.



Abduction, kidnapping, disappearance, arbitrary arrest, detention	UKRAINE	LIBYA	AFGHANISTAN	BURKINA FASO	CAMEROON	DRC
	MALI	MOZAMBIQUE	MYANMAR	NIGER	NIGERIA	SUDAN
	SYRIA	CAR	CHAD	COLOMBIA	ETHIOPIA	HONDURAS
	IRAQ	VENEZUELA	BURUNDI	GUATEMALA	YEMEN	EL SALVADOR
	PACIFIC	SOMALIA	OPT			

Human rights activists including IDP community leaders were subject to arbitrary arrest and detention in [Sudan](#). Incidents of abduction and kidnapping were also reported in Khartoum and Jabal Mara areas. Arbitrary arrests and detention of civilians perceived as affiliated to non-state armed groups is high in [Mali](#). Arbitrary arrests are a critical protection concern in [Myanmar](#)—civilians often arrested because of accusations or suspicions of being in contact with opposition armed groups. Kidnapping has increased especially in Adamawa state of [Nigeria](#). In the month of April 2022 itself, over 6,200 protection incidents were reported from the eastern Provinces of [DRC](#) with the majority of those incidents including abductions and kidnappings. In [CAR](#), with transport infrastructure compromised, women and girls are at a heightened risk of kidnapping. In May, IDPs from the Meluco district in [Mozambique](#) reported the kidnapping of several boys by NSAGs.

Theft, extortion, eviction or destruction of personal property	DRC	AFGHANISTAN	BURKINA FASO	CAMEROON	CHAD	GUATEMALA
	HONDURAS	LIBYA	MALI	MYANMAR	NIGER	UKRAINE
	SYRIA	CAR	COLOMBIA	EL SALVADOR	ETHIOPIA	IRAQ
	NIGERIA	PACIFIC	SUDAN	BURUNDI	MOZAMBIQUE	VENEZUELA
	YEMEN	SOMALIA	OPT			

There has been an increasing risk of mass demolitions and displacement of Bedouin and herding communities in the [Jordan Valley](#), [Jerusalem Periphery](#) and [South Hebron Hills](#). Between January and May 2022, 24% of all structures targeted in Area C were seized rather than demolished. [Chad](#) reports the theft of cattle and destruction of villages making households vulnerable. Incidents of theft including animals, extortion, eviction, looting and destruction of personal property have increased in [South](#), [West](#) and [Central Darfur](#) in [Sudan](#). In the Tanganyika province in [DR Congo](#), since April 2022, armed groups committed looting and extortion of villages. Violations of property rights by armed groups were also predominant in the 4 regions of [Niger](#). 61 percent of assessed communities in [Syria](#) report HLP concerns, including destruction, informal housing, illegal occupation of private property and lack and loss of reliable HLP documentation. In [CAR](#), 2,698 IDPs are at the risks of forced eviction after the Batangafo administrative authorities' ultimatum to IDPs to leave the site by December 2022.

Impediments/restrictions to access to documentation, remedies and justice	CAMEROON	DRC	SYRIA	AFGHANISTAN	CHAD	ETHIOPIA
	IRAQ	LIBYA	MALI	MOZAMBIQUE	SUDAN	UKRAINE
	BURKINA FASO	CAR	COLOMBIA	HONDURAS	MYANMAR	PACIFIC
	VENEZUELA	GUATEMALA	EL SALVADOR	NIGER	NIGERIA	YEMEN
	BURUNDI	SOMALIA	OPT			

Most of the population in [Chad](#) does not have civil status documents. Lack or loss of civil documentation is reported in 76 percent of assessed communities in [Syria](#) and spread across all governorates. IDPs in [Ukraine](#) face delays when receiving identity documentation including in obtaining a passport or restoring lost or damaged documents. Inability to provide the requisite identity documentation is resulting in the exclusion of IDPs from registration by the authorities and assistance. As rates of violence rises in [Sudan](#), access to justice remains limited and crime continues to be perpetrated with grave impunity. Ethiopia's Federal Government continues to prevent, or tightly restrict telecommunication and internet access.

Presence of mines, and other explosive ordnance	UKRAINE	SYRIA	AFGHANISTAN	CAR	DRC	MYANMAR
	VENEZUELA	YEMEN	BURKINA FASO	CHAD	COLOMBIA	ETHIOPIA
	IRAQ	LIBYA	MALI	NIGER	NIGERIA	OPT
	CAMEROON	HONDURAS	SUDAN	BURUNDI	GUATEMALA	MOZAMBIQUE
	PACIFIC	SOMALIA	EL SALVADOR			

Explosive devices have reappeared in urban areas of **Colombia**. From January to May 2022, 26 incidents related to improvised explosive devices were reported in **Niger** resulting in 51 casualties compared to 18 incidents in the same period in 2021 with 56 victims. Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERWs) pose a serious threat to people in **Myanmar**, where the number of casualties now stands at 100 with children representing 37% of casualties from landmine/ERW explosions. Explosive ordnance is encountered in areas affected by conflict in **Ethiopia**, including in critical infrastructure such as schools and main roads. Mines and explosive devices have been reported in the department of Fouli, in **Chad**. The monthly average number of civilian ERW casualties in **Yemen** so far this year has been 46, up 31% from the 2021 average of 35%. Approximately one in three communities in **Syria** is estimated to be contaminated by explosives. Attacks using explosive weapons in populated urban areas in **Ukraine** continue to inflict civilian casualties and cause considerable damage to essential infrastructures. Between January to May 2022, 31 incidents resulting in 36 casualties were reported in **CAR** –75% of which were civilians, with men representing 41% and children 52%.

IN FOCUS - EIGHT OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN ACCESS FOR PROTECTION

Amidst areas of real progress with strengthening protection response and outcomes, there remains one area where the protection community has collectively struggled to make meaningful steps forward: sustained, unhindered access that both enables communities caught up in crisis to obtain protection and humanitarian support, as well as enables protection actors to reach those at risk and deliver the impactful interventions that save lives and protect rights.

The ability of protection actors to reach, engage with and deliver support to populations living in crises contexts where their safety and rights are threatened remains core to realizing strengthened protection of civilians. Consistent and sustained access thus remains foundational to protection work. However, over the past several years, there has been a dramatic narrowing of humanitarian access broadly, and protection access in particular, to populations in need, especially in conflict contexts. **COVID has further accelerated this trend while a range of factors including bureaucratic and administrative restrictions imposed by State and non-State actors on humanitarian personnel and supplies, the intensity of hostilities in civilian areas targeting both civilians and civilian infrastructure, attacks on humanitarian personnel and theft of assets, and the imposition of counter-terrorism measures, amongst other factors, are all contributing.** Simply put, access remains out of reach for communities and protection actors in far too many crisis contexts today.

While the humanitarian system continues to grapple with this reality, efforts are often focused on and result in very narrow forms of access. One-off deliveries of food and other physical items are too often the assumed and accepted forms of access, while real challenges remain in terms of realizing more sustained access for protection purposes. **Access for protection is thus not a new concept but simply a way of reinforcing the needed quality of access – sustained, unhindered, unimpeded and that enables access to the full range of protection support.**

Beyond the external challenges, obstacles within the protection sector that are curtailing progress in advancing more

Access for Protection: Definition and Concept

Humanitarian access is the central and overriding problem in humanitarian action. Defined as both people's ability to reach aid and aid's ability to reach people, humanitarian access is the precondition for effective and principled emergency response. The worst conflict-driven humanitarian crises occurring today have constrained humanitarian access as a key feature, making lack of access a proxy indicator for severity of need.

Similarly, protection access can be defined as protection actors' ability to reach populations in need and affected population's access to protection services. Access is the foundation. It is not sufficient, but it is critical for protection. Humanitarian access that drives protection dividends is one that enables the full range of protection programmes and services to be delivered by local and international actors and that enables sustained protection presence in communities impacted by crisis.



sustained access include vague definitions of access and its meaning for protection and lack of metrics to evaluate it, the lack of system-wide impact of humanitarian advocacy in the counter-terror policy space, and challenges of innovating at scale beyond the traditional models.

On 1 June, the Global Protection Cluster (GPC) convened a private Expert Roundtable discussion on the topic of 'access for protection'. A range of expert participants joined, bringing diverse perspectives grounded in their experiences across a number of roles, organizations and contexts. Key insights shared during the discussion are feeding into the GPC's development of an 'agenda for change' in support of strengthened policy and practice in relation to access for protection. Based on the roundtable and other consultations the GPC has been undertaking to date, there are eight opportunities emerging that show real promise to support strengthened access for protection.

1. A more comprehensive conceptualization of access, with protection at its core.

Protection actors require sustained access that enables relationship-building, nuanced analysis of diverse needs, experiences and barriers, support for more inclusive and community-based measures, and responsive advocacy grounded in local priorities and leadership. Access? For what types of response and access to what services? For how long? For whom? It is imperative, as a sector, to move towards a more comprehensive understanding of access and a more ambitious approach in terms of what is needed to strengthen protection outcomes. This requires we move beyond narrow and fragmented views of access and protection – ensuring core concepts and related actions are grounded in the lived realities of communities impacted by crisis, rather than institutional mandates or technical definitions that aren't fit for purpose. Building on the Independent Review of the implementation of the IASC Protection Policy (May 2022), there is a potential for more explicit expansion and linking of key concepts and definitions of access around a protection-focused core. This could ensure the need for protection outcomes is clearly articulated across access related efforts and a more comprehensive understanding of access for the purposes of protection is adopted. Centering 'access for protection' as a core element of a collective agenda is crucial to achieving meaningful impact on the protection, and ultimately the lives, of people living through crisis.

2. Strengthened engagement and negotiation with armed groups around access for protection

While there are multiple drivers contributing to constrained access, it is clear that armed groups have a crucial role to play in any efforts by humanitarians to gain and expand access. The ICRC estimated that between 60-80 million people are living in territories exclusively controlled by armed groups, including in Central African Republic, South Sudan, Mali and Colombia, for instance. Being able to successfully influence the behaviours of armed groups, and ultimately secure their acceptance of humanitarian action and their related support for sustained access for protection is critical. And yet, despite the control and influence armed groups have over the daily protection of communities, a significant gap with protection responses across crisis contexts tends to be the lack of systematic engagement and negotiation with armed groups and parties to the conflict. Not only can such engagement support access for protection, it also serves to promote acceptance of humanitarian principles and action, and prevent and respond to protection concerns. However, this remains limited to a handful of protection organizations which have adopted global access and protection strategies and invested in training on negotiations and other guidance for operating in complex and hard-to-access environments. The system as a whole needs to be far more joined up, ambitious and effective in terms of how engagement with parties to the conflict, from local militia leaders to the highest levels of national governments, can be advanced in support of access for protection.

3. Investing in community self-protection and community-based protection networks and action

Across humanitarian action, while an invaluable focus on community empowerment, accountability and local leadership has grown over the past several years, there remains a tendency to frame the civilian "role" more as a beneficiary of aid. However, in situations of violence, civilians and communities engage in self-protection actions daily to keep themselves and their families safe. This routinely involves engaging with armed actors, be it to negotiate safe passage for the children of a community under siege to access the local school or to find ways to ensure access to urgently needed medical care for community members. It can also take shape as communities organizing themselves, to set up 'early warning networks' to alert others when armed groups may be approaching or women community leaders establishing peer support groups where women can provide support to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in their community. Within the current humanitarian system, there is limited technical guidance, no common standards and little visibility of community self-protection work at global level and missed opportunities in terms of how to further strengthen such efforts at country level. Further supporting and enabling their access and protection action should be the cornerstone of all access negotiations and advocacy across the humanitarian sector.

4. Shift power and invest in local leadership on access for protection

Rigidity of humanitarian system(s) is a major challenge, including when trying to enable local leadership on access for protection considerations. Donor requirements often drive short term actions focused on service delivery and tangible outputs, while creating disincentives for investment in other forms of protection, including engagement with communities and armed groups, and proactive presence. There is a need to support increased localization and local agency via flexible and empowering funding relationships and partnerships that are grounded in more equitable sharing of risk and, importantly, of power. We must also nuance the role of internationals and approach on a more case-by-case basis to understand where an adequate international presence is helpful and where it may be stifling community-led responses, and how to achieve complementary roles in light of context specific dynamics.

5. Ensuring humanitarian systems and diplomatic support all geared towards a shared aim of access for protection

There is a need to strengthen complementary and collaborative approaches to access for protection, building on the comparative advantages of different actors across the humanitarian system. Importantly, such approaches need to be grounded in the recognition that it is not just insecurity or logistical constraints that are narrowing access in many contexts but also often bureaucratic impediments, attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, language and cultural barriers, and other barriers, all requiring a multi-faceted approach across humanitarian programmes and diplomacy. There is an opportunity to look into existing humanitarian access systems and processes to further integrate a protection lens, gearing its focus towards the protection of civilians. Humanitarian Country Team, embassies and donors, OCHA-led coordination mechanisms, faith actors, UN missions and global humanitarian leadership – all have a leadership role supporting and complementing such efforts; leveraging their points of influence in support of access for protection.

6. Establishing a global monitoring and reporting system to track quality of access in crisis contexts and support greater transparency and accountability

The current global access monitoring system⁸ collects and analyses data on the impact of access constraints on the humanitarian response. Along with information on specific incidents that restrict access (through nine types/indicators of access constraints), the global monitoring system supports the recording of information on formal or informal policies instituted by State and non-State actors that restrict access as well as of actions taken to address constraints and outcomes to establish or enhance humanitarian access. Building on this system, we must integrate a protection lens, taking into account the range of protection services communities can regularly access and the ability of protection actors to access communities and deliver protection interventions. Ultimately, the global access monitoring system should be looking beyond 'red/green roads' to track access across a set of broader indicators that help measure quality of access.

7. Advancing advocacy in support of access for protection

Robust advocacy on protection issues is critical in terms of protection actors' ability to call attention to and help stop rights abuses. This includes the criticality of advocacy in contributing to expanded, quality access for protection purposes. And yet, in many crisis contexts around the world today, advocacy continues to be perceived and assumed as a 'risk' that may undermine access and protection. Many operational organizations are weary of 'speaking up' for fear of having their operations 'shut down'. Such perceptions often then result in a sort of self-censoring on the part of humanitarian actors, with a reluctance to use the broad range of advocacy tools that exist to support protection, including access for protection. With both advocacy and access as foundational for effective protection response, we must find ways to better navigate and manage and, ultimately, leverage these elements in support of strengthened access for protection.

8. When some access is possible, get better at layering in protection elements


While it may be the trucks delivering food assistance to a community in northern Ethiopia, or a convoy transporting medicine crossline in Syria that are the most visible access related 'wins', this must be the tip of the iceberg in terms of how across the humanitarian sector we leverage narrow windows of access to layer in protection elements. When even very minimal access is possible, we need to ensure a systematic approach to maximizing all possible protection elements: Who is on the truck that is delivering food and can a protection officer join? Who is spoken to at checkpoints, and can there be any engagement with armed actors, community leaders and populations at risk? Can information in local languages be shared together with the material assistance? Ultimately, this is about recognizing how constrained access often is, and doing as much as possible to leverage and expand this access by layering in and supporting protection elements. We must pursue creative and nimble efforts in terms of how we integrate protection into any small access-related openings that be present themselves, while continuing to engage in negotiations and advocacy for more sustained access.



Building on the ‘expert roundtable’, the GPC will convene a ‘donor roundtable’ and a ‘practitioner roundtable’ in the coming months, further contributing to the GPC’s core understanding of access for protection related issues and ways forward. The GPC will organize its annual thematic forum in October 2022 around the issue of access for protection, convening discussions with field colleagues and local actors, and workshops on related challenges, promising practices, new evidence and learning. Based on the series of roundtables, the thematic forum as well as further discussions, consultation and engagement with a range of protection, advocacy and access stakeholders, the GPC will develop an ‘agenda for change’ in 2022 based on priority policy and practice related changes that will support strengthened access for protection outcomes. There is a need to collectively rally behind the current humanitarian leadership; championing private diplomacy, strong advocacy, access negotiation, and conflict mediation, as core to humanitarian action.

PROTECTION ACCESS

Protection access refers to the ability of protection actors to reach affected people, as well as the ability of affected people to access protection assistance and services in a timely and unimpeded manner.



Access by protection actors to affected population

During the reporting period, Protection Clusters report that the access situation by protection actors to affected populations remained similar in most operations (59%), while it deteriorated in **Burkina Faso, CAR, Colombia, DRC, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Ukraine** and **Yemen**. The access situation improved only in the **Pacific and Somalia**.

Most operations report that between 25% and 50% of affected populations can be reached by protection actors. **Ethiopia** and **Sudan** operations report that it can reach a mere 25% of affected population, while only **Iraq** and **Guatemala** report that it can reach 75% or more of affected populations. 5 operations (**Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Honduras** and **Niger**) can reach between 50% and 75% of affected populations.

Percentage of affected population that can be reached by protection actors				
>75%	75-50%	50-25%	<25%	Do not know
Iraq, Guatemala	Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Honduras, Niger, Mozambique	Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, Chad, Colombia, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pacific, Somalia, Venezuela, Syria, Yemen	Ethiopia, Sudan	oPt, Ukraine


The most critical barriers for protection actors to reach affected population relate to:

- ↑ On-going insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance (incl. presence of landmines, IEDs, ERW, UXOs) for 20 operations
- ↑ Environmental and logistical constraints for 14 operations
- ▬ Bureaucratic and administrative constraints for 13 operations
- ↑ Direct attacks or threats against protection actors, facilities and assets for 13 operations
- ▬ Interference into implementation of protection activities from local authorities or non-state actors for 11 operations.

Direct attacks or threats against protection actors, facilities and assets as the most critical barriers for protection actors to access affected population has increased compared to the last reporting period, reported now across 13 operations compared to 9 in March 2022.

Operations updates: Hostile surveillance, blockage of medical missions, attacks on educational institutions, and the destruction of vehicles belonging to humanitarian organizations have been occurring in regions under dispute between armed actors in Colombia. Due to the deteriorated security situation in **Sudan** and the announcement of the state of emergency, protection actors were not able to conduct protection monitoring or ensure protection by presence. In **Yemen**, the protection response is undermined by the regular interferences by the authorities on protection monitoring, verification and assessments as well as the partners' low access, presence and capacity in specialized protection programming, such as child protection, mine risk education and women empowerment. A new legislative framework for NGOs in **Niger** has caused access constraints for some NGO. Government restrictions in **Syria** prevent direct implementation of several activities related especially to legal assistance and case management. Presence and access of humanitarian actors in occupied territories of **Ukraine** is practically non-existent, obstructing engagement with the affected population in order to assess needs as well as deliver protection services. The humanitarian and operational environment remains extremely unpredictable in **Nigeria**. Security has improved significantly in parts of Adamawa and Yobe States but in Borno State, all the major supply routes are dangerous for civilians and humanitarian workers, as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance by road. Humanitarian access for protection partners remained a topmost constraint in **Myanmar**, as the country's overall security and political situation continued to deteriorate. Administrative hindrances in obtaining travel authorizations (TAs), ongoing safety and security risks (because of road closure, ongoing fighting, restriction of movement by armed actors) and constraints on engagement hindered humanitarian access. The violence in **Northern Ethiopia** has subsided during the second quarter of 2022. At the end of March, the parties announced a humanitarian truce, resulting in a significant improvement in the flow of aid supplies into Tigray through road convoys from the neighbouring Afar region. Humanitarian operations in Tigray are still hindered by the shortage of fuel and the suspension of cash, electricity and communication services by the Federal Government

Trends in access situation for affected populations to protection services



Access by affected populations to protection services

During the reporting period, Protection Clusters report that access situation for affected populations to protection services has remained similar in 67% of our operations. The situation deteriorated in **Burkina Faso, DRC, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Ukraine, Yemen**. Only in **Somalia** and the **Pacific** did the situation improved.

Most operations (56%) report that between 25% and 50% of the affected population can reach protection services. In **Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sudan** a mere 25% or less of the affected population can reach protection services. Only in **Iraq** and **Guatemala** can 75% or more of the affected population reach protection services.

Percentage of affected populations that can reach protection services

>75%	75-50%	50-25%	<25%	Do not know
Iraq, Guatemala	Honduras	Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pacific, Somalia, Venezuela, Syria, Yemen	Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan	Cameroon, oPt, Ukraine



The most critical barriers for affected populations to access protection services relate to:

- ↑ Unavailability of protection services for 21 operations
- ↑ Ongoing insecurity or hostilities for 18 operations
- ↑ Direct attacks or threats against affected populations for 16 operations
- ↑ Environmental and logistical constraints for 15 operations
- ▨ Restriction and obstruction of access to protection services by local authorities and non-state actors for 12 operations


The unavailability of services as the most critical barriers for affected populations to access protection services has increased compared to last reporting period, reported now across 21 operations compared to 15 in March 2022.

Operations updates: Protection partners are struggling to cope with the increased needs in the context of a deteriorating environment in the **West Bank** in recent months, while at the same time, movement and access restrictions and the general escalation of violence has significantly impeded the delivery of protection services in hotspots, particularly for services requiring longer term or sustained interventions such as MHPSS. Increasing unrest and longstanding occupation-related policies (physical and administrative measures) in the West Bank continues to impact access to services and hindering ability of humanitarian actors to deliver services. In **Mali**, the ECOWAS embargo continues to heavily impact on the economic situation pushing affected population to develop coping mechanisms with negative impact on their protection situation. In **Niger**, violent extremism and the activism of armed groups restricts people’s access to basic social services and means of subsistence. Contamination by explosive ordnance in **Syria** limits the safe movements of civilians trying to access services and of humanitarian actors trying to deliver assistance. The access situation remains challenging in some parts of **Afghanistan** as restrictions continue to hamper access to humanitarian aid, mainly with regard to access for women as well as sites contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war. From January to March 2022, out of a total of 38 incidents affecting humanitarian activities in **CAR**, 29 were violence against people, property and community infrastructure. These various constraints make any movement of people or goods complicated, costly, long and dangerous

Efforts undertaken

The nature of protection work, in supporting individuals to access their rights, requires sustained presence and engagement with communities, duty-bearers and armed actors. Protection Clusters report enhanced engagement with OCHA-led coordination forum (e.g. Access WG, CMCoord) to strengthen common analysis, identify priority issues for joint action and tailor approaches to negotiations and advocacy. Protection Cluster also report engaging with HC/HCT, UN Agencies, and national or local authorities on access for protection. Types of efforts undertaken to enable access for protection includes monitoring/tracking access (22 operations), global advocacy (13 operations), and negotiation with duty bearers/armed actors (11 operations).

Operations updates: Issues related to humanitarian access are central to the discussion of the HCT in **Colombia**. A Humanitarian Access Working Group has been created, with which progress is being made in training and recruitment processes for the territorial teams.




FIELD COORDINATION AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSE

In Q2 2022, the GPC wrapped up its 2022 regional technical forums. The forums were organized around standard sessions across all regions focusing on three global priorities of the GPC: the Field Coordination Package, protection analysis and advocacy, other key technical issues such as localisation, disability inclusion and service mapping, as well as sessions with regional bureaux. The workshops were attended by 267 staff from field clusters and AoR joined by regional and global colleagues, partners, and donors. The report featuring key take-aways, and commitments for action from field operations, as well as highlights from each forum is available [here](#).

The GPC also launched its mid-year funding data collection exercise. 23 field operations directly contributed data from more than 550 operational partners – more than double the amount of data received compared to the 2021 mid-year exercise; and reporting 833 million USD in protection funding – here two doubling the funding reported last year. The data collected contributed to the publication of the GPC 2022 Mid-Year funding report [Where do we stand mid-year 2022? A spotlight on operational access for protection](#).

DELIVER ESSENTIAL QUALITY SERVICES TO POPULATIONS IN NEED


Good Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Weak



Protection partners continue to deliver critical life-saving protection services despite dire operational contexts and low level of funding significantly impacting the coverage of essential protection services. As a result, almost half of field operations report that most of their services reach less than 30% of target populations or are not implemented at all. Yet, despite those challenges, in 11% of field operations most services remain available to more than 65% of target populations.

COORDINATE SERVICE DELIVERY


Good Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Weak



All operations have a system tracking who is doing what, where and when, to track progress and coverage of activities. The GPC is engaging field operations to launch a new monitoring tool to enhance the quality and timeliness of information shared by partners for the 5W. About 2/3 of operations have services mapping and referral pathways in place. Nevertheless, progress remains to be made to ensure greater coverage, harmonization and information sharing within the cluster and with other clusters.

INFORM HUMANITARIAN STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING


Good Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Weak



With protection analysis as a key priority for the GPC, 2/3 of field operations report having protection monitoring and needs assessments systems in place. 81% of operations report undertaking joint and collective protection analysis. However, only half do it at least on a quarterly basis and produce regular reports. Operations providing regular briefings to HCT has increased to 77%, with most of them with positive results in influencing HCT decision making.

PLAN AND IMPLEMENT CLUSTERS STRATEGIES

Good Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Weak




Strategic planning remains a strong point of field operations. Virtually all field operations have a specific strategy. All promoted the Centrality of Protection in inter-sectoral and other clusters' needs analysis and planning, and report at least some level of success.

All operations engage in interagency funding processes such as Pooled Funds and CERF. Most operations actively engage in durable solutions processes. Although still limited, operations show good practices in engaging with development and peace actors.




MONITOR AND EVALUATE RESPONSE




76% of operations conduct reviews of progress against objectives, targets and requirements, 2/3 of those do it at least quarterly. However, there are important gaps in relation to mechanisms to monitor the quality of protection services. 60% of field operations completed their 2020 CCPM process with active participation and contributions from operational partners marking a major increase from previous years.

BUILD NATIONAL CAPACITIES IN PREPAREDNESS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING




More attention needs to be given to ensuring preparedness and contingency plans, with a strong component of localisation through capacity building of local authorities, civil society, local partners and communities for different type of recurrent hazards (i.e., conflict/violence, natural hazards, diseases outbreaks). During this quarter, the GPC published a new guidance and toolkit for field cluster operations on disaster and climate change preparedness to build on good practice and provide relevant guidance to enhance preparedness in field operations.

SUPPORT ROBUST ADVOCACY




Most operations produce regular advocacy briefing notes and reports. Almost all operations contribute to HCT advocacy messaging, with half of them contributing or systematically advising the HCT on advocacy. About half of field operations conduct multilateral meetings with donors, but only a third at least quarterly. The GPC conducted dedicated advocacy sessions during the Regional Forum with field operations to strengthen advocacy processes, targets and messaging.

ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED POPULATIONS AND STRONG ENGAGEMENT WITH COMMUNITIES



3/4 of operations report facilitating training for partners on Code of Conduct, PSEA or Child Safeguarding. Less than half required adherence to at least one of those policies as a condition for cluster membership. A quarter of field operations report facilitating trainings on AAP and feedback mechanisms highlighting lingering lack of clarity on the role of the cluster on AAP. Finally, while rights awareness-raising and community-based protection constitute some of the strongest programming in field operations, only 23% have developed harmonized approaches for community engagement and RCCE.

CLUSTER RESOURCES AND LEADERSHIP




Effective protection coordination requires dedicated resources, appropriate structures, and collective ways of working. 72% of field Protection Clusters & Sectors have a dedicated coordinator and 55% have a dedicated IMO (up from 38%). These numbers are balanced by lower number of coordinators (55%) and IMOs (28%) on FTA leading to high turnover and regular gaps in field capacity and resulting in reliance on short-term deployments. Half of field operations have established UN-NGO co-coordination.

The Global Protection Cluster is a network of NGOs, international organizations and UN agencies, engaged in protection work in humanitarian crises including armed conflict, climate change related and natural disaster. The GPC ensures well-coordinated, effective and principled protection preparedness and responses, and that protection is at the core of all humanitarian action and recognized as essential in any nexus with development and peace. The GPC unites members, partners and communities working on the full gamut of protection activities, including in four specialized Areas of Responsibility: Child Protection, Gender-Based Violence (GBV), Housing, Land and Property and Mine Action. The GPC contributes to and benefits from the broader IASC system.



GPC National Protection Cluster 2022

Global Protection Cluster



LEAD & CO-COORDINATING AGENCIES & ORGANIZATIONS





Endnotes

- 1 <https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises-in-2021/>
- 2 <https://protectingeducation.org/publication/education-under-attack-2022/>
- 3 <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/2022/06/21/gpc-protection-funding-mid-year-review-2022/>
- 4 <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/operational-response/independent-review-implementation-iasc-protection-policy>
- 5 IDMC Report 2022.
- 6 [How the Ukraine crisis is fueling a “perfect storm” for food insecurity - World | ReliefWeb](#)
- 7 [PAU-South-Sudan-Jan_March-2022.pdf \(globalprotectioncluster.org\)](#), Pg 11.
- 8 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/OCHA_Access_Monitoring_and_Reporting_Framework_OCHA_revised_May2012.pdf

