



GLOBAL PROTECTION UPDATE

OCTOBER 2026



**PROTECTION IN TIMES OF CONSTRAINT: REDUCING
HARM, PRESERVING DIGNITY**

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


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1. Executive Summary



In 2026, humanitarian crises continue to be driven by protracted and escalating armed conflicts, political and social fragmentation, forced displacement, climate and disaster-related shocks, and the erosion of accountability and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights. The [GPC 2026 Protection of Civilians Advocacy Note](#) highlights a particularly dangerous convergence: unlawful or prohibited methods of warfare such as siege, child recruitment and conflict-related sexual violence are increasingly combined with advanced technologies, notably armed drones, creating new and multiplying risks for civilians. The growing use of drones and other technologies is changing the scale, speed and reach of attacks, while siege tactics and deliberate deprivation continue to expose civilians to hunger and displacement. Together, these trends point to a continued weakening of IHL compliance and an urgent need for stronger accountability, renewed humanitarian diplomacy, and protection-centred responses that prevent harm as well as respond to its consequences.

An estimated 351 million people were exposed to protection risks in December 2025 (a figure that has risen to 418 million by October 2026), with 139 million people in need of protection and approximately 51 million targeted for protection assistance in 2026 Humanitarian Response Plans. Across the 3,857 subnational areas assessed, 1,630 (42%) are multi-risk hotspots – showing the combination of severe or extreme level of risks. The Humanitarian Reset’s call to focus on the most urgent needs requires explicit attention to the severity and combination of protection risks. The subnational protection analysis is critical to inform prioritisation, resources and protection action, and should be strongly considered in the upcoming Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans.

This year has also seen a succession of new or sharply deteriorating emergencies. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus has become the country’s largest outbreak on record, spreading across six provinces amid insecurity, displacement and constrained access to essential services. In Venezuela and Colombia, two major earthquakes have added a sudden-onset disaster dimension to an already complex protection environment. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, renewed escalation has heightened risks for civilians and displaced populations. The protection situation in the oPt remains critical, with civilians exposed to ongoing violence and severe restrictions on access to essential services in Gaza and escalating settler violence in the West Bank. In the Sahel, the conflict in Mali has sharply deteriorated in April with a succession of major attacks, while in Sudan the fighting has increasingly concentrated on El Obeid and the wider Kordofan region, where civilians face severe risks from violence, displacement, deprivation and attacks affecting essential infrastructure.

The contraction in humanitarian financing is now directly affecting the ability of protection actors to prevent and respond to harm. The GPC’s [Protection Capacities Under Pressure](#) report, based on consultations across 22 operations, shows that funding cuts are reducing staffing, geographic scope and presence, community engagement, referrals and the ability to identify and respond to protection risks. Overall, the protection sector has received \$1.3 billion against a \$2.8 billion requirement in 2026. At the same time, the US has committed significant resources, including an initial US\$2 billion commitment to OCHA-managed pooled funds, followed by a further US\$1.8 billion in 2026. These allocations demonstrate the potential of large-scale funding to sustain life-saving action, but the GPC advocacy remains clear: funding must be adequate, flexible, predictable, and must reach protection activities and local actors beyond material assistance.

Protection matters – to the safety, rights and dignity of crisis-affected people – and it works: preventing and reducing violence, providing life-saving supports and delivering survivor-centred care. Across contexts where Protection Clusters are operational, the vital role that civilian-centred protection plays has been front and centre across response efforts in 2026 as levels of violence, displacement and deprivation accelerate while protection actors persist in working for and with communities to respond to threats, reduce vulnerabilities and grow protection capacities. Protecting these capacities, even in a moment of severe constraints, is essential to prevent harm and ensuring that humanitarian action achieves meaningful outcomes for those most at risk.

GUIDE TO PROTECTION RISKS CATEGORIES

Protection risks in this report are presented using abbreviated labels for ease of reference. The table below sets out the corresponding full terminology, consistent with the GPC standard protection risk categories. Each reported risk reflects context-specific analysis and may encompass one or more forms of violence, coercion or deliberate deprivation within the scope of its standard definition. The definitions are set out in the [Protection Risks Explanatory Note](#). Related human rights violations and considerations are outlined in the accompanying [Human Rights Analysis Matrix](#).

ICON	LABEL	PROTECTION RISK
	ABDUCTION & DETENTION	Abduction, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary or unlawful arrest and/or detention
	ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS	Attacks on civilians and other unlawful killings, and attacks on civilian objects
	DISCRIMINATION	Discrimination and stigmatization, denial of resources, opportunities, services and/or humanitarian access
	DISINFORMATION	Disinformation and denial of access to information
	FAMILY SEPARATION	Child and forced family separation
	FORCED RECRUITMENT	Forced recruitment and association of children with armed forces and groups
	GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	Gender-based violence
	LEGAL IDENTITY	Impediments and/or restrictions to access to legal identity, remedies and justice
	FORCED MARRIAGE	Child, early or forced marriage
	MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT	Unlawful impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, siege, and forced displacement
	PRESENCE OF MINES	Presence of mines and other explosive ordnance
	PSYCHOSOCIAL	Psychological/emotional abuse or inflicted distress
	THEFT & EVICTION	Theft, extortion, forced eviction or destruction of personal property
	TORTURE & CRUELTY	Torture or cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment
	TRAFFICKING & LABOUR	Trafficking in Persons, Forced Labour or Slavery-Like Practices

2. Global Protection Trends



418 M.
**PEOPLE EXPOSED TO
PROTECTION RISKS**

Exposure to protection risks continues to increase, underscoring the worsening protection environment at the centre of crises. As of October 2026, Protection Clusters estimate that **418 million people are exposed to protection risks across 22 countries**, compared with 395 million across 23 operations last year. While differences in coverage require caution in interpreting this increase, the figures indicate the sustained scale of threats arising from **violence, coercion and deliberate deprivation**.

Across crises, overlapping risks threaten lives, undermine people’s safety and dignity, and weaken their ability to recover. Addressing these threats remains central to humanitarian action and requires sustained political engagement and accountability. These projections will be refined as Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs) are finalised. The map below shows the proportion of the crisis-affected population exposed to protection risks in each country. A detailed data breakdown is provided as annex.





Figure 1 - Global overview of people exposed to protection risks and hotspots.
The percentages represent the share of affected population exposed to protection risks

The regional breakdown covers 22 countries: **West and Central Africa** (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria); **East and Southern Africa** (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan); **Europe and the Middle East** (Palestine, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen); **the Americas** (Colombia, Haiti and Venezuela); and **Asia** (Afghanistan and Myanmar).



SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS AT NATIONAL LEVEL

The table below provides a global snapshot of the combination of the 15 protection risks across 22 operations and where severe or extreme risks occur at the same time, using a scale from minor (1) to extreme (5). The picture is striking: 18 of 22 operations report at least one severe or extreme protection risk, and 15 operations report four or more. **The occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and Myanmar show the broadest concentration of severe protection conditions**, with the majority of risks at severe or extreme levels. In the oPt, attacks on civilians and infrastructure, displacement orders and restrictions on movement, and impediments to humanitarian access reinforce one another with people losing their homes and essential services while facing obstacles to reaching safety and assistance. Myanmar's similarly combines threats to physical safety with severe restrictions on rights and access to assistance.

Sudan, the DRC and South Sudan illustrate how violence affecting particular areas produces wider and sustained protection consequences: siege and displacement around El Fasher and Zamzam in Sudan, mass displacement following escalating violence in North and South Kivu in the DRC, and attacks on communities in Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei in South Sudan. The analysis shows that severe conditions extend beyond attacks themselves, including family separation in Sudan and South Sudan, and forced recruitment in Sudan and the DRC. These patterns underline the need to connect civilian protection efforts with support that remains accessible during displacement and after families leave the immediate area of fighting.

Region / Country		R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9	R10	R11	R12	R13	R14	R15	Risks 4/5
Americas	Colombia	1	3	2	2	2	1	4	3	3	2	3	2	1	3	3	1
	Haiti	2	4	3	3	2	2	3	4	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	2
	Venezuela	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	1	5	4	3	4	3	9
Asia	Afghanistan	4	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	3	4	3	4	4	4	10
	Myanmar	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	13
	DRC	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	3	3	8
East & Southern Africa	Ethiopia	3	3	3	4	3	2	2	4	3	4	4	3	2	3	3	4
	Mozambique	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	4	4
	Somalia	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	3	2	4	4	3	4	3	5
	South Sudan	3	4	4	4	3	2	2	4	4	2	4	4	2	1	4	8
	Sudan	3	4	4	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	3	10
Europe & Middle East	oPt	5	5	5	4	5	4	3	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	14
	Syria	2	2	3	3	2	3	2	4	3	3	4	4		3	3	3
	Yemen	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	2	4	3	2	2	3	6
	Ukraine	2	5	3	1	3	2	2	3	3	5	4	3	2	2	3	3
	Burkina Faso	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	2	3	0
West & Central Africa	Cameroon	4	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	3	2	4	7
	CAR	3	3	2	4	3	3	2	4	3	2	4	4	3	2	3	4
	Chad	3	3	1	1	4	4	1	3	1	1	4	3	1	3	3	3
	Mali	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	5
	Niger	4	4	3	4	4	3	3	4	3	2	4	4	4	3	4	9
	Nigeria	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	0

Minor (1) Stressed (2) Moderate (3) Severe (4) Extreme (5)

Protection risks abbreviations:

R1 Abduction, detention
R2 Attacks on civilians
R3 Discrimination
R4 Disinformation
R5 Family Separation

R6 Forced recruitment
R7 Gender-based violence
R8 Legal Identity
R9 Forced marriage
R10 Presence of mines

R11 Psychosocial distress
R12 Theft & eviction
R13 Torture & cruelty
R14 Trafficking & labour
R15 Movement & Displacement

Afghanistan, Niger and Ukraine also require sustained attention, although their protection situations differ. In Afghanistan, severe restrictions on women and girls' movement, education and employment limit both their independence and their access to assistance; restrictions on female humanitarian workers further weaken the response. In Niger, armed-group activity and cross-border violence are interacting with displacement, exclusion and economic hardship. The high level of severe risks indicates a breadth of harm comparable to several major conflict emergencies. Ukraine presents a different pattern: extreme for attacks on civilians and explosive ordnance show why the urgency of a country's situation cannot be judged solely by the number of risks rated severe.

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS AT SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

Protection risks vary significantly across sub-national areas, with **one in four assessed areas (25%) facing severe or extreme protection** conditions – 20% severe and 5% extreme. These findings show that various forms of violence, coercion and deprivation are worsening in many assessed areas, including those not classified as extreme severity.




Figure 2 - Percentage of subnational areas by overall severity of protection risks across all operations

The analysis also highlights significant differences within countries that national-level severity alone may not show. This is critical given that many subnational areas face multiple severe risks that require targeted prioritisation, resources and protection action, and should be strongly considered in the upcoming Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans prioritizations.




Figure 3 - Percentage of subnational areas by overall severity of protection risks by region

The analysis covers **3,857 subnational areas, an increase of 1,184 areas, or 44% compared with 2025**. Despite significant funding constraints, Protection Clusters have expanded assessment coverage by prioritising consultations with partners closest to affected populations, in an effort to ensure that local knowledge and people's perspectives remain central to understanding how risks are experienced. This shift supports a more operational approach to

protection risk analysis: moving beyond national-level trends to identify **where risks are concentrated, which populations are most exposed, and where collective action and resources are most urgently needed**. The 2026 analysis shows that **direct conflict and violence are increasingly intertwined with social and psychosocial harms**.

In **oPt**, attacks on civilians, unlawful restrictions on movement, siege and forced displacement, and psychological/emotional abuse or inflicted distress are severe or extreme across all assessed areas. In **Afghanistan**, GBV, restrictions on movement and forced displacement, inflicted distress, and discrimination are prominent across assessed areas. In **Sudan**, child, early and forced marriage and forced recruitment stand out, while **Myanmar** has severe risks involving forced recruitment alongside inflicted distress, discrimination, movement restrictions and barriers to legal identity and justice in areas assessed at sub-national level.

Ethiopia has intersecting and high levels of risk related to GBV, child marriage, inflicted distress and impediments to justice and documentation. In **South Sudan**, GBV, theft, extortion, forced eviction or destruction of property, and inflicted distress are prominent. In **Ukraine**, inflicted distress is recorded at severe levels alongside attacks on civilians and explosive-ordnance risks. In **Colombia**, forced recruitment, attacks on civilians, family separation and forced displacement overlap.

Subnational hotspots

For this analysis, a **protection hotspot** is an assessed subnational area where at least four of the 15 protection risks are rated severe or extreme (levels 4–5). The threshold of four risks is an operational cutoff used to identify the co-occurrence of severe conditions across more than one quarter of the risk categories and to provide a consistent basis for examining geographic concentrations of multiple threats¹.

Alongside overall severity, the analysis helps identify areas with the most worrying combination of severe and extreme risks. **Across the 3,857 subnational areas assessed, 1,630 (42%) are multi-risk hotspots, and 785 (20%) face eight or more severe or extreme protection risks simultaneously. In six operations, hotspots face an average of nine or more severe or extreme risks: oPt (10.2), Myanmar (10.0), Mozambique (9.7), Haiti (9.6), the DRC (9.5) and Cameroon (9.0).**

In 9 out of 22 operations – **Afghanistan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, oPt, South Sudan and Sudan** – more than half of assessed areas are hotspots. Haiti and the DRC illustrate how a narrower geographic spread of hotspots can still involve a high concentration of threats: hotspots account for 21% and 37% of their assessed areas, respectively, yet face an average of nearly 10 severe or extreme risks each.

The analysis also identified where risks reach the highest levels of concentration. **All 15 protection risks are rated severe or extreme in 35 assessed locations across Myanmar’s Chin, Magway and Sagaing; North Kivu in the DRC; West Guji in Ethiopia’s Oromia region; and parts of Somalia’s Bakool, Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle. All five assessed governorates in Gaza, as well as Al Fasher in Sudan, and Gressier and Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite in Haiti, each record 14 severe or extreme risks.**

Across all 1,630 hotspots, the most frequently rated severe or extreme risks are psychological/emotional abuse or inflicted distress (84%); gender-based violence (79%); unlawful impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, siege and forced displacement (70%); and discrimination and stigmatization, denial of resources, opportunities, services and/or humanitarian access (59%).

Severe protection risks also persist in countries preparing to transition from humanitarian coordination, with worsening conditions recorded in some subnational areas. In **Cameroon**, the average severity of protection risks increased across assessed areas in the North-West, South-West and Far North, while the number of areas facing eight or more severe or extreme risks rose from three in 2025 to ten in 2026. In **Colombia**, lower overall severity in several departments coexists with persistent severe threats: 271 assessed areas face at least four severe or extreme risks, and forced recruitment and child and forced family separation reach extreme levels across all seven assessed areas in Arauca. In **Nigeria**, seven assessed areas face an average of eight severe or extreme risks each; gaps in the previous assessment limit conclusions about changes over time. **Transitions must therefore ensure continuity of protection action wherever severe risks persist**, with clear responsibilities and sustained resources for protection monitoring, specialised services and community-based protection mechanisms.

The Humanitarian Reset’s call to focus on the most urgent needs requires explicit attention to the severity and combination of protection risks. Subnational protection analysis should inform Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans and changes in humanitarian coordination arrangements, linking identified threats to shared objectives across sectors and specialised protection interventions. Success should be assessed through reductions in people’s exposure to violence, coercion and deliberate deprivation, alongside the delivery of assistance.

The country findings that follow show where multiple severe protection risks converge and where prioritisation decisions have the greatest implications for people’s safety and rights. Donors, Member States and humanitarian leadership should use these findings to inform decisions on where assistance needs to be sustained, which protection and other capacities to reduce protection risks need to be preserved, and where diplomatic engagement is most urgently needed. Detailed subnational analysis for each country is available upon request from the Global Protection Cluster or country Protection Clusters and can be explored in the [GPC Global Dashboard](#).


¹ Each qualifying risk is counted once. The threshold is an analytical convention, not a statistically validated breakpoint or an additional severity classification. It identifies overlapping risks at area level and does not imply that the same individuals experience all of them. Areas below the threshold may still require urgent action, particularly where an individual risk is extreme.

COUNTRY	HOTSPOTS ANALYSIS: CONCENTRATION OF SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS
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The country profiles below present an overview of all assessed areas² where several severe or extreme protection risks are occurring simultaneously, providing the proportion meeting the threshold, the parts of the country where the situation is most acute and **which risks are repeatedly severe in the same locations**. The maps visualize the regions of the country with the highest percentage of hotspots.

AMERICAS

COLOMBIA



PERCENTAGE OF MUNICIPALITIES CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

36% (271/753)


HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Cauca, Putumayo, Vichada


Main hotspot areas: Cauca (13), Putumayo (13), Vichada (13)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Attacks on civilians + Forced recruitment | 92% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



HAITI



PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNES CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

21% (29/140)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Ouest, Artibonite


Main hotspot areas: Artibonite (14), Ouest (14), Centre (10)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Attacks on civilians + Theft & evictions | 86% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



VENEZUELA



PERCENTAGE OF MUNICIPALITIES CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

46% (11/24)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Sucre

Main hotspot areas: Sucre (10), Bolívar (8), Amazonas (7), Falcón (7), Zulia (7)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Family separation + Gender-based violence | 91% of hotspots


MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



² The terminology used to designate the assessed areas follows the official country nomenclature for administrative levels.

ASIA

AFGHANISTAN



PERCENTAGE OF DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

91% (416/457)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Logar

Main hotspot areas: Logar (13), Badakhshan (12), Laghman (12), Paktika (12), Panjsher (12)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: GBV + Movement & displacement | 91% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Gender-based violence
98%



Movement Displacement
93%




Psychosocial Distress
89%



Discrimination
80%

MYANMAR



PERCENTAGE OF TOWNSHIPS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

52% (186/358)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Chin, Magway, Sagaing

Main hotspot areas: Chin (15), Magway (15), Sagaing (15)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Psychosocial distress + Movement & displacement | 76% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Psychosocial Distress
90%



Forced Recruitment
83%




Movement Displacement
82%



Discrimination
79%

EAST & SOUTHERN AFRICA

DRC



PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNES CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

37% (104/278)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Nord-Kivu

Main hotspot areas: Nord-Kivu (15), Ituri (14), Sud-Kivu (14)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Gender-based violence + Psychosocial distress | 81% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Gender-based violence
91%



Psychosocial Distress
82%




Attacks on civilians
78%



Forced Recruitment
68%

ETHIOPIA



PERCENTAGE OF MUNICIPALITIES CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

71% (42/59)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Oromia

Main hotspot areas: Oromia (15), Amhara (13), Contested (13)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Forced marriage + Gender-based violence | 79% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Gender-based violence
100%



Forced Marriage
79%




Legal Identity
69%



Psychosocial Distress
67%

MOZAMBIQUE



PERCENTAGE OF DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

53% (10/19)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Cabo Delgado

Main hotspot areas: Cabo Delgado (13), Nampula (11)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Abduction & detention + Attacks on civilians | 90% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Movement
Displacement
100%



Abduction
Kidnapping
90%




Attacks on
civilians
90%



Psychosocial
Distress
90%

SOMALIA



PERCENTAGE OF DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

40% (36/90)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Lower & Middle Juba, Bakool, Lower Shabelle

Main hotspot areas: Bakool (15), Lower Juba (15), Lower Shabelle (15), Middle Juba (15)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Gender-based Violence + Psychosocial Distress | 81% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Psychosocial
Distress
97%



Gender-based
Violence
83%




Theft &
Evictions
69%



Trafficking &
Labour
67%

SOUTH SUDAN



PERCENTAGE OF COUNTIES CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

54% (43/79)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Abyei Administrative Area

Main hotspot areas: Abyei Administrative Area (14), Jonglei (13), Upper Nile (13)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Gender-based violence + Theft & evictions | 84% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Gender-based
violence
93%



Theft &
Eviction
91%




Psychosocial
Distress
84%



Forced
Marriage
72%

SUDAN



PERCENTAGE OF LOCALITIES CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

56% (106/188)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

North Darfur

Main hotspot areas: North Darfur (14), Blue Nile (13), Central Darfur (11), North Kordofan (11)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Forced marriage + Forced recruitment | 80% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Forced
Marriage
92%



Forced
Recruitment
87%



Gender-based
Violence
62%



Family
Separation
55%

EUROPE & MIDDLE EAST

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES



PERCENTAGE OF GOVERNORATE CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

100% (16/16)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Gaza Strip

Main hotspot areas: Gaza Strip (14), West Bank (11)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Attacks on civilians + Psychosocial distress | 100% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Attacks on
civilians
100%



Psychosocial
Distress
100%




Movement
Displacement
100%



Presence of
mines
94%

SYRIA



PERCENTAGE OF DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

12% (31/262)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Al-Hasakeh

Main hotspot areas: Al-Hasakeh (8), Aleppo (7), Ar-Raqqa (7)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Family separation + Psychosocial distress | 45% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Trafficking &
Labour
71%



Legal
Identity
65%




Gender-based
Violence
61%



Psychosocial
Distress
61%

YEMEN



PERCENTAGE OF DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

48% (161/335)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Hajjah

Main hotspot areas: Hajjah (13), Ad Dali' (12), Aden (12), Ta'iz (12)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Gender-based violence + Psychosocial distress | 89% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Gender-based
Violence
71%



Psychosocial
Distress
65%




Legal
Identity
61%



Discrimination
61%

UKRAINE



PERCENTAGE OF REGIONS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

25% (6/24)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Khersonska

Main hotspot areas: Khersonska (8), Donetsk (7), Kharkivska (7)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Attacks on civilians + Gender-based violence | 100% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Attacks on
Civilians
100%



Gender-based
Violence
100%




Presence of
mines
100%



Psychosocial
Distress
100%

WEST & CENTRAL AFRICA

BURKINA FASO



PERCENTAGE OF DEPARTMENTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

6% (19/335)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Soum, Liptako

Main hotspot areas: Liptako (9), Soum (9), Yaadga (5)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Psychosocial distress + Movement & displacement | 95% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Movement
Displacement
100%



Psychosocial
Distress
95%




Forced
Marriage
89%



Gender-
based
Violence
89%

CAMEROON



PERCENTAGE OF DIVISIONS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

52% (16/31)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

North-West

Main hotspot areas: North-West (12), Far North (11), South-West (7)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Gender-based violence + Psychosocial distress | 100% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Gender-based
Violence
100%



Psychosocial
Distress
95%




Legal
Identity
89%



Abduction &
Detention
89%

CAR



PERCENTAGE OF SUB-PREFECTURES CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

29% (25/85)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Haut-Mbomou

Main hotspot areas: Haut-Mbomou (14), Ouham (9), Ouham Pendé (9)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Gender-based violence + Psychosocial distress | 100% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Movement
Displacement
100%



Psychosocial
Distress
100%



Theft &
Eviction
84%



Forced
Marriage
76%

CHAD



PERCENTAGE OF DEPARTMENTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

27% (19/70)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Lac

Main hotspot areas: Lac (11), Wadi Fira (6), Mandoul (5), Ouaddaï (5), Sila (5)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Discrimination + Disinformation | 84% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Discrimination
84%



Disinformation
84%




Psychosocial
Distress
84%



Gender-based
Violence
68%

MALI



PERCENTAGE OF DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

31% (49/157)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Tombouctou, Bandiagara

Main hotspot areas: Bandiagara (13), Tombouctou (13), Menaka (11)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Gender-based violence + Psychosocial distress | 78% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Psychosocial Distress
98%



Gender-based Violence
78%




Discrimination
71%



Theft & Eviction
71%

NIGER



PERCENTAGE OF DEPARTMENTS CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

55% (27/49)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Diffa

Main hotspot areas: Diffa (14), Tillabéri (13), Maradi (12)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Forced marriage + Gender-based violence | 81% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Gender-based Violence
89%



Psychosocial Distress
85%




Theft & Eviction
85%



Forced Marriage
81%

NIGERIA



PERCENTAGE OF LGAs CLASSIFIED AS HOTSPOTS

15% (7/48)

HIGHEST OCCURENCE OF SEVERE/EXTREME RISKS

Borno

Main hotspot areas: Borno (13), Yobe (8), Adamawa (5)

DOMINANT COMBINATION: Abduction & detention + Attacks on civilians | 71% of hotspots

MOST RECURRENT SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS IN HOTSPOTS



Gender-based Violence
86%



Abduction Detention
71%



Attacks on Civilians
71%



Psychosocial Distress
71%

GLOBAL PROTECTION RISKS MONITORING OVERVIEW

Protection analysis provides a core evidence base for operationalising the Centrality of Protection, including in Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs), in line with the Humanitarian Reset's commitment to place protection at the centre of humanitarian action. Embedded in the Protection Cluster's joined-up approach to analysis, the assessment of the 15 protection risks is intended to support intersectoral analysis and collective response priorities³.

PROTECTION RISK	MINOR	STRESSED	MODERATE	SEVERE	EXTREME
ABDUCTION, DETENTION	1	4	10	6	1
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS	0	2	11	7	2
DISCRIMINATION	0	4	9	8	1
DISINFORMATION	1	4	11	6	0
FAMILY SEPARATION	1	3	13	4	1
FORCED RECRUITMENT	1	6	10	4	1
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	0	0	5	16	1
LEGAL IDENTITY	1	2	10	8	1
FORCED MARRIAGE	2	3	6	10	1
MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT	0	0	14	7	1
PRESENCE OF MINES	2	9	5	4	2
PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS	0	0	5	14	3
THEFT & EVICTION	0	3	8	10	1
TORTURE & CRUELTY	3	6	7	5	0
TRAFFICKING & LABOUR	1	8	9	4	0

Table 1 - Number of countries by reported national severity



PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES REPORTING PROTECTION RISKS

	ABDUCTION DETENTION	ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS	DISCRIMINATION	DISINFORMATION	FAMILY SEPARATION	FORCED MARRIAGE	FORCED RECRUITMENT	GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	LEGAL IDENTITY	MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT	PRESENCE OF MINES	PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS	THEFT & EVICTION	TORTURE & CRUELTY	TRAFFICKING & LABOUR
OCT 24	100%	100%	96%	96%	100%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%
OCT 25	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	100%	96%	100%	96%	100%	96%	96%	96%	100%	100%
OCT 26	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%	100%	100%



PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES REPORTING PROTECTION RISKS AS SEVERE OR EXTREME

	ABDUCTION DETENTION	ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS	DISCRIMINATION	DISINFORMATION	FAMILY SEPARATION	FORCED MARRIAGE	FORCED RECRUITMENT	GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	LEGAL IDENTITY	MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT	PRESENCE OF MINES	PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS	THEFT & EVICTION	TORTURE & CRUELTY	TRAFFICKING & LABOUR
OCT 24	48%	64%	52%	24%	28%	40%	52%	88%	52%	72%	44%	64%	56%	28%	32%
OCT 25	43%	59%	26%	26%	26%	46%	30%	71%	48%	58%	45%	61%	43%	25%	17%
OCT 26	32%	41%	41%	27%	23%	50%	23%	77%	41%	36%	27%	77%	50%	24%	18%

³ Protection risk severity is assessed through the [Protection Cluster Joined-Up Approach to Protection Analysis](#) combining available evidence with expert judgement elicitation and partner consultations, including at subnational level. Using common definitions and severity criteria, each of the risks is assessed on a five-point scale: minor (1), stressed (2), moderate (3), severe (4) and extreme (5). Analysis considers threats, their effects on affected populations and existing capacities, guided by the Protection Analytical Framework. Assessment modalities are adapted to each context and data availability. Risk severity is distinct from the calculation of severity of needs and People in Need.




ABDUCTION, KIDNAPPING, ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE, ARBITRARY OR
UNLAWFUL ARREST AND/OR DETENTION

In 2026, abduction, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance continue to emerge as significant protection risks for civilians across crisis contexts. Armed groups and authorities are using abduction and detention as tools of territorial control, punishment, financing and intimidation, with men and boys particularly targeted and impacted. At the same time, the accountability gap, lack of due process, unlawful or prolonged detention and restricted access to families and legal support compound the harms. The impact extends beyond those directly affected, entrenching fear and impunity, restricting freedom of movement and disrupting access to essential services and humanitarian assistance.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	oPt
4	Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger
3	Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Chad, Nigeria, Somalia, Central African Republic, Yemen
2	Syria, Burkina Faso, Ukraine, Haiti
1	Colombia

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In the **oPt**, more than 22,300 Palestinians have been detained by Israeli forces since October 2023, predominantly affecting men and boys, who face heightened exposure to detention during night raids and military operations, limited access to family or legal support, and enduring fear and stigma after release. In **Cameroon**, violence increased in Mayo Tsanaga in the Far North during June. Armed actors targeted civilians, looted goods and used kidnapping for ransom to raise funds. Reported kidnappings (310 cases) tripled compared with the same period in 2025. In **Colombia's** Sierra Nevada, 160 people were recorded disappeared between September 2025 and February 2026, alongside increased extortive kidnappings used for territorial control and armed-group financing. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, kidnappings, arbitrary arrests remain recurring risks for civilians in Ituri. Mass kidnappings were reported during ADF attacks on villages in Mambasa, alongside children's exposure to abduction. In Haiti, kidnapping for ransom perpetrated by armed groups remains a significant protection risk, exposing victims and families to prolonged deprivation of liberty, extortion, psychological distress and physical and sexual violence during captivity. In **Yemen**, 73 humanitarian personnel remain arbitrarily detained by the Houthi de facto authorities; some were held incommunicado and one had died in detention. In **Sudan**, abductions and enforced disappearances targeted lawyers and human rights defenders for carrying out their professional duties; arbitrary detention and abduction for ransom were also reported among the threats facing civilians during displacement and restricted movement. In **South Sudan**, four humanitarian workers transporting critical Ebola-preparedness supplies were abducted by unidentified armed men along the Yei–Lasu Road in Central Equatoria State in August.



ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND OTHER UNLAWFUL KILLINGS, AND ATTACKS ON
CIVILIAN OBJECTS

With 90% of clusters operating in a context affected by conflict and armed violence, attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure remain among the most severe and widespread protection risks reported in 2026. Across contexts, civilians continue to bear the direct and indirect consequences of attacks, including death and injury, displacement, trauma and the loss of homes, livelihoods and access to essential services. The rapidly increasing use of armed drones by state and non-state actors across multiple conflict contexts is having particularly devastating impacts. This escalation includes direct attacks on civilians as well as on humanitarian operations and civilian infrastructure. In a further concerning trend, attacks are affecting an increasingly wide array of civilian infrastructure that people depend on for survival and protection, including schools, hospitals, homes, markets, water and energy facilities, and displacement sites.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	Ukraine, oPt
4	Sudan, South Sudan, Cameroon, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Haiti
3	Mozambique, Afghanistan, Mali, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Colombia, Chad, Nigeria, Somalia, CAR, Yemen
2	Syria, Burkina Faso
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Sudan**, more than 1,000 civilians were killed by drone strikes between January and May, representing about 80% of recorded civilian deaths during that period. Drone attacks around El Obeid struck houses, schools, a market, fuel facilities, water points and the main power station. At least 141 attacks were reported in North Kordofan through 8 July, more than half since June, causing casualties and disrupting water, healthcare, transport and humanitarian operations. In **Afghanistan**, renewed cross-border hostilities with Pakistan caused significant civilian harm in June, including at least 41 civilian deaths. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, 600 people were killed in Ituri from January through April, including over 25 civilians killed in one day in Djugu, while attacks also included pillage and destruction or occupation of homes, schools and health facilities, including Ebola treatment infrastructures in Rwampara in May. In **Myanmar**, military airstrikes, drone attacks, artillery and arson continue to affect civilians and civilian sites across key conflict zones. A dozen military-perpetrated mass killings were reported in the first half of 2026, killing over 450 civilians, while schools, hospitals, religious sites and displacement shelters remain exposed to attack. In **Cameroon**, more than 88 attacks on education were reported in the North-West and South-West between January and June, with schools attacked and teachers facing intimidation and abduction. In the **oPt**, civilians continue to face airstrikes, drone attacks and ground operations with devastating consequences for their safety while attacks by settlers are rapidly escalating in the West Bank. Civilian infrastructure also continues to come under fire: 45 attacks on healthcare in Gaza caused 10 fatalities and 44 injuries between January and August. In **Haiti**, renewed gang clashes in Cité Soleil in June reportedly killed at least 30 people, prompting the temporary suspension of humanitarian medical activities. In August, a gang attack in Kenscoff killed 47 people. In **Ukraine**, an escalating pattern of airstrikes and drone attacks has continued to kill civilians and damage residential areas and critical infrastructure in Kyiv and other cities, including Kramatorsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. In **CAR**, 601 protection incidents linked to transhumance were documented between January and June 2026, resulting in at least 59 deaths and 46 injuries. In **Ethiopia**, armed violence in Amhara, Oromia and Tigray caused killings, injuries and displacement, while damage to and occupation of schools and other civilian infrastructure disrupted access to essential services. In **South Sudan**, aerial bombardment, ground offensives and intercommunal attacks continued to expose civilians to harm, particularly in northern Jonglei and southern Upper Nile. In **Mali**, the use of drones against civilians remains high amid persistent armed violence, with 146 victims of armed drone attacks, particularly affecting the central and northern regions.



CHILD AND FORCED FAMILY SEPARATION

Protracted and repeated displacement is increasing the risk of child and family separation, as families face multiple movements and the breakdown of family and community support networks. Children may become separated during flight, evacuation, return or onward movement, exposing them to heightened risks of exploitation, trafficking, recruitment and other forms of violence. At the same time, overstretched child protection systems, limited humanitarian access and reduced funding are constraining family tracing, reunification and safe alternative care. As displacement becomes increasingly protracted, temporary separation risks becoming prolonged, with significant implications for children's protection and well-being.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	oPt (Gaza)
4	Sudan, South Sudan, Venezuela, Myanmar, oPt (West Bank)
3	Mozambique, Syria, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Mali, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ukraine, Niger, Yemen, Haiti
2	Burkina Faso, Colombia, Central African Republic
1	Chad

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Venezuela**, earthquake-related displacement and temporary or informal accommodation weakened family and community protection networks. Family separation, inadequate privacy, lost documentation and urgent psychosocial needs particularly affected children, women, older people and persons with disabilities. In **Ethiopia**, conflict, recurrent displacement and unsafe migration disrupted family unity, while household economic pressures increased children’s exposure to separation and exploitation. In **South Sudan**, 558 separated children were recorded during January–June 2026 due to sudden flight from attacks, kidnapping and livelihood pressures, particularly in Upper Nile and Jonglei. Limited tracing capacity and poor communications prolonged separation and increased children’s exposure to neglect, exploitation and abuse. In **Sudan**, approximately 5,000 unaccompanied and separated children had been registered due to flight from El Fasher, checkpoint separations and repeated displacement. Restricted access and weakened identification systems delayed tracing, including when children reached eastern states far from their communities of origin. In **Myanmar**, the ongoing conflict and recurrent displacement, compounded by the effects of the 2025 earthquake have resulted in unprecedented impacts on the family unity. Many children who are unaccompanied or separated, end up in informal institutional or community-based care rather than family-based alternatives. In **Ukraine**, the deportation or forcible transfer of more than 1,200 children from five regions were reported with approximately 80% had not returned. Concealment of their whereabouts and placement arrangements impeded family tracing and reunification.



CHILD, EARLY OR FORCED MARRIAGE

Escalating conflict and displacement continue to exacerbate risks of child, early or forced marriage, particularly as families face heightened insecurity, economic hardship and disruption to social and support networks. In several contexts, early marriage may be used as a negative coping mechanism in response to these pressures, including as a perceived means of protection or to reduce household costs. At the same time, these risks are rooted in longstanding gender inequalities and social, cultural and religious norms and practices, which can be reinforced in times of crisis.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	Sudan
4	Mozambique, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger, Central African Republic, Yemen, oPt (Gaza)
3	Mali, Syria, Myanmar, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, oPt (West Bank)
2	Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Colombia
1	Chad, Ukraine

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Afghanistan**, some earthquake-affected families arranged early marriages for girls to reduce shelter overcrowding or obtain another tent. This coping strategy increased exposure to intimate partner violence and early childbirth. In **Mozambique**, early married remains widespread, with particularly high prevalence in Cabo Delgado. Displacement, interrupted education, livelihood loss and economic pressure heighten girls’ exposure to early unions. Similarly in **Ethiopia**, conflict, displacement, school disruption and household economic pressures increased girls’ exposure to child, early and forced marriage, particularly in rural and displaced communities, including Somali Region. In **South Sudan**, families’ reliance on dowries for survival contributed to marriage pressures, while armed actors were also involved in forced marriage. In **Sudan**, increased reports of child, early and forced marriage was linked to deteriorating livelihoods, prolonged insecurity and repeated displacement. Economic pressures narrowed household options, while movement restrictions and reduced access to services weakened prevention and support. In **oPt**, increase in child marriage, including cases involving girls aged 14–16 was reported in Khan Younis, Beit Hanoun and northern Gaza. In **Cameroon**, reports highlighted heightened exposure to forced marriage among out-of-school girls in northern conflict-affected areas. In **Mali**, forced marriage accounted for 8% of the 5,644 GBV incidents documented during January–June 2026. In **Haiti**,

families are increasingly resorting to child and forced marriage as a perceived protective measure against armed violence.



DISCRIMINATION AND STIGMATIZATION, DENIAL OF RESOURCES, OPPORTUNITIES, SERVICES AND/OR HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Discrimination, stigmatization and denial of resources, essential services and humanitarian access continued to be reported as significant protection risks in 2026. These barriers disproportionately affected certain groups and communities, while insecurity, administrative restrictions, movement constraints and attacks against humanitarian workers further narrowed humanitarian space and limited access to assistance.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	oPt (Gaza)
4	Afghanistan, Sudan, Mali, Venezuela, Chad, Myanmar, Niger, Yemen, oPt (West Bank)
3	Mozambique, South Sudan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ukraine, Central African Republic
2	Syria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Haiti
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Afghanistan**, bans on women NGO workers and Mahram movement requirements continued to reduce women's access to assistance following the earthquake. Reporting indicates deaths among women, including pregnant women, who could not access a female healthcare provider. In the **Central African Republic**, 64 incidents affecting humanitarian workers were recorded in the first half of 2026, driven by ongoing military operations and the activities of armed groups. This sharp increase signals a worsening operating environment for humanitarian actors. Attacks on Ebola responders and health workers were also reported in the **DRC**, particularly in southern Haut-Uele. In **Mali**, following the April attacks, insecurity, irregular checkpoints and explosive hazards restricted humanitarian movement, temporarily suspending activities in Kidal and severely limiting access to displaced and host communities in northern and central regions. In **Myanmar**, military-imposed blockades on goods entering Rakhine State and continued denial or obstruction of humanitarian assistance further restricted civilian's access to essential goods and services. In the **oPt**, more than 900 checkpoints, gates, roadblocks and other obstacles delayed or limited humanitarian operations across the West Bank. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, stigma and fear around Ebola restricted access to healthcare, education and assistance. Insecurity and attacks on health structures further reduced humanitarian space. In **Ukraine**, attacks on humanitarian personnel increased by 38% in the first quarter of 2026, including the killing of two humanitarian deminers and injuries to two women humanitarian workers when a drone struck their vehicle in Kherson as they responded to a domestic-violence case. In **Ethiopia**, severe fuel shortages in Tigray contributed to the suspension of 148 humanitarian interventions across 84 woredas, reportedly affecting approximately 1.8 million people. In **South Sudan**, 391 humanitarian-access incidents were reported during January–June 2026, a 62% increase over the same period in 2025. Violence against personnel, movement restrictions and operational interference particularly affected Upper Nile, Jonglei and Central Equatoria. In **Sudan**, checkpoints, administrative restrictions and insecurity impacted deliveries of food, medicines and other essential assistance, particularly in Darfur and Greater Kordofan. Harassment and threats against frontline responders further reduced access to protection services.




DISINFORMATION AND DENIAL OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Disinformation, misinformation and denial of access to information are emerging as increasingly concerning trends across several humanitarian crises, undermining trust, social cohesion, and directly affecting access to services and assistance.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	
4	Afghanistan, Sudan, Chad, Myanmar, Yemen, oPt (Gaza)
3	Mozambique, Syria, Cameroon, Mali, Venezuela, Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ukraine, Niger, Central African Republic, oPt (West Bank)
2	South Sudan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Haiti
1	Colombia

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, misinformation and rumours surrounding Ebola and the response fuelled mistrust, stigma and rejection of health services in Ituri. This misinformation contributed to reluctance to seek care and was associated with attacks and vandalism targeting Ebola treatment facilities and health workers. In Mongbwalu and Rwampara, six attacks on Ebola facilities or personnel were documented, including the burning of six isolation tents and the flight of six confirmed or suspected patients. In **Mali**, hate messages, calls for violence and unfounded rumours circulated on social media after the 25 April attacks, while assaults were reported against people suspected of links to armed groups. National authorities warned that disinformation and incitement could disrupt public services, education and social cohesion.



FORCED RECRUITMENT AND ASSOCIATION OF CHILDREN WITH ARMED FORCES AND GROUPS

In 2026, children remain at heightened risk of use and recruitment by and association with armed forces and groups, particularly in contexts marked by prolonged violence, territorial control, and limited access to education and services. Recruitment and exploitation are also adapting to new environments, with armed groups increasingly using social media and other digital platforms to reach and manipulate children. At the same time, attacks on and the disruption of education continue to further increase children's vulnerability to recruitment and other forms of exploitation.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	Sudan
4	Venezuela, Colombia, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo
3	Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, Yemen, Haiti, oPt (Gaza)
2	South Sudan, Syria, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Central African Republic, oPt (West Bank)
1	Chad

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Colombia** (Buenaventura), communities reported recruitment in or near schools with adolescents aged 13–14 acting as messengers, lookouts and providing logistical support. In Sierra Nevada, armed groups used social media to attract and intimidate children, normalizing violence and links to illicit economies. Indigenous, rural, refugee and migrant children faced the greatest risk amid weak referral systems. In **Haiti**, child recruitment and use by armed groups surged, with the number of children recruited or used reportedly tripling compared with the previous year. The recruitment and use of children by armed groups is one of the most documented and systemic protection risks in **CAR** with 33 cases (including 19 girls) verified in the first quarter of 2026. In **Ethiopia**, reports emerging since April 2026 alleged recruitment-related abductions by Tigrayan forces, including boys as young as 15. Renewed armed mobilisation, school disruption and limited livelihoods increased concerns over children's recruitment and forced association in Tigray and Amhara. In **South Sudan**, 104 children associated with armed forces and groups were reported during January–June 2026. Children were associated in combat and support roles and for sexual exploitation. In **Sudan**, forced recruitment at checkpoints and during displacement were reported, with men and adolescent boys particularly exposed. Separated children faced additional risks of recruitment and use by armed groups as parental care and community protection weakened.

In **Mali**, children reportedly participated in the April attacks, while the expansion of armed group activities into new areas, including central and southern parts of the country, is significantly increasing the risk of child recruitment and use by armed groups.



GENDER BASED VIOLENCE

Conflicts, attacks, and displacement continue to be primary drivers of GBV, exacerbated by underlying gender inequality, which increases vulnerability and restricts access to survivor care.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	oPt (Gaza)
4	Mozambique, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, Ukraine, Niger, Central African Republic, Yemen, Haiti, oPt (West Bank)
3	Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Chad, Nigeria
2	
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Sudan**, daytime drone strikes on water points in El Obeid pushed women and girls to collect water after dark, when they faced harassment, rape and other sexual violence. Displacement, crowded, often unsafe shelters and environments also heightened GBV risks during sudden onset disasters (e.g., earthquakes in **Afghanistan**, **Venezuela** and **Colombia**). Stigma, fear and armed-group control and disruption of health services continued to limit access to medical and specialised GBV services. In **DRC**, Ebola restrictions and disrupted sexual and reproductive health services increased exposure and delayed life-saving access and confidential care. Several countries, such as Mali, saw significant spikes in reported incidents (85%, compared to previous year). In **oPt**, reported CRSV cases included rape or attempted rape, genital violence, forced nudity and degrading searches in detention, transit and checkpoints. In **Haiti**, more than 176 women and girls experienced documented sexual violence between 6 March and 31 July, including rape as collective punishment. In **Mali**, GBV recorded incidents increased by more than 58% between the first and second quarters, while identified survivors among internally displaced people increased by 113%. In **Myanmar**, at assessed earthquake-affected sites, fewer than one in five shelters had internal locks, and 30% of respondents reported no safe sleeping space for women and girls.



IMPEDIMENTS AND/OR RESTRICTIONS TO ACCESS TO LEGAL IDENTITY, REMEDIES, AND JUSTICE

Impediments to legal identity, access to justice and effective remedies continued to present significant protection risks across contexts.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	oPt (Gaza)
4	Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Cameroon, Venezuela, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, oPt (West Bank)
3	Mozambique, Syria, Mali, Ethiopia, Colombia, Nigeria, Somalia, Ukraine, Niger, Central African Republic
2	Burkina Faso, Haiti
1	Chad

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Afghanistan**, returnees from Iran and Pakistan were reported more likely to lack ‘tazkira’ and other civil documentation, constraining access to services and post-earthquake assistance. Lost documentation and insecure tenure also hindered efforts to reclaim or rebuild homes. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, GBV survivors in Ituri face inadequate legal support and distant justice institutions concentrated in Bunia. Stigma, fear of reprisals and weak referral systems reduce reporting, while impunity persists. In **Syria**, gap in civil documentation remain widespread, particularly among recent returnee households. Women with missing husbands faced particular barriers to property and legal rights, while costs, damaged registries and procedural complexity constrained access to documents and remedies. In **CAR**, accusations of witchcraft and popular justice remain a significant protection concern, particularly in rural areas where access to formal justice is limited and trust in judicial institutions is weak. These gaps in access to justice contribute to collective violence, arbitrary detention, forced evictions and lynchings, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups such as older women, widows, children and persons with disabilities. In **Ethiopia**, interrupted payment of judicial and administrative personnel during 2026 in Tigray further weakened formal remedies. In **South Sudan**, survivors of sexual violence faced few functioning courts and prolonged proceedings. Community mediation, stigma and fear of reprisals discouraged formal reporting, while alleged release of perpetrators through bribery undermined accountability. Returnees also faced documentation gaps that complicated housing and land claims. In **Sudan**, destroyed or inaccessible land offices, missing property records and weakened civil registration prevented displaced people and returnees from proving ownership and exercising legal rights. Fragmented statutory and customary systems constrained restitution and dispute resolution.



PRESENCE OF MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

Explosive ordnance contamination generated severe protection risks across multiple contexts in 2026 causing thousands of casualties and reducing communities access to essential services and livelihood.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	Ukraine, oPt
4	Sudan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Myanmar
3	Mozambique, Syria, Afghanistan, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo
2	South Sudan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, Central African Republic, Yemen, Haiti
1	Venezuela, Chad

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



Explosive ordnance contamination continued to pose severe protection risks across multiple humanitarian contexts in 2026, resulting in civilian casualties, displacement, restrictions on freedom of movement, and reduced access to essential services. The most acute impacts were observed in **Syria, Myanmar and Sudan**, where casualties increased sharply, while in **oPt and Ukraine** widespread contamination continued to impede access to education, healthcare, housing, and livelihoods. In **Ethiopia and Nigeria**, explosive ordnance constrained access to farmland, schools, health facilities, and water sources, with children disproportionately affected by accidents. In **Afghanistan**, contamination remained a major threat to children's safety with 847 schools located within one kilometer of contaminated areas and children accounting for 219 of the 280 explosive ordnance casualties as of August 2026. In **South Sudan**, explosive hazards compounded existing vulnerabilities stemming from conflict and climate-related shocks. In **Colombia**, explosive threats contributed to confinement and restricted access to basic services and livelihoods. In **Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Yemen**, explosive ordnance remained a significant driver of civilian harm, displacement, humanitarian access constraints, and heightened protection risks for affected populations. Reduced mine action capacity has resulted in less data collection and reporting, limiting the availability of information on contamination trends, casualties, and humanitarian impacts. In most countries, this risk prevents the implementation of durable solutions for IDPs.



PSYCHOLOGICAL/EMOTIONAL ABUSE OR INFLICTED DISTRESS

Psychological and emotional abuse or inflicted distress were pervasive across contexts, often compounding existing protection risks and contributing to further harm. Yet access to specialized mental health services and immediate psychosocial support remained limited, with these areas identified among the activities most affected by funding cuts in the GPC Protection Capacity Mapping.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	Venezuela, Ukraine, oPt
4	Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Cameroon, Mali, Ethiopia, Chad, Myanmar, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Syria, Central African Republic, Yemen
3	Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Nigeria, Haiti
2	
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Afghanistan**, trauma and mental distress were the most frequently cited protection risks in post-earthquake assessments. Adults described stress, depression and anxiety, while children showed crying and aggression signs. Similarly, in **Venezuela**, children affected by the earthquakes are experiencing acute distress after witnessing deaths, losing homes and facing uncertainty about missing relatives. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, conflict, repeated displacement and the Ebola outbreak compounded fear, bereavement, isolation and trauma in Ituri. In **Mali**, intimidation, restrictions on social activities and movement, abductions, public flogging of women, and imposed dress codes, contribute to fear, stigma, loss of freedom of movement, and the erosion of community coping mechanisms and livelihoods. In the **OPT**, threats, humiliation, solitary confinement, recurrent violence and displacement contributed to significant psychological distress. This was associated with anger or aggressive behaviour, including domestic violence and child neglect. Men and boys also experienced increased isolation following the loss of community support networks. In **Colombia**, armed groups continued to inflict psychological and emotional harm through threats, territorial control, confinement, and restrictions on cultural and community life. In **Ethiopia**, prolonged conflict, repeated displacement, bereavement and sexual violence sustained psychological distress. In **South Sudan**, communities in western Akobo described persistent fear of aerial bombardment and ground attacks affecting their children. Emotional distress was identified as a major consequence of family separation, while specialised psychosocial support remained limited. In **Sudan**, repeated displacement disrupted social support, while the detention, disappearance or death of caregivers prolonged uncertainty.



THEFT, EXTORTION, FORCED EVICTION OR DESTRUCTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

Theft, extortion, forced eviction and destruction of personal property continued to undermine livelihoods, access to housing and land and the ability of affected communities to remain safely in their homes and areas of origin.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	oPt
4	South Sudan, Syria, Cameroon, Mali, Venezuela, Myanmar, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Central African Republic
3	Mozambique, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, Nigeria, Ukraine, Yemen
2	Burkina Faso, Colombia, Haiti
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Colombia**, rising extortion and extortive kidnapping were reported in Sierra Nevada, with particularly sharp increases in Maicao and Uribia. Armed groups used these practices to reinforce territorial control and generate revenue, affecting livelihoods and contributing to fear and displacement. In Buenaventura, armed-group control reportedly involved extortion and price-fixing, with the cost of the basic food basket increasing by more than 30%. Several urban neighbourhoods also experienced home dispossession, forced eviction and curfews, while rural communities lost access to crops, fishing and commercial activities. In the **oPt**, settlers in the West Bank frequently destroyed or confiscated Palestinian property, amid approximately 190 settler attacks per month between January and April. Incidents included arson, vandalism of olive trees and agricultural assets, livestock theft, land seizure and damage to homes, with Bedouin, herding and farming communities particularly exposed. In **Ethiopia**, armed conflict in Metekel caused substantial destruction of homes and livelihoods, while violence in Oromia also involved property destruction. Returnees in northern conflict-affected areas encountered occupied or destroyed housing and disputed ownership. Missing documentation and limited dispute-resolution mechanisms obstructed recovery of property and increased the risk of renewed displacement. In **South Sudan**, armed and intercommunal violence involved livestock theft, looting, destruction of homes and forced evictions. Older persons and persons with disabilities faced particular difficulties recovering after losing shelter, assets and access to livelihoods. In **Sudan**, displaced households faced eviction threats, limited notice and few alternative housing options. Rising rents in Gedaref, Red Sea, Blue Nile and Al Jazirah increased housing insecurity and sometimes contributed to premature returns. Returnees also encountered destroyed or occupied homes, while missing documentation and weak restitution mechanisms obstructed recovery of property. In **Mali**, attacks by armed groups, robberies, and illegal fines imposed in the form of “zakat” remain the main factors exposing civilians to these violations.



TORTURE OR CRUEL, INHUMAN, DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

Torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment remain a serious protection concern in humanitarian contexts, yet are often difficult to monitor and document due to restricted access, fear of retaliation, stigma and the risks faced by survivors in reporting abuses. As a result, torture is frequently underreported and may not be sufficiently reflected in protection analyses, despite the severity of its impact on survivors.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	
4	Afghanistan, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, oPt
3	Mozambique, Cameroon, Mali, Venezuela, Nigeria, Somalia, Central African Republic
2	Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Yemen, Haiti
1	Burkina Faso, Colombia, Chad

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In the **oPt**, Palestinians returning to Gaza reported physical violence, threats, degrading treatment and intrusive searches at Kerem Abu Salem and Rafah crossings. Allegations included beating, handcuffing, forced undressing under surveillance and confiscation of medicines, identity documents, money and assistive devices. Palestinians held in the West Bank reported torture and ill-treatment, including severe beatings, whipping, painful stress positions, prolonged solitary confinement and suspension by shackled wrists. In **South Sudan**, torture and other cruel treatment alongside intentional killings and rape were reported in Nagero County. In **Sudan**, torture and ill-treatment alongside detention and abduction affecting civilians was reported in contexts of restricted movement and displacement. These practices compounded threats encountered while seeking safety. In **Afghanistan**, 147 men and 15 women were publicly flogged in January 2026; some punishments were accompanied by imprisonment. In **Ukraine**, nearly all repatriated Ukrainian prisoners of war reported torture or ill-treatment. Accounts included beatings, electric shocks, sexual violence and denial of medical care.




TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, FORCED LABOUR, OR SLAVERY-LIKE PRACTICES

Trafficking and exploitation continued to emerge as significant protection risks across several contexts, yet the scale and nature of these risks remained difficult to capture. Children were particularly vulnerable to harmful forms of work, while evolving trafficking networks increasingly exploited digital platforms and economic hardship.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	
4	Afghanistan, Venezuela, Somalia, oPt (Gaza)
3	Syria, Mali, Ethiopia, Colombia, Chad, Myanmar, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, oPt (West Bank)
2	Mozambique, Sudan, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Ukraine, Central African Republic, Yemen, Haiti
1	South Sudan

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Afghanistan**, children were reported working after the earthquakes, including boys as young as 11 seeking daily wages and undertaking heavy rebuilding work. Children also collected rubbish or scrap and girls performed domestic work. In the **oPt**, the proportion of families sending at children to work rose, amid school dropout, displacement and severe household income loss. In **Myanmar**, online scam compounds remain a major trafficking and forced-labour threat. Victims are recruited through fraudulent job offers, have documents confiscated and are coerced through violence, threats and debt bondage into cyberfraud. In **Ethiopia**, displaced and economically vulnerable young people faced trafficking and exploitative recruitment along migration routes through Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen and towards Libya. Communities in Qoloji described deceptive recruitment to carry unidentified packages and demands for large payments during journeys. In **South Sudan**, trafficking risks were identified during displacement with separated children and households under severe livelihood pressure facing heightened exposure to exploitation. In **Sudan**, trafficking and exploitation risks were reported along secondary-displacement routes into eastern states, particularly for unaccompanied and separated children. Sexual slavery and forced domestic servitude were also reported.



UNLAWFUL IMPEDIMENTS OR RESTRICTIONS TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, SIEGE, AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT

Severe restrictions on freedom of movement, siege and forced displacement remain among the leading protection risks across contexts in the first half of 2026. Conflict, disasters and climate shocks continue to drive large-scale and repeated displacement while significant return movements, including those under adverse circumstances, are evident in a number of contexts. At the same time, movement restrictions, blockades, encirclement and siege are increasingly prominent tactics in several contexts like Sudan, the Sahel, Colombia and Myanmar, used to control populations and territory. For civilians living through restrictions on movement, their ability to access food and essential services is deeply impacted while their exposure to violence and abuse escalate given affected areas are often at the centre of intensifying conflict.

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	oPt
4	Mozambique, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Cameroon, Mali, Myanmar, Niger
3	Syria, Sudan, Venezuela, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Colombia, Chad, Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ukraine, Central African Republic, Yemen, Haiti
2	
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Afghanistan**, more than 6,000 households remained in temporary displacement sites following the

earthquake, with some facing secondary displacement due to clashes in three districts of Kunar. In **Cameroon**, violence displaced more than 24,000 people in the Far North between January and June, including new movements into Mayo-Danay and Mayo-Kani. In **Somalia**, approximately 217,000 new displaced persons were recorded during the second quarter of 2026. Conflict and drought accounted for nearly 90%. In **South Sudan**, violence displaced more than 420,000 people between January and June 2026, primarily in Jonglei. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, fighting around Bule caused new movements, while Ebola fears also generated pressure for displaced people to leave sites and return to insecure areas. In **Sudan**, the imposition of severe movement restrictions continues to drive severe harm and deprivation in areas across Darfur and Kordofan regions, including El Obeid, Dilling and El Fasher. In **Colombia**, armed groups imposed confinement and mobility restrictions, with Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities facing particular pressure. In **Mali**, a blockade of Bamako was announced in April, primarily targeting the roads and fuel supply routes into the capital, while several villages and localities remained under prolonged encirclement, including Diafarabe, Lere, exacerbating vulnerabilities and limiting access to essential services, healthcare, and food. Conflict parties in **Myanmar** continue to impose widespread movement and access restrictions, including sieges, blockades, and checkpoints, severely constraining humanitarian access. In the **OPT**, more than 800 checkpoints, roadblocks, gates and road closures, together with the 712-kilometre barrier wall, continue to permanently or intermittently restrict movement across the West Bank. Men and boys in particular faced denied passage and harassment, while communities reported reduced access to healthcare, education and protection services. In **CAR**, armed groups control several strategic routes, particularly in the Birao, Vakaga and Haut-Mbomou areas, through practices such as extortion, illegal taxation, confiscation of property and attacks against civilians, restricting movement of people and goods, and leading to recurrent and forced displacement. In **Ethiopia**, checkpoints and insecurity restricted movement of civilians along major routes in Amhara, Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz. In **Afghanistan**, large-scale returns from Pakistan and Iran continued in 2026, with many returnees without civil documentation and facing limited access to essential services, housing, and livelihoods. In **Syria**, IDP returns have continued, alongside new cross-border movements from Lebanon, placing additional pressure services in areas of return. Despite ongoing conflict and insecurity, **Sudan** has also seen significant returns to certain areas, including Khartoum, although protection risks remain high and humanitarian access limited, with such returns likely fragile and potentially reversible.

CRISIS WATCH

VENEZUELA & COLOMBIA

The aftermath of the earthquake in both Venezuela and Colombia is generating significant protection concerns, with displacement, loss of housing, temporary accommodation and disruption of community and protection networks increasing exposure to protection risks. In Venezuela, reported concerns include family separation, psychosocial distress, inadequate privacy and security in temporary accommodation, and loss of documentation. In Colombia, the 7.4-magnitude earthquake of 10 August has compounded an already fragile humanitarian and protection environment, particularly in conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas of Chocó, Risaralda, Valle del Cauca and Caldas; damage to homes and essential infrastructure, displacement and restricted access are increasing risks related to GBV, inadequate shelter, disruption of health and protection services, and weakened protection networks. In both contexts, women, children, older persons and persons with disabilities face disproportionate exposure to these risks along with additional barriers in accessing protection and assistance.

SUDAN

Protection partners operating in Sudan are alarmed at the deteriorating protection situation in El Obeid, and the Kordofan region. El Obeid is a critical refuge point for displaced population. Around 100,000 people have displaced into the city, alongside the 500,000 residents. The city, and its surrounding areas, are in an increasingly fragile protection environment due to military action of parties to the conflict. Displacement from locations across Kordofan, coupled with insecurity, economic deterioration and pressure on overstretched services, is steadily eroding the coping capacity of displaced and host communities. Intensified hostilities and drone attacks are restricting civilian movement within and around the city, and humanitarian access and essential services remain constrained. Civilians face risks including arbitrary detention, extortion and violence at checkpoints and sexual violence, as well as explosive ordnance. Unsafe shelter conditions, as well as the shortages of basic goods and services, are increasing vulnerabilities among displaced and host communities. The use of drones is changing the dynamics of the conflict for civilian populations. In one documented incident on 25 September, drone strikes reportedly affected civilian locations including a site sheltering displaced families, fuel facilities and residential areas. According to partners operating in the area, at least two civilians were killed and approximately 20 others injured. These types of events are particularly concerning given the repeated exposure of civilians to aerial attacks. As many families are already displaced, the cumulative impact of hostilities on civilian infrastructure, essential services and safe movement is limiting civilian life. In June 2026, the UN Security Council warned of the imminent potential of mass atrocities amid a significant RSF build-up around the city. Any intensification of violence and hostilities can have profound implications for civilians living in the city and surrounding areas. **More information:** [Protection Cluster Alert on El Obeid](#).

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus continues to expand geographically, with cases reported across 61 health zones in six provinces; Ituri remains the epicentre. In addition, the outbreak is occurring within a highly fragile protection environment, where conflict, displacement, attacks against civilians and constrained humanitarian access already undermine access to essential services. Overcrowding and inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene conditions in displacement sites and informal settlements further increase exposure and complicate prevention and timely access to care. From a protection perspective, the response also needs to account for the risks associated with limited access to health services, stigma and community acceptance, as well as increasing misinformation and disinformation around the outbreak and response. Strengthening risk communication and community engagement (RCCE) is critical to addressing misinformation, building trust and ensuring that affected populations can access information and services safely and without discrimination. Protection actors are playing a key role in identifying and mitigating protection risks, strengthening community feedback and referral mechanisms, supporting meaningful community participation, and ensuring that protection concerns are integrated into the broader Ebola response. **More information:** [Protection Analysis Update - Ituri](#).

Please note that this Global Protection Update reflects the information available at the time of its development and does not capture recent developments and emerging protection concerns in Yemen and northern Ethiopia. Country-level Protection Clusters are closely monitoring the evolving situation and will provide further updates and analysis as information becomes available.

3. Protection Response and Impact on People



Drastic funding cuts starting in 2025 significantly reduced the capacity of protection actors to operate and respond to the threats and related vulnerabilities experienced by people living through humanitarian crises. In early 2026, the GPC conducted comprehensive research on the impact of these cuts, drawing on a survey that received 747 responses across 22 contexts, as well as consultations with country Protection Clusters and partners. The GPC's [Protection Capacities Under Pressure](#) report show a stark reality across crisis contexts: the impact of funding cuts on protection capacities is widespread and affects all layers of the protection response simultaneously. The cuts are resulting in reductions in the frontline workforce, the types and scope of service delivery, geographic coverage, direct engagement with people affected by the crises, and the system-enabling functions that underpin an effective humanitarian response. Mental health and psychosocial support, community-based protection, protection monitoring and case management, individual protection assistance, referrals, and safe spaces are some of the particular programmatic areas that have been most affected.

Protection relies on the continuity of services, trust and proximity with affected communities alongside an ability to design and deliver interventions and supports in ways that prevent or reduce violence and meet the particular needs and priorities of the most vulnerable people. Taken together, these reductions are weakening the capacity of protection actors to prevent and respond to protection risks, reach people in need, and maintain the continuity and quality of essential services. The research findings paint a bleak picture. However, throughout the research and in ongoing engagement across the GPC network, it is clear that protection continues to 'work' and have vital impacts on the safety and wellbeing of millions of people. Despite major challenges with shrinking resources and increasingly complex operating environments marked by violations of international law, protection partners have continued to demonstrate the positive contribution and impact of protection interventions, including by preventing harm and supporting people to access essential services and assistance.

OVERVIEW OF PROTECTION RESPONSE IN 2026

In 2026, the Protection Cluster response monitoring is structured around the [GPC Consolidated Protection Response Framework](#), developed as part of the streamlined HPC process. It combines collective protection actions by coordination structures with specialised protection programming delivered by protection actors.

The results illustrate how protection action is sustained within the scope of HNRP monitoring, despite growing reporting constraints, while capturing only part of the wider protection efforts undertaken. Important functions such as advocacy, policy engagement, coordination and influence are often not fully reflected in HNRP response monitoring data, despite their contribution to reducing protection risks and strengthening protection outcomes.

The analysis looks beyond the number of people reached to capture the range of protection action and differences in delivery across contexts and response components. It draws on reporting from **15 of the 22 operations** with a Protection Cluster presence⁴. Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Myanmar, the Occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), Syria and Yemen are not included.

Findings should therefore be understood as describing the reporting operations rather than representing all 22 contexts. Nevertheless, the analysis provides a substantial evidence base and solid outlook on the scale and composition of the response monitored across diverse HNRPs.

KEY 2026 HNRP TARGETS & REACH				
AFFECTED POPULATION REACHED	RESPONSE ACTORS SUPPORTED	MECHANISMS ESTABLISHED OR STRENGTHENED	AREAS PROVIDED WITH SAFETY OR SAFE SPACES	RESOURCES PROVIDED
11.7M 39.7M	8.700 50.500	419 1.352	374 548	369 1.190
Reached Target	Reached Target	Reached Target	Reached Target	Reached Target
In 15 operations	In 8 operations	In 7 operations	In 2 operations	In 2 operations

⁴ Following its introduction in 2025, the consolidated response framework has been adapted progressively to contexts to minimise reporting burdens. Data from 15 of 22 operations could be consolidated for this report; data from the remaining operations was available but not yet sufficiently harmonised for inclusion. Harmonisation is continuing across all operations with a Protection Cluster presence.

The response combines several forms of protection action, but progress remains uneven. Safe spaces and environments and capacity strengthening show comparatively higher progress, at 60% and 74%, respectively. Services and assistance and community-based protection remain further from their targets, at 22% and 14%, revealing important differences in the balance of reported delivery.

PROGRESS ACROSS COLLECTIVE PROTECTION ACTION

Pillar	% of achieved / targeted	No. of countries reporting
Identification, monitoring and analysis <i>i.e. protection monitoring; assessments; safety audits</i>	35.2%	12
Provision of services and assistance <i>i.e. individual protection assistance; case management, legal services; referrals</i>	22.3%	14
Safe spaces and environments <i>i.e. safe spaces; mine clearance;</i>	59.7%	8
Community-based protection <i>i.e. community mechanisms; participation; self-protection</i>	14.4%	13
Critical information and awareness <i>i.e. EORE; risk education; rights awareness</i>	37.6%	15
Capacity strengthening <i>i.e. trainings; technical support; institutional accompaniment</i>	74.1%	11

Across 15 operations, the table below illustrates the scale and breadth of collective protection delivery, alongside differences in progress across contexts and forms of support. Figures present the reported number of people reached, while colours indicate progress against targets where these were available.

PEOPLE REACHED ACROSS COUNTRIES

Country	Identification, monitoring and analysis	Provision of services and assistance	Safe spaces and environments	Community-based protection	Critical information / awareness	Capacity strengthening
AFGHANISTAN	519,917	1,665,642	198	67,837	1,025,259	3,435
CAMEROON	7,981	109,906	-	7,977	1,142,594	-
CAR	59,566	651	-	-	14,283	-
CHAD	14,789	31,994	-	322	29,777	515
COLOMBIA	-	11,432	21,781	-	83,513	-
DRC	53,866	62,326	-	23,016	234,262	-
HAITI	3,247	35,538	-	2,315	101,432	88
MOZAMBIQUE	112,609	436,571	17,205	831	280,308	-
NIGER	7	43,759	-	13,732	114,453	28
NIGERIA	50,700	155,662	121,355	-	541,715	10,025
SOMALIA	-	205,185	-	17,503	208,499	5,546
SOUTH SUDAN	265	390,273	-	75,163	230,485	6,481
SUDAN	20,249	2,001,266	19,837	-	1,244,853	13,770
UKRAINE	3,818	839,039	16,143	36,048	511,141	-
VENEZUELA	4,105	174,942	-	15,311	186,039	4,222

No Target available
 <25%
 25 < 50%
 50 < 75%
 ≥75%

Large differences across operations shape response progress. Afghanistan, for example, reports approximately 78% progress in essential services and assistance and 87% in monitoring and analysis, compared with just 3% in community-based protection. In South Sudan, community-based protection stands at 100%, while essential services and assistance reach approximately 24%. These contrasting profiles show why the priorities for strengthening delivery differ between operations.

Provision of critical information, services and assistance account for the largest reported reach. Critical information and awareness reached approximately 6 million people, followed by 4.77 million reached through services and assistance, including safe spaces and environments. Among individual assistance, psychosocial support and case management recorded the highest reach, at 2.38 million and 1 million, respectively.

Services and assistance remain a substantial shortfall in the response. With reported progress at 22%, the provision of individual assistance, case management, legal services and referrals remains well below targets. Progress in other areas of protection action therefore coexists with significant gaps in direct support to individuals and families.

Progress in safe spaces varies across operations. Eight operations report outputs related to safe spaces and environments. Among the five with comparable results, two remain below one-quarter of their targets, demonstrating that the overall progress figure of 60% does not reflect a uniform level of delivery.

SPECIALISED RESPONSE⁵

Gender-Based Violence 2.9 M / 19.8 M Reached (12 operations) / Target (21) Broader reach of activities improving service seeking behaviour and access to specialised GBV service delivery. ⁶ Need for further attention in availability of Women and Girls Safe Spaces ⁷ and GBV prevention	Child Protection 2.8 M / 18.3 M Reached (13) / Target (20) Broader reach in case management (excluding FTR) and community-based prevention Need for further attention in family tracing and reunification and system strengthening	Mine Action 1.5 M / 11 M Reached (7) / Target (14) Stronger progress in increased capabilities for EO risk mitigation through training, NGO accreditation, risk education, and safety awareness. Slower progress in explosive ordnance clearance and victim assistance
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The figures reflect available reporting and provide a substantive indication of the scale and patterns of protection delivery, while not capturing the full extent of activities undertaken or results achieved.

IMPACT OF PROTECTION INTERVENTIONS

The figures presented above show the reach of protection interventions. But **what matters most is the difference these interventions make in people's lives**: helping prevent violence, coercion and deliberate deprivation, supporting recovery, and enabling people exercise their rights safely and with dignity. To understand this impact, we need to look beyond the number of people reached and consider whether support is timely, appropriate and sustained, and whether people facing the greatest protection risks can access it.

The GPC's Protection Capacities Under Pressure report highlights what is at stake for affected populations when this support is reduced: fewer opportunities to seek help safely, interrupted care and follow-up, and greater barriers to specialized services. Preserving protection capacities is therefore essential to sustaining the support on which people's safety and recovery depend. The examples below illustrate how protection interventions contribute to these outcomes through prevention, direct assistance and more inclusive humanitarian action.

Protection helps prevent harm and reduce people's exposure to threats

This includes community protection mechanisms, early warning, safe evacuations, and reducing exposure to threats such as explosive ordnance. For example, evacuations are a critical protection intervention in **Ukraine**,

⁵ These figures do not represent unique beneficiaries; it is the sum of reported reach across activities in these countries and may include individuals reached through multiple activities.

⁶ Progress is not even across regions with some regions such as Latin America falling behind.

⁷ According to the GPC global GBV WG more than 500 Women and Girls Safe Spaces having closed since 1 January 2026 in 14 countries with humanitarian emergencies, impacting the lives of an estimated 3 million women and girls.

enabling civilians facing sustained and escalating attacks to move away from immediate danger and seek safety. Protection and evacuation teams work with communities to identify people most at risk – including older people, persons with disabilities and those with limited mobility – and support safe, dignified movement despite increasingly dangerous conditions. Similarly, mine action contributes directly to this objective by helping people recognize and avoid explosive ordnance threats, reducing exposure to contaminated areas, and supporting safer behaviours and decision-making. In **Gaza**, explosive ordnance risk education sessions enabled children to recognize dangerous remnants of war, avoid contaminated areas and share life-saving information with their peers, reducing the risk of accidents in their communities. In **Sudan**, mine action partners are developing risk education materials together with survivors and organizations of persons with disabilities to alert people about the risk of explosive ordnance, while in **Afghanistan** risk education has been adapted to be disability-inclusive so that life-saving messages are accessible to all members of the community. Beyond risk education, survey, clearance and land release activities reduce civilian exposure to explosive hazards, enabling safer movement and helping prevent future harm. In **Myanmar**, GBV actors are working to ensure the specific protection and sexual and reproductive health risks faced by women and girls are addressed from the outset of a disaster through an inter-agency Anticipatory Action Framework for cyclones. This allows partners and communities to act earlier to identify at-risk individuals, reduce evacuation barriers, prevent avoidable maternal complications and mitigate the heightened risks of GBV associated with displacement and emergency sheltering.

Protection supports people to regain safety, recover from harm and exercise their rights

When harm does occur, protection helps individuals recover, access their rights and reconnect with the services and systems they need. In **Burkina Faso**, in 29 communes affected by severe humanitarian access constraints, protection actors are continuing to provide direct protection assistance, including mental health and psychosocial (MHPSS) support, emergency kits, and safe spaces for affected populations. These interventions go beyond prevention and awareness-raising to provide concrete protection services and assistance, with activities implemented primarily at grassroot level by local associations, including women-led organisations. In **Haiti**, child protection interventions are critical to preventing the recruitment and use of children by armed groups and supporting children formerly associated with them. Interventions include identifying children at heightened risk, helping them access education and age-appropriate livelihoods as safe alternatives, and supporting their safe, family- and community-based reintegration. In the **occupied Palestinian territory**, strengthened victim assistance and referral mechanisms have connected hundreds of direct victims of explosive ordnance to medical care, rehabilitation, psychosocial support and specialized services. In north-east **Nigeria**, victim assistance programmes have helped survivors access emergency treatment and referrals, reducing the financial burden on families and restoring hope to communities. In **Afghanistan**, community-based protection monitoring is enabling direct engagement with vulnerable community members and supporting their access to information and needed services in support of their rights and wellbeing – from specialized protection assistance to psycho-social supports to livelihoods programming. In eastern **DRC**, women and girls' safe spaces are providing safe, confidential, physical entry points that enable women and girls, including survivors of GBV, to access a range of life-saving services and assistance. In a context where conflict-related sexual violence has sharply escalated over the past year, these spaces are often the only confidential entry points for survivors to access medical care, psycho-social support and other protection services that support their safety and rights. They also provide a critical safe space for adolescent girls to meet and connect with other girls, particularly in conservative communities where their mobility is restricted.

Protection enables access to safe and inclusive humanitarian assistance

In an operating environment shaped by severe funding constraints and shrinking humanitarian resources, protection helps humanitarian actors identify and overcome challenges that prevent people from accessing assistance on an equal basis. Mobile services, home visits and tailored assistance help people overcome physical, communication and other barriers to accessing support. By responding to people's distinct needs, these approaches position protection as a driver of more inclusive, safer and effective ensuring that the right assistance reached those who need it most, at the right time. In **South Sudan**, persons with disabilities and their representative organizations actively participated in mapping services and identifying accessibility barriers that need to be addressed and mitigated, helping shape more inclusive humanitarian assistance and response. In **Afghanistan**, a national mapping of mine victim assistance and disability services, combined with a dedicated mine action hotline, enables survivors and persons with disabilities to access information, tailored referrals and needed support. In **Ukraine**, the Age and Disability Technical Working Group under the Protection Cluster engaged directly with Older People's Associations (OPAs) and Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs)

to inform the HNRP process. These consultations revealed that humanitarian assistance often remains inaccessible or inappropriate for these populations, highlighting urgent needs from prolonged power and heating outages for those dependent on medical devices, risks faced by people living with dementia and their caregivers, as well as older women-headed households struggling to afford rising medication and fuel costs. Integrating these insights with disaggregated data helps guide prioritisation and adapt assistance to the risks and access barriers identified by older people and persons with disabilities themselves. In **Ethiopia**, protection efforts have amplified the voices of older people by actively engaging OPAs in coordination mechanisms, ensuring that operational decisions are guided by their priorities rather than assumptions about their needs. In **Sudan**, broader protection efforts have addressed the invisibility of older people by embedding age considerations into core assessments – such as the Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) and Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) – and driving capacity strengthening through inclusive humanitarian action training. Age, gender and disability considerations are also being integrated into mine action planning and data collection, which improved the identification of protection risks and helped address barriers to assistance.

The progress by protection actors within the constraint environment depends on people being able to get support for as long as they need it. The GPC's *Protection Capacities Under Pressure* report shows that people are facing shorter or less frequent contact, reduced follow-up and fewer options for specialized referrals. This can mean that a need is identified but not resolved, or that initial support is not followed by the care people need to recover. Sustaining protection means keeping these connections intact, particularly for people facing the greatest barriers to accessing help.

People's own assessment of their safety and access to rights must guide how we understand progress. Alongside monitoring the response, we need to know whether people face fewer protection risks, can safely access the services they are referred to, and find the support appropriate to their needs. Combining this evidence with community feedback would give a clearer picture of what protection interventions achieve and where more action is needed.

4. Field Coordination and Operations



The GPC provides interagency field support through a system of country focal points, who provide day-to-day country level support to cluster operations. Additionally, the GPC hosts dedicated capacity to support advocacy, analysis, information management, child protection, gender-based violence, as well cross-cutting issues such as inclusion. Interagency field support capacity is provided by UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, OHCHR, NRC, NORCAP, Help-Age, SDC and War Child Alliance. For more information, please consult: [GPC Interagency Field Support Trends Overview January-June 2026](#)

556

Support requests from
cluster operations

22


Cluster operations
receiving direct support

16

Partners, task teams and
other experts involved in
providing field support


192

Of the 556 requests have
been from thematic
specialists (CP & GBV)




In the first half of 2026, coordination teams requested support in revising and updating cluster administration documents, including ToRs, SOPs and membership, to ensure consolidation of the cluster. Multiple countries experienced new shocks and crises that required additional support to update strategies, tools and partner approaches including the Ebola response in the DRC and the Earthquakes in Venezuela and Colombia.

Building on progress made by country operations in 2025, the GPC continued to provide support to Protection Clusters in their consolidation efforts, to meet the June 2026 deadline issued by the ERC. 28% of all requests are linked to consolidation or from countries undertaking IASC transition.



The GPC provided 5 field support missions – Palestine (consolidation), Myanmar (HCT protection leadership), Niger (training & consolidation), Nigeria (transition) and South Sudan (consolidation and operations) and held 3 peer-to-peer sessions between coordination team members on protection issues linked to men and boys (January 2026), experiences of engagement with area-based coordination (January 2026), and reflection on the transition of HLP from protection coordination (April 2026). 21 of the 22 cluster operations participated in the Cluster Coordination Performance Monitoring (CCPM).



Protection Clusters engaged in the PoC Week, Human Rights Council, and Special Rapporteur processes, while 7 clusters issued Protection Analysis Updates. The GPC also launched the 2026 Protection Series with partners presenting existing tools that are essential to protection action. Between January – September 2026, the GPC has hosted 6 sessions, on the Professional Standards for Protection Work (ICRC), Digital Risks (ICRC), the Stockholm Manual (IHL Resource Centre), Cash for Protection Guidelines (C4P Task Team) and Case Management (IRC, NRC).

Annex: People exposed to risks and hotspots breakdown



The table below present the detailed overview of the people exposed to protection risks compared to the overall affected population, and the number of areas with at least 4 risks at severity 4 or 5 (hotspots).

Country	ISO3	People exposed to protection risks (PER)	Affected population	% PER	Hotspot locations	Eligible assessed locations	Hotspot %	PRA level
Afghanistan	AFG	35,108,807	48,595,624	72.2%	416	457	91.0%	ADM2
Burkina Faso	BFA	12,046,964	16,364,820	73.6%	19	335	5.7%	ADM3
Cameroon	CMR	1,968,621	3,158,214	62.3%	16	31	51.6%	ADM2
Central African Republic	CAF	4,385,788	5,434,226	80.7%	25	85	29.4%	ADM2
Chad	TCD	1,530,442	2,588,921	59.1%	19	70	27.1%	ADM2
Colombia	COL	8,000,000	53,399,171	15.0%	271	753	36.0%	ADM2
DR Congo	COD	51,082,477	54,177,098	94.3%	104	278	37.4%	ADM3
Ethiopia	ETH	81,941,226	115,103,466	71.2%	42	59	71.2%	ADM2
Haiti	HTI	2,232,569	3,203,008	69.7%	29	140	20.7%	ADM2
Mali	MLI	19,546,734	26,527,699	73.7%	49	157	31.2%	ADM2
Mozambique	MOZ	2,642,772	3,985,218	66.3%	10	19	52.6%	ADM2
Myanmar	MMR	42,846,295	57,008,150	75.2%	186	358	52.0%	ADM3
Niger	NER	14,423,484	17,232,942	83.7%	27	49	55.1%	ADM2
Nigeria	NGA	6,501,832	7,813,080	83.2%	7	48	14.6%	ADM2
oPt	OPT	5,536,706	5,564,858	99.5%	16	16	100.0%	ADM2
Somalia	SOM	18,052,143	22,789,568	79.2%	36	90	40.0%	ADM2
South Sudan	SSD	9,992,802	11,306,560	88.4%	43	79	54.4%	ADM2
Sudan	SDN	43,779,803	47,632,693	91.9%	106	188	56.4%	ADM2
Syrian Arab Republic	SYR	14,969,193	23,703,857	63.2%	31	262	11.8%	ADM2
Ukraine	UKR	2,683,319	2,981,221	90.0%	6	24	25.0%	ADM1
Venezuela	VEN	11,101,077	27,840,326	39.9%	11	24	45.8%	ADM1
Yemen	YEM	28,059,044	35,015,292	80.1%	161	335	48.1%	ADM2
Total		418,432,098	591,426,011	71%				

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