



HAITI

Protection Analysis Update

SEPTEMBER 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti has been experiencing a deepening political, security, and humanitarian protection crisis since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, with escalating armed violence and civil unrest, particularly in the West, Artibonite, and Centre departments. Weak rule of law institutions, constrained resources, and endemic corruption hinder the State's ability to protect and promote human rights. Armed violence exacerbates pre-existing humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities stemming from socio-economic inequalities and frequent natural disasters.

The Haitian population faces serious protection risks arising from the actions of armed groups, self-defence groups, and security forces. From 1 January to 31 July 2026, the Human Rights Service (HRS) of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented 3,373 killings and 1,494 injuries. During the same period, 176 people were kidnapped for ransom by armed groups, compared with 433 in 2025. .

These patterns of violence intersect with other protection risks and disproportionately affect people facing heightened vulnerabilities. Gender-based violence (GBV) remains alarmingly high and underreported, with 6,337 incidents, primarily affecting women and girls, reported between January and 31 July 2026. Children are exposed to violence, family separation and trafficking, including recruitment by armed groups, increasing their vulnerability to abuse and exploitation. Restrictions on freedom of movement further compound these risks, limiting access to food, safe drinking water, healthcare and education, disrupting the transportation of goods and constraining humanitarian access.

Continued violence and restrictions on movement have also contributed to more than 1.47 million people being internally displaced since 2022. Many live in increasingly overstretched host communities, while others remain in overcrowded and unsafe displacement sites with limited access to basic services. Repeated displacement has disrupted family and community networks, education, livelihoods and access to social protection, eroding existing coping capacities.

These internal displacement dynamics are compounded by forced returns of Haitians from countries of destination. Haitians returning from the Dominican Republic and other countries may face return without adequate safeguards or due process, often into areas where insecurity, limited services and weak institutional capacity constrain opportunities for safe and sustainable reintegration. The termination of U.S. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians on 27 July 2026, which had protected 350,000 Haitian nationals and the arrival of the first deportation flight in Cap-Haïtien on 20 August, further underscore the potential for increased return-related protection pressures.

Mass displacement forced returns and weakened State presence in areas affected by violence are aggravating barriers to legal identity and access to justice. Loss of documentation limited civil registration services and restricted access to legal assistance and remedies particularly affect internally displaced persons and forcibly returned Haitians. These barriers undermine fundamental rights and compound risks, including restrictions on freedom of movement, exposure to violence and exclusion from essential services.

Against this backdrop, the Humanitarian Reset provides an opportunity to move beyond responding to incidents and delivering assistance to address the underlying drivers of protection risks – by reducing threats, mitigating vulnerabilities and strengthening the capacities of affected populations, through prevention, community-based protection and multisectoral interventions. Such an approach is critical to strengthening community leadership and resilience, preserving social cohesion and ensuring that humanitarian interventions contribute measurably to reducing protection risks.

The priority protection risks¹ requiring immediate attention in the period covered by this analysis are:

1. **Attacks on members of the population and other unlawful killings, and attacks on public and private objects**
2. **Unlawful impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, and forced displacement**
3. **Gender-based violence**
4. **Forced recruitment and association of children in armed forces and groups**
5. **Impediments and/or restrictions to access to legal identity, remedies and justice**

¹ Based on the Protection Risk Assessment and the analysis of risk severity for the period 1 January–31 July 2026.

CONTEXT

CASUALTIES		GBV INCIDENTS		KIDNAPPING		INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS		CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED GROUPS	
4,867		6,337		176		1.47 M		892	
PERIOD	Source	PERIOD	Source	PERIOD	Source	PERIOD	Source	PERIOD	Source
Jan to July 2026	OHCHR	Jan to July 2026	Source GBV Thematic Area	Jan to July 2026	OHCHR	Total as of mid- 2026	IOM DTM	Jan to Dec2025	UNICEF

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Haiti continues to face political instability, shaped by long-standing institutional weaknesses, socio-economic challenges, and escalating armed violence. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2022, Haiti has been governed by transitional authorities. In April 2024, under the auspices of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) was established to guide the political transition and facilitate the restoration of constitutional order. However, persistent insecurity, political fragmentation, governance challenges, and allegations of corruption hampered progress towards key reforms and the organization of elections. As of mid-2026, Haiti remains under a transitional governance framework following the dissolution of the Transitional Presidential Council in February 2026, with Alix Didier Fils-Aimé serving as acting Prime Minister. The first round of legislative and presidential elections, initially scheduled for August 2026, have been postponed to December 2026. Despite these efforts, the continued expansion of armed groups, limited state presence, and worsening humanitarian conditions continue to undermine public confidence in state institutions and the prospects for a credible, inclusive, and peaceful return to democratic governance.

ESCALATION OF ARMED VIOLENCE AND EXPANSION OF ARMED GROUPS BEYOND PORT-AU-PRINCE

Since mid-2021, armed groups in Haiti have significantly expanded their territorial control and influence, committing widespread human rights violations and abuses, including killings, kidnappings, sexual violence, restrictions on freedom of movement, forced displacement, extortion, and the destruction of public and private property. These tactics are used to subjugate communities, consolidate territorial control, and undermine state authority. Major infrastructure, transport corridors, and economic hubs in and around Port-au-Prince remain affected by the presence and criminal activities of armed groups, constraining the movement of people, humanitarian assistance, and commercial goods. International flights to Port-au-Prince remain suspended following the shooting of commercial aircrafts in late 2024.

By mid-2026, security force operations had contained the expansion of armed groups in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. This had, however, prompted some armed groups to shift their activities to other areas of the capital, which subsequently experienced a significant increase in armed violence, including in the Plaine-du-Cul de Sac and Cité Soleil. At the same time, armed groups have continued to exercise their criminal governance in their strongholds, resorting to targeted killings, severe beating and sexual violence to enforce it. Armed groups have also continued to expand their attacks and other criminal activities into the Artibonite, Centre, and South-East departments, further weakening state presence and access to basic services. In the Artibonite and Centre departments, recurrent attacks, clashes between rival armed groups and self-defense groups, and efforts to control key transportation routes have triggered large-scale displacement, disrupted livelihoods, and heightened protection risks for affected populations.

The expansion of armed groups towards the Centre department and key border corridors with the Dominican Republic, as well as their growing presence in the South-East, raises concerns over the further spread of insecurity into previously less affected

areas. This evolution threatens regional connectivity, increases risks of cross-border trafficking in persons, arms, and ammunition, and further limits humanitarian access and the delivery of essential services. The continued geographic expansion of armed violence is contributing to new displacement trends and exacerbating already severe humanitarian and protection needs across the country.




Figure 1 - Mapping of Protection Risk Severity

The most severe protection risks (Phase 5 – Very High) are concentrated in the West and Artibonite departments. In the West, Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Kenscoff, Gressier, Cité Soleil, Tabarre and Croix-des-Bouquets are classified as Phase 5, while in the Artibonite, L'Estère, Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite and Desdunes are similarly affected. These areas represent the main hotspots for killings, injuries and attacks on civilian objects, reflecting the intensity and geographic concentration of armed violence.

WEAK RULE OF LAW INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY FORCES INTERVENTIONS

Haiti's law enforcement and justice institutions remain severely constrained by limited resources, weak oversight mechanisms, corruption, and the deterioration of state authority across large parts of the country. While the Haitian National Police (HNP) has intensified anti-armed groups operations, concerns persist regarding lack of precautionary measures, excessive use of force, summary executions, civilian harm, and lack of accountability for human rights violations committed during security operations. Self-defence groups and non-organized members of the population continue to carry out acts of so-called "popular justice", including killings of individuals suspected of affiliation with armed groups, further contributing to cycles of violence and impunity.

To counter the expansion of armed groups, the Haitian Government has increasingly relied on joint security operations involving the HNP, including a specialized government task force the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD'H), as well as, since 2025, the use of armed drones and other force-multiplying technologies. Despite operational gains in some areas, security interventions

have at times resulted in casualties among members of the population, including deaths and injuries linked to drone strikes and operations conducted in densely populated urban neighborhoods. Allegations of disproportionate use of force and concerns regarding civilian-harm mitigation, transparency, and lack of accountability continue to be raised by human rights actors.

The international security response has also evolved. The Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, deployed in June 2024 pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 2699 (2023), faced chronic staffing, and operational constraints that limited its impact. Following continued deterioration of the security situation, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2793 (2025), authorizing the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) in late 2025 to replace the MSS, with an expanded mandate and significantly greater personnel and operational capacity. By mid-2026, the GSF has begun deploying new international personnel and conducting intelligence-led operations alongside the HNP and FAd'H, supported by a UN logistical support mission (United Nations Support Office in Haiti, UNSOH). As of September 2026, the GSF remains in a scaling-up phase and has commenced patrols but has not yet begun full-scale operations. Continued monitoring of compliance with international human rights standards, prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, child protection, civilian-harm mitigation, and accountability mechanisms remain essential.

Haiti's justice system remains deeply dysfunctional, creating significant barriers to access to justice and perpetuating widespread impunity. Courts operate with limited capacity, many judicial personnel face security constraints, and pre-trial detention rates remain among the highest in the world. The establishment by Government decree of two specialized judicial units (*pôles judiciaires spécialisés*) in April 2025 represents an important step towards strengthening accountability and addressing impunity. One unit focuses on corruption and complex financial crimes, while the other addresses serious human rights violations, including sexual violence. Progress has since been made towards their operationalization, with 12 judges and magistrates assigned to the specialized judicial units. The units have also begun processing cases related to mass crimes, marking an important step towards their effective operationalization.

Overcrowding, inadequate food and water, limited access to healthcare, and poor sanitation continue to characterize cruel, inhuman and degrading detention conditions. The deterioration of security, mass displacement, and rising forced returns have further reduced access to legal remedies, particularly for internally displaced persons, returnees, women, children, and persons lacking civil documentation. As a result, public confidence in judicial institutions remains extremely low, while accountability for serious human rights violations and abuses remains limited.

BARRIERS TO BASIC SERVICES, MARGINALIZATION, AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES

Haiti faces some of the most severe social and economic inequalities in the Americas, rooted in decades of political instability, entrenched corruption and impunity, recurrent economic crises, natural disasters, and chronic underinvestment in public institutions. The expansion of armed group criminal activities, combined with weakened state presence, has further reduced the Government's capacity to provide basic services and maintain social protection systems. Armed violence and displacement have exacerbated existing vulnerabilities, particularly in the West, Artibonite and Centre departments, where communities face increasing barriers to accessing essential services and livelihoods.

PROTECTION RISKS

RISK 1

Attacks on members of the population and other unlawful killings, and attacks on public and private objects

Between January and July 2026, killings, injuries and attacks on public and private infrastructure remained among the most severe protection risks in Haiti. Armed violence continued to expose members of the population to direct physical harm while simultaneously affecting homes, businesses, schools, health facilities, agricultural assets and other infrastructure essential to the survival and well-being of affected communities.

According to data collected by BINUH and OHCHR, **3,373 people were killed and 1,494 injured** between 1 January and 31 July 2026, representing 4,867 casualties, of whom **83% were men, 13% women, 2% boys and 2% girls**. This represents a 7.6 per cent decrease in killings but a 7.3 per cent increase in injuries compared with the same period in 2025, when at least 3,650 people were killed and 1,393 injured.

Three main dynamics accounted for these casualties: attacks perpetrated by armed groups, security forces operations against armed groups, including summary executions involving police personnel; and acts of “popular justice” by self-defence groups and mobs.

CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE	NUMBER OF VICTIMS	PERCENTAGE
During security operations conducted by the Haitian National Police (HNP) against gangs, including summary executions involving police officers, and actions carried out by a “task force”, composed of police officers and a private military company	2,540	52.2%
Attacks by armed groups against the population	1,996	41%
Acts of “popular justice” by self-defense groups and non-organized members of the population	243	5%
Summary executions by the Haitian National Police	82	1.8%

Table 1 - Context of Violence between 1 January and 31 July 2026

Armed groups remained responsible for a substantial proportion of killings and injuries, notably during attacks on areas perceived to be under the influence of rival armed groups. They also continued to impose criminal governance in areas under their control through targeted killings, severe beatings, sexual violence and other forms of violence. In addition, they restricted freedom of movement, imposed illegal checkpoints and extortion, attacked or damaged public and private property, agricultural assets and infrastructure essential to civilian life.

The escalation of violence in the **Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil** illustrates the severity of this risk. Between **6 March and 31 July 2026, at least 613 people were killed and 375 injured** during clashes between rival armed groups. Nearly one third of the casualties were people not associated with armed groups, including individuals hit by stray bullets or deliberately attacked because of suspected links with rival armed groups or security forces. These incidents demonstrate how territorial confrontations expose members of population not only to direct attacks but also to indiscriminate harm when fighting takes place in densely populated residential areas.

Attacks on and damage to infrastructure further amplify the consequences of armed violence. Armed groups have targeted public and private buildings and disrupted commercial activities and essential services, including schools and health facilities. During the March–July violence in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and Cité Soleil, such attacks led to the suspension of basic services, including education and healthcare, and commercial activities in affected neighbourhoods, and forced more than 18,000 people to flee. Health facilities have been particularly affected. On 11 May 2026, the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Cité Soleil was forced to temporarily suspend its activities following more than 24 hours of armed clashes that directly threatened the safety of patients and staff. Bullets struck the hospital premises, and a support staff member was hit by a stray bullet. In the face of continued gunfire and extreme insecurity, MSF evacuated the facility and temporarily suspended medical services. The hospital resumed normal activities in early June 2026, once security conditions had improved, restoring access to essential healthcare for the population of Cité Soleil. This was the third time MSF had been forced to suspend activities at its Cité Soleil hospital due to armed violence, following previous suspensions in April 2022 and March 2023. Beyond physical destruction, attacks against infrastructure create longer-term protection consequences by depriving communities of access to healthcare, education, markets and livelihoods. Continued insecurity in these areas therefore affects not only directly exposed communities but also the movement of essential goods and access to services for a broader population.

The increasing proportion of casualties linked to security operations represents an important evolution in the protection environment. Operations have intensified since late 2025 and have helped contain the advance of armed groups in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. However, they have not resulted in the sustained restoration of State authority in neighbourhoods already controlled by armed groups in the metropolitan Port-au-Prince area.

From 1 January until 31 July 2026, **approximately 79% of casualties documented during security operations were alleged armed groups members, while 21% were people not associated with armed groups, including people struck by stray bullets or drone strikes while inside their homes or undertaking daily activities in the streets.** Most operations took place in densely populated areas of metropolitan Port-au-Prince and were conducted by specialized HNP units, sometimes with support from international security actors or private contractors using explosive drones. These operations also resulted in damage to property.

The use of force in such densely populated environments creates significant risks for protection. Under Haiti's international human rights obligations, law-enforcement operations must respect the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability, including where security functions are delegated to private actors. Concerns are compounded by 82 summary executions involving police personnel. Reported cases included individuals suspected of affiliation or support to armed groups on the basis of their place of residence, appearance or inability to present identification documents, highlighting continued concerns regarding arbitrary profiling, due process and accountability.

THE PERSISTENT RISK OF KIDNAPPING

Kidnapping for ransom perpetrated by armed groups remained a significant protection risk in 2026, exposing victims and families to prolonged deprivation of liberty, extortion, psychological distress and, in some cases, physical and sexual violence during captivity. Between 1 January and 31 July 2026, **176 people (136 men, 28 women, eight boys and four girls)** were kidnapped for ransom by armed groups, compared with 433 people during the same period in 2025, **representing a 59.4 per cent decrease.** While kidnappings have decreased, they remain a significant protection concern. In 2026, cases are particularly reported in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, including Delmas, Port-au-Prince, Carrefour-Feuilles, Martissant, Croix-des-Bouquets, Pétion-Ville and Kenscoff. The Artibonite department was also affected, notably L'Estère and Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite. Cases of torture are not frequently reported; however, victims may be subjected to physical and sexual violence while in captivity. In June 2026², nine women and four girls were raped by gang members while being held captive following an attack in Belekou. The profile of victims also evolved, with perpetrators increasingly targeting individuals perceived as having greater financial means. The modus operandi has also become more organized and sophisticated, suggesting greater planning in the identification and targeting of victims. An evolving pattern has also been observed in the methods used by kidnappers to exert pressure on victims' families, including the use of video calls during captivity as a means of psychological coercion and to accelerate ransom negotiations. Actual figures of kidnapping are therefore likely to be higher as many families negotiate directly with perpetrators rather than involving the police.

RISK 2

Unlawful impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, and forced displacement

Armed groups continue to impose severe restrictions on freedom of movement across Haiti. Key transportation corridors linking Port-au-Prince with other departments of the country remain affected by armed control, illegal checkpoints, extortion practices, and recurrent armed confrontations. Restrictions on mobility, insecurity, and frequent security operations continue to disrupt the movement of people, goods, and humanitarian assistance, contributing to shrinking humanitarian space and undermining access to basic services and protection. Movement restrictions also affect access to livelihoods, healthcare, education, markets, and civil documentation services, particularly in areas under the influence of armed groups.

² Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q2 2026 (April–June 2026).

Public transportation remains limited, unreliable, and increasingly costly due to insecurity and operational constraints. Transport operators often avoid entering high-risk neighbourhoods, forcing residents to walk long distances or use unsafe routes, exposing them to risks including armed attacks, kidnapping, crossfire, and stray bullets. Fear of reprisals also compels many individuals to conceal their place of origin or residence when travelling between areas controlled by different armed actors. These constraints further isolate communities and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities.

Widespread violence, territorial expansion of armed groups, and deteriorating humanitarian conditions continue to drive large-scale displacement across the country. According to the 2026 latest IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, approximately **1.47 million people are internally displaced in Haiti, 79 per cent³ whom live outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.** Displacement patterns create differentiated protection risks. **While 84 per cent of IDPs live outside displacement sites,** mainly with host families or in rented accommodation, the remaining lives in spontaneous sites, where overcrowding, inadequate services and insecurity can heighten exposure to GBV, exploitation and other forms of violence. In the provinces, where 98 per cent of IDPs live outside sites, prolonged displacement places increasing pressure on host communities and household resources. Persistent gaps in food, livelihoods, shelter, water and sanitation, and healthcare further weaken coping capacities and may increase reliance on negative coping strategies.

Living conditions in displacement sites remain extremely precarious and are characterized by overcrowding, inadequate shelter, poor sanitation and limited access to healthcare. In addition, women and girls face increased risks of gender-based violence and exploitation, while children remain vulnerable to family separation, child labour, trafficking, recruitment by armed groups, and psychosocial distress. Older persons and persons with disabilities face additional barriers to assistance and protection due to inaccessible infrastructure and limited specialized services.

At the same time, **the Government has continued efforts to relocate internally displaced persons and closed⁴ certain displacement sites, particularly those established in schools and other public facilities.** While restoring access to public infrastructure and education services is a legitimate objective, humanitarian actors have raised concerns regarding the extent to which some relocations and returns are conducted in line with the principles of safety, voluntariness, dignity, and informed decision-making. In several locations, limited consultation with affected communities, insufficient information on available alternatives, and the lack of sustainable reintegration conditions have raised protection concerns. Many displaced families continue to face significant obstacles to durable solutions due to persistent insecurity, loss of housing, lack of livelihoods, and limited access to basic services.

Although IOM has recorded growing numbers of individuals returning to their communities of origin, conditions for sustainable return remain fragile. Many return movements appear to be driven by necessity rather than improved security conditions and take place in environments where basic services remain disrupted and protection risks persist. The continued presence of armed actors in many areas of origin, combined with extensive destruction of homes and livelihoods, limits the prospects for safe and lasting solutions.

Cross-border movements continue to compound vulnerabilities. **Deportations and forced returns** of Haitians from neighbouring countries, particularly the Dominican Republic, remain significant and place additional pressure on border communities and overstretched humanitarian services. From the Dominican Republic alone, an average of around 800 people has been forcibly returned every day in 2026 across the four border points with Haiti. Belladère and Ouanaminthe are the main entry points for deportations. Women, including pregnant and lactating with newborn babies, represent approximately 25% of all deportees in 2026, an increase compared with the averages observed in 2025 and particularly in 2024. Many returnees arrive with limited resources, lack civil documentation, and require immediate humanitarian and protection assistance. The absence of a comprehensive national framework for reception, referral, reintegration, and support further exacerbates risks of homelessness, exploitation, family separation, and onward displacement.

³ https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/98976?file=1&type=node&id=64836

⁴ Three displacement sites hosting approximately 12,000 people: the OPC site, the Ministry of Communication Annex, and École Nationale Colombie.

Concerns have also grown regarding the potential protection implications of changes in migration policies affecting Haitians abroad. According to an official communication transmitted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the Government of Haiti through the National Office for Migration (ONM) on 25 June 2026, the termination of U.S. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians, which had provided approximately 350,000 Haitian nationals with authorization to reside and work in the United States, is expected to result in a progressive increase in forced returns to Haiti. U.S. authorities estimated that these returns could reach or exceed 250 people per week over the following months. TPS was terminated on 27 July 2026, with the first deportation flight arriving in Cap-Haïtien on 20 August. While returns from the United States currently account for only 0.5% of the 141,720 forced returns recorded between January and June 2026, compared with 98.86% from the Dominican Republic, the termination of TPS could significantly alter this dynamic. If implemented at scale, increased returns would place additional pressure on already overstretched national, humanitarian, protection and reintegration capacities and could heighten protection and human rights risks, particularly for children, women, older persons and persons with disabilities. In anticipation of these risks, the Office National de la Migration (ONM) developed a National Contingency Plan for the Reception and Assistance of Haitian Migrants Forcibly Returned from the United States, focusing on preparedness, emergency reception, protection of the most vulnerable, coordinated response and sustainable reintegration. Effective implementation of the plan will require sustained technical and financial support from the international community to prevent further deterioration of protection conditions and human rights.

RISK 3 Gender-based violence

Gender-based violence (GBV) in Haiti continued to deteriorate sharply in 2026 as the combined effects of expanding influence by armed groups, mass displacement and deepening poverty. Further, the erosion of state protection mechanisms increased exposure to violence and reduced access to protection and assistance. Between January and July 2026, **6,337 GBV incidents were reported** by 23 organizations⁵, with a marked monthly increase throughout the year. Women and girls remain disproportionately affected, accounting for 96% of survivors, while perpetrators are **overwhelmingly men (94%)**, predominantly **members of armed gangs (76%)**. Rape remained the most prevalent form of GBV, followed by psychological violence and physical assault.

Sexual violence perpetrated by armed groups remains of alarming concern. During the first semester of 2026 (January–June), **1,088 victims of sexual violence involving armed groups** reported their cases through the Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements (MARA), with 88% reporting having been raped collectively. It should be noted that, of the 1,088 victims, 63% stated that they had been raped during the first semester of 2026, while 38% reported having been raped between 2020 and 2025. Retrospective reporting thus remained a concern, highlighting victims' reluctance or inability to report earlier due to fear of retaliation, stigma, limited access to service providers, and lack of trust in the police and justice system. In some instances, sexual violence was used by gangs during attacks on localities as a deliberate tool of subjugation and intimidation, and to force displacement. In other instances, it was used as a means of "punishment" and to enforce compliance with gangs' criminal governance. Other victims were raped after being intercepted in the streets while carrying out their daily activities, or when perpetrators broke into their homes.

The risk of GBV remains heavily concentrated in the West department, particularly in Port-au-Prince and surrounding communes. However, 2026 witnessed both an intensification and a geographic expansion of the phenomenon. Cité Soleil emerged as the most affected commune during the second quarter, while incidents were documented for the first time in parts of the Southeast department, illustrating the spread of insecurity and associated protection risks beyond traditional hotspots.

Displacement continues to be a major driver and aggravating factor of GBV risk. **Internally displaced persons living in host communities constitute the largest group of survivors.** Overcrowded living conditions, economic dependence, extortion, and

⁵ The data on GBV incidents is derived from aggregated reports submitted by multiple partners, whose reporting capacities may vary monthly. Both the number of reporting partners and the figures may therefore fluctuate over time. Incidents are voluntarily disclosed by survivors in the context of service provision. No identifiable data is shared with the GBV thematic area by partners.

social exclusion increase exposure to abuse, particularly for women and adolescent girls. Heightened vulnerabilities are also reported among homeless women, displaced children, women with disabilities, female-headed households, unaccompanied and separated children, returnees and deportees, and LGBTIQ+ persons, who face intersecting forms of discrimination and barriers to accessing protection and services. In displacement sites, poor infrastructure, including inadequate lighting, insecure sanitation facilities, and distant water points, creates conditions that facilitate sexual violence and exploitation. Incidents frequently occur in survivors' homes following forced entry, on roads and public spaces, and, to a lesser extent, in displacement sites themselves.

Access to comprehensive, timely and survivor-centred services remains severely constrained. According to UNFPA⁶, during the period January–July 2026, repeated waves of violence and displacement have overwhelmed health facilities, leading to shortages of post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits and other essential medical supplies. Only 25% of survivors whose cases were reported by GBV service providers accessed care within the critical 72-hour window for effective HIV prevention and emergency contraception; 58% accessed services between 72 hours and one month after the incident, while 17% accessed services more than one month later.

Survivors face multiple obstacles, including insecurity along transportation routes, movement restrictions imposed by armed groups, high transportation costs, fear of retaliation, and interruptions to referral pathways. Access to justice remains equally limited. The issuance of medico-legal certificates continues to be restricted by shortages of accredited personnel and the persistence of unauthorized fees, while fear of reprisals, stigma and limited trust in authorities contribute to significant underreporting of cases through formal judicial and law enforcement channels. Service provision remains uneven, with comparatively greater access to medical services and psychosocial support than to shelters, legal assistance, livelihood opportunities and longer-term recovery support.

As displacement, insecurity and economic hardship deepen, **affected populations increasingly resort to harmful coping mechanisms.** Transactional and survival sex have become common strategies for women and adolescent girls seeking food, shelter, income or protection. These practices increase exposure to HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies, further exploitation. Families are increasingly resorting to child and forced marriage as a perceived protective measure against armed violence, while adolescent girls adopt extreme self-protection strategies that often expose them to additional risks. Women heading households are frequently forced to undertake informal economic activities in areas controlled by armed groups despite the high risk of sexual violence. Reports also indicate increased substance abuse as a coping mechanism among survivors seeking to deal with trauma and distress.

RISK 4 Forced recruitment and association of children in armed groups

The continued deterioration of the security situation in Haiti, particularly in the West and Artibonite departments, is increasing the risk of children becoming associated with armed groups. Structural and crisis-related factors, including poverty, limited access to education, forced displacement, and recent evictions from displacement sites into insecure areas, have further weakened family, community and social protection mechanisms and heightened children's vulnerability to recruitment and use by armed groups. According to OHCHR data, 26 criminal gangs are operating across the West, Artibonite and Centre departments, with their total membership estimated at approximately 11,000 individuals. **Most gang members are young people**, the vast majority of whom have been involved in serious criminal violence. This context further underscores the risks faced by children and adolescents living in areas under the influence or control of armed groups.

Children associated with armed groups, some as young as 10 years old, are exploited in a range of roles, including domestic tasks such as cleaning and cooking, surveillance of police movements, transporting ammunition, delivering extortion payment letters to businesses, and participating in clashes against other armed groups and security forces. **Girls face heightened vulnerability to sexual exploitation and are often forced into sexual relationships with members of armed groups, while other children are coerced into violent criminal activities.** This trend is fueled by a complex interplay of coercion and structural

⁶ GBV Incident Reports (Quarter 1 and Quarter 2, and July 2026), ReliefwebResponse.

factors, exploited through the criminal governance established by armed groups in neighborhoods under their control. Threats and violence against children and their families facilitate recruitment, while poverty, food insecurity, school dropout and unmet basic needs can drive children to join armed groups in search of economic support, protection or a sense of belonging. Children from low-income and/or single-headed households are particularly at risk, while close family or community ties with armed group members can further facilitate recruitment. Once recruited, many children are unable to leave freely due to threats and fear of retaliation, while the absence of alternative livelihoods can prolong their association. Rejection or violence from families and communities further compounds their isolation and creates additional barriers to reintegration. Adopting a human trafficking perspective marks a critical shift: it places armed groups' abuses against children within a broader human rights framework, underscores the need for stronger protection measures for all children under 18, and affirms that those involved are victims, not perpetrators.

These practices constitute grave violations of children's rights. According to the 2025 Annual Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, 2,088 grave violations were verified against 1,661 children in Haiti, **including 892 cases of recruitment and use** and 620 cases of killing and maiming. While these figures likely reflect only a fraction of the reality, qualitative evidence gathered by the Human Rights Service of BINUH, OHCHR and UNICEF from State authorities and service providers confirms both the alarming rise of this phenomenon compared to the previous year and its devastating impact on children's rights and communities. **Between January and July 2026, Protection Cluster partners documented and supported the reintegration of 185 children associated with armed groups**, further illustrating the continued scale of children's exposure to recruitment and association with armed groups and the need to strengthen identification, protection, release and sustainable reintegration mechanisms.

While the 2023 "Protocol of Agreement on the Transfer, Reception, and Care of Children Associated with Armed groups Encountered During Security Operations on National Territory", signed between the Government of Haiti and the United Nations, provides an important framework for the handover and care of affected children, **sustainable reintegration remains severely constrained by persistent insecurity, continued population displacement, risks of re-recruitment, stigma, family and community rejection, and concerns over reprisals**. While some provisions of the protocol are being implemented, others remain pending. It is essential that security operations respect human rights and respect the Protocol when encountering CAAFAG. At the same time, the national child protection system - including the Police Brigade for the Protection of Minors (BPM) and the Institute of Social Welfare and Research (IBESR) - must be strengthened, as both institutions currently lack the financial and human resources required to meet the growing scale of needs of children associated with armed groups.

Addressing the involvement of children with armed groups in Haiti requires a holistic and integrated response. Social protection and education programs targeting at-risk children and youth, as well as support for their families, are essential to creating safe environments, building resilience and reducing vulnerability to recruitment by addressing poverty, social exclusion, and lack of socio-economic opportunities.

Civic education initiatives, including human rights education, peaceful conflict resolution and psychosocial support, complement school efforts to build resilience. Because many schools cannot operate, community and faith-based organizations, with UN support, run child friendly spaces that provide food, basic services, psychosocial care, sports, and skills training.

RISK 5 Impediments and/or restrictions to access to legal identity, remedies and justice

The ongoing security and humanitarian crisis in Haiti continues to severely undermine access to legal identity, legal remedies, and justice. Widespread violence, repeated displacement, the expansion of armed group control, and the weakening of public institutions have significantly reduced access to civil registration and justice services, increasing protection risks for crisis-affected populations. According to the MSNA 2025, 10% of households across Haiti reported facing barriers to accessing judicial or administrative services due to threats in their community.

Access to civil documentation remains a major challenge across the country. According to the National Identification Office (ONI)⁷, since 2019 and as of 31 July 2026, **6,614,094 National Identification Cards (CINs) have been produced**, of which **89.04% have been delivered**, leaving approximately **725,000 cards (10.96%) undelivered**. The largest numbers of CINs were recorded in Ouest (2,412,588), Artibonite (691,125) and Centre (410,038), departments significantly affected by violence and displacement. Non-delivery is mainly linked to difficulties in locating or reaching applicants, including displacement and changes of residence, as well as insecurity and access constraints affecting both applicants and identification services. Repeated displacement also increases the risk of identity cards being lost, damaged or left behind, while insecurity and limited access to administrative services make their replacement difficult. **Nearly 30% of forcibly returned Haitians arrive without documentation**, according to IOM DTM 2026.

Access to birth certificates is particularly constrained in areas where civil registry officers are absent or services are no longer functioning. The lack of digitized civil registries further limits the ability to retrieve, verify or reissue birth records when original documents or physical registers are lost, damaged or destroyed. These structural weaknesses are compounded by insecurity, displacement and restrictions on movement, which prevent people from reaching administrative services.

The absence of legal identity has significant protection consequences. Individuals without documentation face restrictions in accessing humanitarian assistance, healthcare, education, employment, freedom of movement, and other basic services. They are also at heightened risk of arbitrary arrest, extortion, discrimination, exploitation, trafficking, and other threats to their physical integrity, particularly when crossing checkpoints or moving through areas controlled by different armed actors. Women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, internally displaced persons, and deported or forcibly returned Haitians face particular barriers to accessing documentation and related services.

For households who sought to access the judicial system, 18% reported facing barriers due to lack of documentation according to the 2025 MSNA, particularly in the communes of Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre and Petionville in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. In the April 2026 round of the [Protection Risk Monitoring](#), 9 of the 17 assessed *sections communales* in the Ouest department reported some degree of movement restrictions based on the absence of documentation.

Access to justice remains severely constrained. Insecurity, attacks on public infrastructure, and the limited presence of state authorities have disrupted the functioning of courts, police stations, prosecution services, and legal aid mechanisms in several parts of the country. Many survivors of human rights violations and protection incidents are unable or unwilling to seek redress due to insecurity, fear of reprisals, lack of resources, movement restrictions, and limited confidence in available institutions. The Office de la Protection du Citoyen (OPC), which has a mandate to provide legal assistance and support to victims, maintains a presence across all 10 departments; however, limited human and financial resources constrain its capacity to respond to protection needs and facilitate access to remedies, particularly in areas most affected by insecurity. Vulnerable individuals often encounter significant obstacles in accessing legal assistance, complaint mechanisms, and effective remedies. These challenges are compounded for displaced populations and returnees, many of whom require support to recover lost documentation, re-establish legal identity, and access protection and justice services.

The combination of limited access to legal identity, weakened justice institutions, and restricted access to effective remedies continues to deepen exclusion, heighten protection risks, and impede the exercise of fundamental rights. Strengthened efforts are needed to expand access to civil documentation, support birth registration and identity recovery, reinforce legal aid and referral systems, and improve safe and equitable access to justice for populations affected by violence, displacement, and forced returns. The erosion of legal identity and access to justice is not only a protection concern but also a key driver of exclusion, vulnerability, and rights violations. Addressing these barriers is essential to ensuring protection, social inclusion, and durable solutions for displaced, returned, and crisis-affected populations in Haiti.

⁷ <https://oni.gouv.ht/>

RESPONSE

PROGRESS MADE ON PROTECTION

Despite severe insecurity, access constraints and major funding gaps, the protection response in Haiti contributed not only to meeting immediate needs, but also to reducing exposure to protection risks, mitigating their consequences and strengthening capacities to prevent and respond to harm. Between January and July 2026, **Protection Cluster partners reached 167,738 people, including 131,327 women and girls (78.3%) and 36,411 men and boys (21.7%).** Community-based organizations played a central role in identifying bereaved families, orphaned children, persons acquiring disabilities through armed violence and households losing their main income earner. Combined psychosocial, medical, referral and livelihood support helped affected people manage the consequences of violence and, for some households, reduce reliance on harmful coping strategies, including school dropout and children's exposure to exploitation or recruitment.

Progress in legal identity, justice and accountability also addressed structural factors that increase protection risks. More than 70,000 civil documents had been delivered by mid-2026 and over 12,000 people benefited from legal counselling and awareness activities, strengthening their ability to exercise rights and access services and remedies. The May 2026 launch of the Specialized Judicial Courts (Pôles judiciaires spécialisés), including jurisdiction over massacres and other serious violations, established an additional institutional avenue for accountability. Its effective operationalization will be critical for this progress to translate into stronger deterrence and reduced impunity.

The GBV response combined direct assistance with measures aimed at strengthening the protective environment. Between January and July, partners reported **46,403 interventions, including 5,552 people receiving psychosocial support, 3,705 accessing safe spaces and 2,118 receiving GBV case management.** At the same time, five GBV coordination platforms became operational, 299 police officers across all 10 departments were trained in survivor-centred investigation and evidence collection, specialized police facilities were rehabilitated and equipped, and 176 judges and prosecutors received specialized training. These investments strengthened national capacity to identify, refer, investigate and respond to sexual violence, while a nationwide prevention campaign reached 8,836 people directly and generated more than 1.4 million online interactions.

Child protection achievements similarly went beyond individual service delivery. **185 children associated with armed groups were supported in reintegration, while 1,563 separated or unaccompanied children received assistance and family reunification,** directly addressing risks associated with recruitment, exploitation and prolonged family separation. A further **4,901 children affected by violence and exploitation received support, 18,640 children received MHPSS and 58,444 were reached with information on rights and protection.** The first meeting in June 2026 of the inter-institutional task force implementing the 2023 Protocol on the Transfer and Care of Children Associated with Armed Groups also established a stronger national mechanism for identification, referral, care and reintegration.

At community level, Community Resource Centres helped connect displaced people, returnees and host communities to legal, social and humanitarian services, strengthening local pathways to assistance and reducing barriers to protection. At strategic level, the operationalization of the Protection Cluster Strategic Advisory Group in February 2026 strengthened collective leadership, national participation and prioritization. Taken together, these achievements indicate progress not only in the number of people assisted, but in strengthening the capacities, systems and mechanisms needed to reduce vulnerabilities, mitigate the effects of violations and address some of the conditions sustaining protection risks.

ACCESS-RELATED CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS

From January to the end of June 2026, OCHA, through the Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework (AMRF), recorded 230 humanitarian access constraints across the country. While this figure illustrates the scale of the challenge, the number of reported incidents should not, in itself, be considered a measure of the severity of the access situation. Rather, the impact of these constraints on the continuity, coverage and timeliness of humanitarian operations, as well as on affected populations'

ability to safely reach or receive health, education, water and sanitation, protection, food and other essential services, is a more meaningful indicator. Constraints are particularly acute in the **Ouest, Artibonite and Centre departments**, while insecurity and associated access challenges continue to expand into other parts of the country.

The erosion of State authority and command and control, combined with the consolidation and expansion of armed groups, has further fragmented the operating environment. At the same time, the lack of effective command and control within the PNH and with coordination and information-sharing mechanisms that remain under development, add complexity to humanitarian engagement and meaningful coordination. The deployment of the GSF adds a further layer of fragmentation to the humanitarian operating environment, given its evolving command structure, expanding operational footprint and the need to establish clear and predictable coordination mechanisms with the HNP and humanitarian actors. The increasing use of explosive drones in security operations introduces an additional and highly unpredictable risk for civilians and humanitarian personnel.

In this environment, access cannot be considered solely as a security or logistical issue: humanitarian activities themselves may carry risks of unintended consequences, including perceptions of affiliation with security actors, the transfer of resources or information to parties to the conflict, or the exacerbation of existing tensions and inequalities. A strengthened do-no-harm approach is therefore essential, requiring humanitarian actors to systematically assess the potential direct and indirect impact of their activities, adapt modalities where necessary, and ensure that engagement with the PNH, GSF and other authorities remains strictly aimed at facilitating safe, principled and independent humanitarian action. Ultimately, restoring and maintaining access must be understood not simply as enabling humanitarian organizations to move, but as ensuring that affected populations can safely and sustainably access the assistance and basic services they need, without humanitarian action inadvertently contributing to the dynamics driving the crisis.

CRITICAL GAPS IN FUNDING AND POPULATION REACHED

Funding for protection activities remains low in 2026, with the Protection Chapter of the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) funded at approximately **26 per cent**, significantly limiting the ability of protection actors to meet escalating needs across Haiti. Limited donor contributions continue to affect the availability of essential protection services, including case management, coordination, psychosocial support, legal assistance, protection monitoring, and specialized interventions for women and girls, children, persons with disabilities, older persons, and LGBTIQ+ individuals. Consultations with Protection Cluster partners have highlighted a growing gap between protection needs and available response capacity and called for funding proportionate to the severity and evolution of protection risks. Nevertheless, important progress has been made in strengthening the centrality of protection within humanitarian financing mechanisms. Protection considerations, particularly those related to assistance, have been increasingly integrated into the allocation strategies of pooled funds, helping to ensure that life-saving protection interventions and protection mainstreaming are reflected across multisectoral responses. The increased emphasis on financing **life-saving interventions** has been key to recognize that protection activities, including physical protection, psychosocial support, legal assistance, case management, and protection monitoring, save lives. At the same time, addressing protection risks in a sustainable manner requires complementary investments beyond emergency life-saving assistance, including support for community-based protection, resilience, social cohesion, durable solutions, and institutional capacity strengthening to tackle the root causes and drivers of protection risks, including those related to armed actors. Sustained and increased investment is required to prevent and reduce growing protection risks, maintain critical services, and ensure that protection remains at the centre of humanitarian action in Haiti.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RISK 1

Attacks on members of the population and other unlawful killings, and attacks on public and private objects

HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

- Integrate civilian-harm mitigation measures in all security operations against armed groups, particularly in densely populated areas, including through systematic risk assessments, precautionary measures and operational planning to minimizing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.
- Strengthen efforts to prevent and respond to attacks and unlawful killings perpetrated by armed groups and self-defence groups, including through enhanced early-warning mechanisms, protection measures for populations at risk, effective investigations and prosecutions of alleged perpetrators, and measures to prevent recurrence.
- Ensure that all use of force by the HNP and other law-enforcement actors complies with international human rights standards and strengthen IGPNH capacity to promptly and independently investigate alleged summary executions, excessive or disproportionate use of force, with appropriate judicial follow-up and access to remedies for victims. Establish and enforce effective regulatory, oversight and accountability mechanisms for private security actors and the use of explosive drones, including systematic documentation and investigation of civilian casualties and damage to public or private infrastructure.
- Operationalize the Specialized Judicial Courts (*Pôles judiciaires spécialisés*) and strengthen investigation and prosecution of massacres, unlawful killings and other serious human rights violations, while ensuring protection and access to remedies for victims, witnesses and affected families.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

- Provide technical and institutional support for the operationalization of the Specialized Judicial Courts and the investigation and prosecution of serious violations.
- Reinforce implementation of the targeted arms embargo and measures against illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition.
- Safeguard predictable and flexible resources for essential protection capacities, particularly protection monitoring, Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS), child protection, community-based protection and assistance to victims and families affected by killings and serious injuries, including through direct support to national, community, women and youth-led organizations able to maintain protection presence in hard-to-reach areas.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Strengthen protection monitoring and early warning in areas affected by armed clashes, including systematic documentation of civilian casualties and the protection impact of attacks on homes and essential civilian infrastructure.
- Expand MHPSS and referral services for individuals and families affected by killings and injuries.
- Support community-based protection mechanisms in high-risk and hard-to-reach areas.
- Ensure Health, Education, Shelter, Food Security and Cash responses systematically identify and mitigate secondary consequences of killings, injuries and attacks on civilian infrastructure, applying the Do No Harm principle.

SECURITY FORCES

- Fully implement and strengthen the GSF human rights compliance and oversight mechanism, ensuring that human rights standards are translated into operational practice, including through pre-deployment and scenario-based training, operational guidance, monitoring and after-action reviews.

RISK 2 Unlawful impediments or restrictions to freedom of movement, and forced displacement

HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

- Adopt a national policy on internal displacement, establishing clear responsibilities of national and local authorities, for prevention, protection and assistance of internally displaced persons throughout all phases of displacement. It should as well establish pathways towards durable solutions based on safety, voluntariness, dignity and respect for the rights of displaced persons.
- Ensure that any relocation, closure, consolidation, or transition of IDP sites is conducted in line with international protection standards, including voluntariness, informed decision-making, safety, dignity, meaningful participation and access to viable solutions before, during, and after relocation.
- Strengthen preparedness, reception, protection screening, and reintegration mechanisms for forcibly returned Haitians, including in anticipation of a potential increase in returns by land and air.
- Promote community-driven social cohesion strategies, including in hosting areas.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Support community contingency planning in areas affected by or at risk of violence to strengthen local preparedness and response capacity.
- Support government's efforts to ensure protection screening, referrals and community-based reintegration support for internally displaced or forcibly returned Haitians, with particular attention to persons with specific needs and those at heightened risk of protection violations.
- Expand Community Resource Centers (CRCs) in areas with high displacement and return movements to provide services, referrals, and promote community participation.

RISK 3 Gender-based violence

HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

- Decentralize post-rape clinical care through the adoption and implementation of a national inter-ministerial protocol, led by the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) enabling post-rape clinical care through mobile units and trained community-level providers, with standardized referral and medico-legal procedures and availability of essential medical supplies, including PEP kits and treatment for sexually transmitted infections, to guarantee survivors timely access to life-saving, survivor-centred services.
- Strengthen access to justice by enforcing the free issuance of medico-legal certificates, eliminating unauthorized fees and expanding authorization to issue certificates to qualified health professionals, including certified midwives.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Update GBV and sexual and reproductive health service mapping and strengthen referral pathways to ensure continuity and accessibility of services across affected areas.
- Improve safety and protection in displacement settings through adequate lighting, secure sanitation facilities, safe spaces and emergency shelter options for the most vulnerable groups, including women, girls, persons with disabilities and female-headed households.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

- Support security and accountability initiatives that comply with human rights and PSEA standards and reinforce efforts to address conflict-related sexual violence.

RISK 4 Forced recruitment and association of children in armed groups

HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

- Ensure the full implementation of the Protocol on the Transfer and Care of Children Associated with Armed Groups, including adequate IBESR and case-management capacity for transfer, care and reintegration.
- Develop and support durable family reunification and reintegration solutions that take into account ongoing insecurity and displacement dynamics.
- Target social protection and livelihood support to children and families in areas of high recruitment risk, to reduce economic drivers of recruitment, exploitation and trafficking by gangs.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Expand access to specialized child protection services, including case management, mental health and psychosocial support, family tracing and reunification, and reintegration assistance for children formerly associated with armed groups.
- Strengthen community-based early identification and referral mechanisms in communities at heightened risk of child recruitment and use by armed groups.

SECURITY FORCES

- Ensure the prompt referral of children identified during security operations to appropriate civilian child protection authorities and services, in line with the established transfer protocol, and apply child-sensitive procedures throughout security operations.

DONORS

- Prioritize sustained support for prevention, case management, family reunification and long-term reintegration of children associated with or at risk of recruitment by armed groups.
- Support education, vocational training, psychosocial recovery, and socio-economic reintegration opportunities for affected children and adolescents.
- Ensure continuity of monitoring and reporting of grave violations against children.
- Advocate for government authorities to uphold and effectively implement the Protocol.

RISK 5 Impediments and/or restrictions to access to legal identity, remedies and justice

HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

- Strengthen civil documentation, including resource allocation to local registries and support for community-based organizations offering legal counseling.
- Ease documentation requirements for humanitarian aid and public services. Adopt facilitated procedures for the recovery or re-issuance of lost, damaged or abandoned documentation due to forced displacement or armed violence.
- Ensure safe access to legal remedies for victims of serious protection violations who face heightened barriers to justice.

HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

- Expand mobile and community-based civil documentation services, prioritizing displaced populations, returnees, women, children, and persons at risk of statelessness.
- Support birth registration and late birth registration procedures, particularly for children affected by displacement and cross-border movements.

Methodology

The PAU methodology builds on the 2026 Protection Risk Assessment (PRA), combining secondary data analysis with technical reviews, consultations with Protection Cluster partners and relevant coordination mechanisms, and key informant interviews to gather qualitative information from key protection actors. Findings were triangulated using quantitative data, qualitative information and partners' operational knowledge to identify and prioritize protection risks.

Limitations

Due to limited resources, the methodology could not include surveys, and group discussions focus to collect information directly from the affected people.



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