



GLOBAL PROTECTION UPDATE

OCTOBER 2025



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PROTECTION IN A PRIORITISED HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

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


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1. Executive Summary



As of October 2025, Protection Clusters estimate that 395 million people across 23 countries are exposed to protection risks. These risks include direct threats to life from violence, coercion, and deliberate deprivation. Across operations, the main protection risks reported are attacks on civilians, abductions and movement restrictions, alongside gender-based violence, denial of services, lack of legal identity, and psychosocial distress. The convergence of these risks, coupled with the erosion of protective environments, has created an unprecedented global protection crisis, challenging both humanitarian response and political accountability.

Countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Myanmar, the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt - Gaza & West Bank), Sudan, and Ukraine face the most extreme situations, where populations experience overlapping patterns of violence, exclusion, and deprivation. Since January 2025, conflict dynamics have intensified as a major driver of protection risks. In Gaza, the humanitarian crisis deepened, culminating in a famine declaration, while in the DRC, violence escalated across North and South Kivu, displacing over a million people in just weeks, adding to nearly 6.4 million IDPs. Sudan continues to face severe threats, particularly in El Fasher and the Zamzam IDP camp, where civilians are exposed to ongoing attacks, siege and displacement. Rising violence in Mozambique (Cabo Delgado), Haiti, and Colombia (Catatumbo) has further exacerbated vulnerabilities, while fragile institutions and economic collapse compound risks in protracted and forgotten crises in Cameroon, Chad, and the Sahel.

Climate shocks exacerbate the effects of protection risks on people's life and continue to aggravate protection needs, with earthquakes in Myanmar and Afghanistan displacing communities and heightening vulnerability, and floods in Nigeria and Venezuela disrupting access to essential services. Displacement, family separation, and loss of property are widespread, leaving communities highly exposed to harm. The situational analysis, presented in this report, conducted at sub-national level is essential to identify specific geographic areas where violence, coercion and deliberate deprivation are not only acute and harmful but also at high risk of further escalation. Prioritizing these hotspots is critical to prevent further deterioration, curb the emergence of new protection risks, and respond to the compounding humanitarian needs they generate.

While most humanitarian crises are fundamentally protection crises, driven by violations of international law and patterns of abuse and violence, the current humanitarian response is constrained by increasing funding restrictions and access limitations, driving to significant service gaps and limited capacity to meet urgent needs across sectors. Protection operations have been severely disrupted, with the scaling back or suspension of critical protection services, community-led interventions and early-warning/prevention mechanisms.

In June 2025, OCHA launched a hyper-prioritized humanitarian response plan to address the most urgent, life-saving needs in acute crises. Thanks to robust advocacy at country and global level, protection was integrated into these hyper-prioritized response plans, alongside the delivery of life-saving assistance. Through this process, the Protection Cluster identified 24.7 million people as most urgently in need of assistance and protection. Yet, this represents just 14,7% of the 168 million people in need of protection globally – leaving 143,3 million people unassisted. Meeting the prioritized protection needs alone requires US \$1,2 billion. As of 31 August 2025, however, the Protection Cluster is only funded at 23% out of the initial US \$3.2 billion requested, leaving a severe funding gap at a time of escalating risks and needs.

In this context, it is essential to position protection as a central pillar of humanitarian action, ensuring that violations are addressed, risks are mitigated, and life-saving assistance is delivered in ways that preserve the safety and dignity of affected populations.


2. Global Protection Trends



395 M.
**PEOPLE EXPOSED TO
PROTECTION RISKS**

As of October 2025, Protection Clusters have identified **395 million people exposed to protection risks** across 23 countries. This represents the number of people facing **direct life-threatening risks** arising from violence, coercion, and deliberate deprivation. While these figures are based on projections and will be refined upon the finalization of the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs), the scale is unprecedented. Protection risks are **converging at extreme**

levels, with political violence, social pressures, and institutional collapse combining into a major **global protection crisis** that challenges both the humanitarian response and political accountability. The map below highlights countries according to the proportion of people at risk within the total crisis-affected population.



SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

The global protection landscape is dominated by **attacks on civilians, abductions and movement restrictions** consistently reported at high or very high levels, alongside **gender-based violence, denial of services, lack of legal identity, and psychosocial distress**. Countries such as the **oPt (Gaza & West Bank), Sudan, DRC, Ukraine and Myanmar** face the most extreme situations, where the convergence of risks and the erosion of protective environments make conditions particularly dire.






Figure 1 Percentage of countries per severity level

Conflict – through violence and deliberate deprivation – remains the primary driver. This includes deliberate sieges and indiscriminate attacks in **Sudan** and **Gaza**, protracted armed group activity in **DRC** and **Myanmar**, and systemic restrictions in **Afghanistan**. Fragile institutions and economic collapse compound risks in **Venezuela** and **Haiti** (further compounded by extreme levels of violence), where families resort to negative coping mechanisms such as child marriage, child labour and unsafe migration. Meanwhile, failures of justice and documentation frameworks deepen exclusion in contexts like **Ethiopia** and **Colombia**.

The effects on populations are stark: displacement, family separation, psychosocial trauma, and loss of property are widespread in **Ukraine**, **South Sudan**, and elsewhere. Overall, the analysis confirms a convergence of **conflict-driven, social, and consequential risks**, leaving entire populations exposed to overlapping patterns of violence, exclusion, and deprivation.





Given the current context of humanitarian response—marked by significant service gaps and limited capacity to meet urgent needs—it is essential to pinpoint specific **geographic areas where the combination of violence, coercion, and deliberate deprivation is not only acute and harmful, but also carries a clear risk of further escalation**. Focusing on these hotspots is essential to prevent further deterioration, curb the emergence of new protection risks, and respond to the compounding humanitarian needs they generate.


The analysis below highlights the areas of countries facing the **highest concentration of severe and extreme risks**, where multiple protection threats intersect and place populations at heightened vulnerability. While the findings are not exhaustive and warrant deeper investigation, they provide a critical overview of the areas that demand **immediate prioritization** in humanitarian programming—and where coordinated action beyond humanitarian response will also be required. For brevity, not all territories are listed here, though a more comprehensive analysis can be made available.

COUNTRY

HIGHEST CONCENTRATION OF SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS

The analysis highlights geographic areas¹ where **four or more protection risks** are assessed at *severe or extreme (4 and 5)* levels. In several crises — notably **Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Sudan** — the number of such high-risk areas is particularly elevated, especially when looking at data at the second administrative level or below. For these contexts, the analysis applied a stricter criterion by considering a greater number of risks at severe or extreme levels, in order to reflect the magnitude and concentration of threats without overstating their spread.

AFGHANISTAN



In **Afghanistan, 334 districts** report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. Among them, the districts of Khash, Shuhada, Imam Sahib, Teshkan, Aybak, Baharak, Guzara, Koran Wa Monjan, Shahr-e-Buzorg, Warsaj, Hazar Sumuch, Mazar-e-Sharif, Taloqan, Bangi, Chal, Farkhar, Ali Abad, Kabul, Namak Ab, Chahab, Khan Abad, Andarab, Fayzabad, Doshi, Dasht-e-Archi, Pul-e-Hisar, Qala-e-Zal, Khinjan, Dasht-e-Qala, Khwaja Bahawuddin, Eshkmesh, Nahr-e-Shahi, Kohsan, Yangi Qala, Tala Wa Barfak, Chahar Darah, Nahrin, Kunduz, Pul-e-Khumri, Deh Salah, Darqad, Burka, Khwaja Ghar, Rostaq, and Fereng Wa Gharu, are subjected to the compounding severe or extreme levels of 11 protection risks.

MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level




BURKINA FASO




In **Burkina Faso, 58 communes** report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. Among them, Dourtenga, Komin Yanga, Lalgaye, Sangha, Soudougui, Yargatenga, Yonde, Koalla, Liptougou, Mani, Thion, Bartiebougou, Foutouri, Kompienga, Madjoari, Botou, Diapaga, Logobou, Namounou, Partiaga, Tambarga, Tansarga, Ouendigui, are subjected to the compounding severe or extreme levels of 6 protection risks. These risks often overlap, compounding vulnerabilities in conflict-affected areas where armed groups impose blockades, target civilians, and exert coercive control, while populations face heightened risks of displacement, sexual violence, and arbitrary detention.

MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level



CAMEROON




In **Cameroon, 14 divisions** report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Mayo-Tsanaga, Boyo, Bui, Donga-Mantung, Menchum, Mezam, Momo, Ngo-Ketunjia, Fako, Kupe-Manenguba, Lebiam, Manyu, Meme, and Ndian. These risks stem from the conflict in the North-West and South-West, where civilians face a wide range of violence, coercion and deliberate deprivation.

MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level



CAR





In **CAR, 18 sub-prefectures** report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Ndim, Kodi, Bocaranga, Bozoum, Ouanda-Djallé, Ouandja, Ouandja Kotto, Ouadda, Bambouti, Bakala, Yalinga, Zémio, Kouï, Obo, Mboki, Bakouma, Zangba, and Amdafoc. These risks are driven by ongoing armed group activity and inter-communal violence.



MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level



¹ The terminology used to designate the assessed areas follows the official country nomenclature for administrative levels.

COUNTRY	HIGHEST CONCENTRATION OF SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS
CHAD 	In Chad, 22 departments report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Mamdi, Wayi, Lac Wey, Dodge, Gueni, Ngourkosso, Mandoul Oriental, Barh-Sara, Mandoul Occidental, Ouara, Abdi, Assoungha, Biltine, Dar-Tama, Kobe, Am-Djarass, Wadi Hawar, Kimiti, Djourf Al Ahmar, Megri, Fouli, and Kaya. These risks are largely driven by armed conflict, intercommunal violence, and insecurity around border areas. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level DISCRIMINATION FORCED RECRUITMENT
COLOMBIA 	In Colombia, 167 municipalities report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. Among them, El Tablón De Gómez, Francisco Pizarro, San Pablo, El Tambo, Consacá, Córdoba, Chachagüí, El Peñol, Cumbitara, La Florida, Puerres, Mallama, Ancuya, Arboleda, Providencia, Imués, La Tola, Guaitarilla, Albán, San José De Cúcuta, Villa Del Rosario, Los Patios, El Zulia, San Cayetano, Puerto Santander, Ábrego, Convención, El Carmen, El Tarra, González, Hacarí, La Playa De Belén, Ocaña, Río De Oro, San Calixto, Sardinata, Teorama, and Tibú, are subjected to the compounding severe or extreme levels of 14 protection risks. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS PRESENCE OF MINES
DRC 	In DRC, 91 territories report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. Among them, Boko, Kenge, Popokabaka, Kikongo, Kwamouth, Drodoro, Fataki, Goma, Karisimbi, Nyiragongo, Katoyi, Kiotshe, Masisi, Mweso, Kibua, Pinga, Alimbongo, Kayna, Lubero, Musienene, Kalunguta, Kamango, Mabalako, Oicha, Katwa, Bambo, Birambizo, Kibirizi, Rutshuru, Rwanguba, Minova, and Hauts-Plateaux are subjected to compounding severe or extreme levels of 10 risks. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT FORCED RECRUITMENT ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
EL SALVADOR 	In El Salvador, 18 departments report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Ahuachapán Centro, Santa Ana Centro, Santa Ana Oeste, La Libertad Centro, La Libertad Costa, La Libertad Este, La Libertad Norte, La Libertad Oeste, La Libertad Sur, San Salvador Centro, San Salvador Este, San Salvador Norte, San Salvador Oeste, San Salvador Sur, Cuscatlán Sur, Usulután Este, San Miguel Centro, and La Unión Sur. These risks are closely tied to gang violence, organized crime, and systemic insecurity, which expose civilians to coercion, exploitation, and displacement, while significantly constraining safe access to essential services and humanitarian support. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level LEGAL IDENTITY GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE TORTURE & CRUELTY ABDUCTION & KIDNAPPING

COUNTRY	HIGHEST CONCENTRATION OF SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS
ETHIOPIA 	In Ethiopia, 23 zones report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Alle, Amaro, Awi, Central, East Gojam, East Wellega, Eastern, Fafan, Gedeo, Horo Gudru Wellega, Kamashi, Kelem Wellega, Konso, Mekelle, North Shewa (AM), North Shewa (OR), North Western, Oromia, South Eastern, Southern, Wag Hamra, West Gojam, West Shewa, and West Wellega. These risks are largely fuelled by inter-communal conflict, armed confrontations, and recurring displacement, exposing civilians to persistent violence, forced displacement, and limited humanitarian access. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE  PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS  ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS  MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT
MALI 	In Mali, 22 cercles report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Nara, Yorosso, Macina, Niono, Bandiagara, Bankass, Djenné, Douentza, Mopti, Diré, Goundam, Gourma-Rharous, Niafunké, Ansongo, Gao, Abeibara, Tessalit, Tin-Essako, Ménaka, Anderamboukane, Inekar, and Tidermene. These risks are driven by the expansion of non-State armed groups and intensified intercommunal violence, exposing civilians to repeated attacks, forced displacement, and coercion, while blockades and insecurity severely restrict humanitarian access. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  THEFT & EVICTION  PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS  MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT  GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE  FORCED RECRUITMENT
MOZAMBIQUE 	In Mozambique, 12 districts report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Ancuabe, Chiure, Ibo, Macomia, Meluco, Metuge, Mocímboa da Praia, Montepuez, Muidumbe, Nangade, Palma, and Quissanga. These risks are driven by the expansion of non-State armed groups and recurrent attacks in Cabo Delgado, exposing civilians to killings, abductions, and mass displacement. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  DISCRIMINATION  FAMILY SEPARATION
MYANMAR 	In Myanmar, 23 townships report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. Among them, Thabaung, Yegyi, Bhamo, Hpakant, Mansi, Momauk, Shwegu, Waingmaw, Loikaw, Gangaw, Kamma, Myaing, Ngape, Pauk, Saw, Seikphyu, Yesagyo, Kyaukpyu, Pauktaw, Sittwe, Hsipaw, Kyaukme, and Nawngkhio, are subjected to the compounding severe or extreme levels of 10 protection risks. These risks are driven by intensified military operations and armed conflict, exposing civilians to widespread violence. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS  PRESENCE OF MINES  FORCED RECRUITMENT  THEFT & EVICTION  LEGAL IDENTITY

COUNTRY	HIGHEST CONCENTRATION OF SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS
NIGER 	In Niger, 8 departments report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Bosso, N’Guigmi, Guidan Roumdji, Madarounfa, Birni N’Konni, Say, Téra, and Torodi. These risks are driven mostly by armed group activity and cross-border violence, compounded by forced displacement, social exclusion, and economic hardship, which erode coping capacities and expose civilians—particularly women and children—to heightened vulnerability. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  ABDUCTION & KIDNAPPING  PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS  FORCED RECRUITMENT
NIGERIA 	In Nigeria, 11 LGAs report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Abadam, Askira/Uba, Bama, Dikwa, Gwoza, Jere, Kukawa, Madagali, Michika, Monguno, and Ngala. These risks are driven by non-State armed group activity and protracted conflict in the northeast, exposing civilians to killings, abductions, and mass displacement. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE  ABDUCTION & KIDNAPPING
OPT 	In the oPt 16 governorates report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include North Gaza, Gaza, Deir Al-Balah and Khan Younis in Gaza subjected to the compounding severe or extreme levels of 13 protection risks, and Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarm, Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, Hebron and Jerusalem in the West Bank subjected to severe to extreme levels of at least 8 protection risks. These risks are driven by sustained attacks on civilians and infrastructure, forced displacement orders, explosive ordnance contamination, and systematic restrictions on movement and humanitarian access. Together, Gaza and the West Bank now face one of the most extreme protection environments globally. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS  DISCRIMINATION  LEGAL IDENTITY  PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS  MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT
SOMALIA 	In Somalia, 25 districts report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Lughaye, Bossaso, Zeylac, Luuq, Afmadow, Badhaadhe, Jamaame, Bu’aale, Jilib, Tayeeglow, Belet Xaawo, Adan Yabaal, Ceel Afweyn, Ceerigaabo, Laasqoray, Caynabo, Laas Caanood, Taleex, Kurtunwaarey, Xudun, Buuhoodle, Qoryooley, Rab Dhuure, Saakow, and Sablaale. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  FORCED RECRUITMENT  LEGAL IDENTITY  MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT  DISCRIMINATION

COUNTRY	HIGHEST CONCENTRATION OF SEVERE OR EXTREME PROTECTION RISKS
SOUTH SUDAN 	In South Sudan, 23 counties report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. Among them, Abyei Region, Kajo-keji, Akobo, Ayod, Canal/Pigi, Fangak, Pochalla, Twic East, Uror, Aweil East, Longochuk, Luakpiny/Nasir, Panyikang, Ulang, Gogrial East, Gogrial West, Tonj East, Tonj North, Tonj South, Twic, Nagero, Tambura, and Yambio, are subjected to the compounding severe or extreme levels of 7 protection risks. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE  THEFT & EVICTION  PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS  FORCED MARRIAGE  LEGAL IDENTITY
SUDAN 	In Sudan, 31 localities report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Tawila, At Tina, Ed Al Fursan, Mershing, Nitega, Gereida, Mukjar, Gharb Jabal Marrah, Um Dukhun, Zalingi, Um Durein, Ar Rashad, Ad Diwaim, Um Rimta, Kosti, As Salam / Ar Rawat, Port Sudan, Tawkar, Al Qureisha, Basundah, Gala'a Al Nahal, Wasat Al Gedaref, Sheikan, Soudari, Al Qurashi, Abu Hamad, Shendi, Atbara, Al Burgaig, Dongola, and Al Meiram. These risks are driven by the escalation of armed conflict and widespread lawlessness, exposing civilians to killings, sexual violence, abductions, and forced displacement, while sieges, insecurity and explosive ordnance contamination severely restrict humanitarian access. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  FORCED MARRIAGE  PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS  DISCRIMINATION  GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
UKRAINE 	In Ukraine, 4 oblasts report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Sumy. These risks are driven by ongoing hostilities, shelling, and occupation-related coercion, exposing civilians to killings, abductions, forced displacement, and intimidation, while insecurity, explosive ordnance contamination and blockades severely restrict humanitarian access. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS  LEGAL IDENTITY
VENEZUELA 	In Venezuela, 8 states report at least four of the 15 protection risks at severity 4–5. These include Amazonas, Apure, Bolívar, Delta Amacuro, Distrito Capital, Miranda, Sucre, and Zulia. These risks are driven mostly by state repression and the entrenchment of armed group control, compounded by collapsing services, economic exclusion, and cross-border deportations, which together force families into high-risk coping strategies such as child marriage, survival sex, and displacement. MOST RECURRENT RISKS at subnational level  GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE  FAMILY SEPARATION

GLOBAL PROTECTION RISKS TRACKER

The tracker is currently embedded in the Protection Cluster approach to contribute to the JIAF and the Humanitarian Needs Overview².

PROTECTION RISK	TOP 5 PROTECTION RISKS IDENTIFIED IN COUNTRY PAUS (NATIONAL COLLECTIVE ANALYSIS) ³	MINOR	STRESSED	MODERATE	SEVERE	EXTREME
ABDUCTION, DETENTION	CAMEROON CHAD DRC HAITI MALI MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR WEST BANK	0	3	10	9	1
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS	CAR COLOMBIA ETHIOPIA GAZA HAITI MALI MOZAMBIQUE NIGER NIGERIA SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN WEST BANK	1	2	6	12	1
DISCRIMINATION	AFGHANISTAN CAR CHAD COLOMBIA ETHIOPIA GAZA GUATEMALA MYANMAR NIGER	0	1	16	5	1
DISINFORMATION	-	0	5	12	5	1
FAMILY SEPARATION	CAMEROON CHAD ETHIOPIA SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN	1	4	12	5	1
FORCED RECRUITMENT	COLOMBIA HAITI NIGERIA SOMALIA	3	4	9	7	0
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	AFGHANISTAN CAMEROON CAR CHAD COLOMBIA DRC ETHIOPIA GAZA GUATEMALA HAITI MALI MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR NIGER NIGERIA SOUTH SUDAN UKRAINE VENEZUELA WEST BANK	0	0	7	15	2
LEGAL IDENTITY	MOZAMBIQUE UKRAINE VENEZUELA	1	1	10	10	1
FORCED MARRIAGE	NIGER	3	4	6	9	2
MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT	AFGHANISTAN CAMEROON COLOMBIA DRC ETHIOPIA GUATEMALA HAITI MALI NIGER NIGERIA SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN UKRAINE VENEZUELA WEST BANK	0	2	8	13	1
PRESENCE OF MINES	AFGHANISTAN CAR COLOMBIA DRC GAZA MALI MYANMAR SUDAN UKRAINE	3	6	3	8	2
PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS	COLOMBIA GAZA MYANMAR UKRAINE VENEZUELA WEST BANK	1	1	7	13	1
THEFT & EVICTION	CAR CHAD COLOMBIA DRC GUATEMALA MOZAMBIQUE SOUTH SUDAN VENEZUELA	2	2	9	9	1
TORTURE & CRUELTY	CAMEROON	1	6	11	5	1
TRAFFICKING & LABOUR	AFGHANISTAN	3	6	11	3	1



PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES REPORTING PROTECTION RISKS

	ABDUCTION DETENTION	ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS	DISCRIMINATION	DISINFORMATION	FAMILY SEPARATION	FORCED MARRIAGE	FORCED RECRUITMENT	GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	LEGAL IDENTITY	MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT	PRESENCE OF MINES	PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS	THEFT & EVICTION	TORTURE & CRUELTY	TRAFFICKING & LABOUR
JUN 24	100%	100%	96%	96%	100%	96%	100%	100%	96%	100%	96%	100%	96%	96%	96%
OCT 24	100%	100%	96%	96%	100%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%
AUG 25	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	100%	96%	100%	96%	100%	96%	96%	96%	100%	100%



PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES REPORTING PROTECTION RISKS AS SEVERE OR EXTREME

	ABDUCTION DETENTION	ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS	DISCRIMINATION	DISINFORMATION	FAMILY SEPARATION	FORCED MARRIAGE	FORCED RECRUITMENT	GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	LEGAL IDENTITY	MOVEMENT & DISPLACEMENT	PRESENCE OF MINES	PSYCHOSOCIAL DISTRESS	THEFT & EVICTION	TORTURE & CRUELTY	TRAFFICKING & LABOUR
JUN 24	35%	50%	47%	21%	15%	42%	45%	90%	47%	60%	37%	55%	53%	16%	32%
OCT 24	48%	64%	52%	24%	28%	40%	52%	88%	52%	72%	44%	64%	56%	28%	32%
AUG 25	43%	59%	26%	26%	26%	46%	30%	71%	48%	58%	45%	61%	43%	25%	17%

² [Protection Cluster Joined-Up Approach to Protection Analysis, June 2024](#)

³ The “country-level priority risks” are the top five risks identified through each Protection Cluster’s [Protection Analysis Updates](#)—jointly agreed by partners and informed by the 15-risk severity scoring plus contextual factors (exposure, affected groups, operational relevance). They therefore may not align one-to-one with the severity totals shown.



ABDUCTION, KIDNAPPING, ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE, ARBITRARY OR UNLAWFUL ARREST AND/OR DETENTION

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (Gaza and West Bank)
4	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CAMEROON EL SALVADOR MOZAMBIQUE NIGER NIGERIA SYRIA VENEZUELA
3	CAR CHAD DRC ETHIOPIA HAITI MALI MYANMAR SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN
2	COLOMBIA UKRAINE
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity level



In **West Bank**, significant spikes in arrest were reported during military operations in Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron, where children and aid workers were among those detained. In **Mozambique**, abductions by non-state armed groups were reported in Macomia, Muidumbe, and Palma, where children and women were forcibly taken from villages. In **Cameroon**, armed groups continue to abduct civilians, especially women and children, mostly in the **Far North**, **North West**, and **South West** regions. In **Nigeria**, arbitrary detentions were reported across Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe during military operations targeting communities suspected of ties with armed groups. In **CAR**, armed groups continue to use abductions as a tactic of control and extortion. Individuals suspected of collaborating with the government or humanitarian actors were unlawfully detained and tortured. In **Myanmar**, arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance remain systemic. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners reported over 19,900 people arrested since the 2021 coup, with 7,100 still in detention and over 30 humanitarian workers detained in Rakhine and Southeast regions. In **Venezuela**, 1,836 people were detained during post-electoral protests, including 211 children, 45 persons with disabilities, and 20 indigenous individuals. Foro Penal recorded 230 detained women, with several subjected to threats of sexual violence. In **South Sudan**, over 120 abductions were documented in Unity, Jonglei, and Greater Pibor Administrative Area, often targeting women and children. Abductions are frequently linked to cattle raids and revenge attacks, with abductees held for extended periods and subjected to physical abuse and exploitation. In **North Kivu (DRC)**, abductions and arbitrary arrests have risen in areas controlled by the M23, including Masisi, Rutshuru, and Nyiragongo, with youth and community leaders targeted for alleged collaboration with armed groups or ransom. In **Ethiopia**, civilians were arrested without due process in Amhara and Oromia, and community leaders disappeared following military raids in West Oromia. In **Mali**, arbitrary arrests targeted community leaders and young men in Gao, Menaka, and Kidal, often leading to prolonged detention without charges.



ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND OTHER UNLAWFUL KILLINGS, AND ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN OBJECTS

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA/WEST BANK)
4	BURKINA FASO CAMEROON COLOMBIA DRC ETHIOPIA MALI MOZAMBIQUE NIGERIA SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN SYRIA UKRAINE
3	AFGHANISTAN CAR CHAD MYANMAR NIGER SOMALIA
2	HAITI VENEZUELA
1	GUATEMALA

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Gaza**, widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure and civilian deaths have been documented across Rafah, Deir al-Balah, and Gaza City, with over 37,000 casualties reported by mid-2025, particularly as a result of EWIPA. In **Mozambique**, indiscriminate attacks on civilian settlements in Quissanga and Mocímboa da Praia continue to result in killings, injuries, and displacement. In **Nigeria**, civilian killings in Maiduguri and Konduga

were recorded during attacks by non-state armed groups in May and June 2025. In **Colombia**, in Arauca, armed confrontations have led to civilian injuries and fatalities. In **Mali**, attacks in Gao and Timbuktu have included road ambushes and targeted killings in IDP return areas. In **South Sudan**, attacks in Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei have led to civilian killings, injuries, and destruction of villages. In **Cameroon**, Boko Haram and separatist armed group continue to attack civilians and civilian infrastructures in the Far North, North West and South West. In **CAR** persistent violence from armed groups and criminal actors continues to expose civilians to killings and attacks, including on healthcare and education facilities. In the **Lake Chad** basin, attacks by non-state armed groups have continued, with villages burned and civilian infrastructure, including water points and health facilities, damaged. In **Myanmar**, homes, markets, religious sites, and IDP shelters have been destroyed, while airstrikes hit schools and clinics, killing children and health workers In **Somalia**, Luuq district has been the deadliest area with dozens killed between 2024 and 2025. In **Ethiopia**, attacks on civilians, airstrikes and ground offensives were documented in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray throughout early 2025, while renewed conflict in Afar’ Shinile Zone displaced thousands and damaged infrastructure. In **Niger**, attacks on villages in Tillabéri have led to mass displacements and the destruction of basic infrastructure including schools and health centres.



CHILD AND FORCED FAMILY SEPARATION

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA)
4	CAMEROON MOZAMBIQUE SOUTH SUDAN SYRIA VENEZUELA
3	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CAR DRC EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA MALI MYANMAR NIGER SOMALIA SUDAN UKRAINE OPT (WEST BANK)
2	COLOMBIA GUATEMALA HAITI NIGERIA
1	CHAD

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Gaza**, over 13,000 children were reported as unaccompanied or separated as of July 2025, particularly in Khan Younis and Rafah. In **Cameroon**, many children flee alone or are separated due to abduction. In **Myanmar**, the recruitment of family members, detention of parents, or destruction of homes have left many unaccompanied children in Kayah, Chin, and Kachin with reunification severely limited by administrative barriers and the absence of a centralised family tracing mechanism. In **South Sudan**, displacement and cattle raids in Akobo, Leer, and Fangak continue to drive separations, with children often found in IDP sites or remote areas and only partial access to reunification. In **Mozambique**, family separations occurred frequently during mass displacements, especially in Chiúre and Metuge. In **West Bank**, children were frequently separated from their families during home raids, imprisonment of caregivers, or checkpoint restrictions, particularly in East Jerusalem, Hebron, Area C and the Seam Zone. In **Somalia**, 72% of newly displaced households reported children not with primary caregiver, and 430 unaccompanied or separated children recorded in Luuq, where no case management capacity exists. In **Ethiopia**, reports from IDP sites in Amhara and Oromia indicated multiple cases of children separated from caregivers during conflict-related displacement, especially during sudden evacuations. Unaccompanied children remain at heightened risk in Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz, with limited tracing and reunification services available. In **North Kivu**, displacements from Kibumba, Kitchanga, and Sake have resulted in thousands of children separated from their families. In **Nigeria**, separations are reported in Borno IDP camps, often linked to conflict or screening at military checkpoints.



CHILD, EARLY OR FORCED MARRIAGE

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	NIGER OPT (GAZA)
4	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO ETHIOPIA HONDURAS MALI MOZAMBIQUE SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN SYRIA
3	CAR DRC EL SALVADOR GUATEMALA NIGERIA SOMALIA OPT (WEST BANK)
2	CAMEROON COLOMBIA MYANMAR VENEZUELA
1	CHAD HAITI UKRAINE

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Niger**, the prevalence remains one of the highest in the world, despite efforts by the government and partners; with 76% of girls married before the age of 18 compared to 6% of boys; and 28% of girls married before the age of 15 compared to 0% of boys. In **Mali**, spikes in marriage requests involving girls under 16 are reported in Douentza and Mopti, tied to economic hardship and displacement. In **Ethiopia**, partners note increases rates of early marriage in Afar and Amhara amidst prolonged displacement and economic hardship. In East Hararghe, girls as young as 13 were reportedly married to reduce economic burdens. In **South Sudan**, the practice remains widespread in Warrap, Lakes, and Jonglei, driven by economic hardship, social norms, and dowry practices. Girls face heightened risk during displacement or after abduction. In **North Kivu**, early marriage is increasing in displacement sites around Goma and Masisi, as families under extreme poverty resort to it. Girls are especially at risk in informal settlements lacking protective structures. In **West Bank**, although not widely reported, protection actors noted rising early marriage in displaced and vulnerable communities in Hebron and Nablus. The humanitarian crisis has exacerbated early and forced marriage in **Myanmar**, particularly among displaced communities. In Shan and Rakhine, child marriage is increasingly used as a negative coping mechanism, especially in female headed households. In **Cameroon** Far North, early and forced marriage persists among host and displaced communities, often linked to economic survival and lack of education opportunities.



DISCRIMINATION AND STIGMATIZATION, DENIAL OF RESOURCES, OPPORTUNITIES, SERVICES AND/OR HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK)
4	AFGHANISTAN CHAD MOZAMBIQUE SUDAN VENEZUELA
3	BURKINA FASO CAMEROON CAR COLOMBIA DRC ETHIOPIA GUATEMALA HAITI MALI MYANMAR NIGER NIGERIA SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN SYRIA UKRAINE
2	EL SALVADOR
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **West Bank**, over 60% of communities in Area C lacked access to water, healthcare, or education due to Israeli restrictions. More than 1,100 movement obstacles hindered humanitarian access and isolated entire communities. Discriminatory zoning resulting in home demolitions and forced displacement. Returnees from **Chad** or **Cameroon** were denied property restitution and stigmatized. Children born from intercommunal unions or sexual violence were denied birth registration and schooling in **Chad**. In **Venezuela**, humanitarian organizations faced increased barriers to reach affected populations in Amazonas, where aid delivery was blocked. In **CAR**, minority groups, particularly Muslim populations in PK5 (Bangui) and Bambari, faced restricted access due to perceived affiliation with armed groups. In **Myanmar**, ethnic and religious minorities, especially Rohingya, faced systemic exclusion from education, healthcare, and legal documentation. Military-imposed access barriers and bureaucratic delays hindered aid to 1.9 million IDPs. In **South Sudan**, marginalized ethnic

groups, women-headed households, persons with disabilities and older persons faced discrimination in aid, land access and service delivery, particularly in Bentiu and Malakal PoC sites. In **North Kivu**, displaced populations face widespread discrimination, particularly those suspected of affiliation with M23, especially in Rutshuru where insecurity also limited humanitarian access. In **Somalia**, minority clans in Luuq were excluded from traditional protection mechanisms such as *xeer* and denied aid distribution or dispute resolution. In **Colombia**, indigenous and Afro-descendant survivors were denied health and legal services in mining areas and informal settlements, while displaced youth struggled to re-access education. In **Nigeria**, GBV survivors in Yobe faced stigma and exclusion from community distributions and support networks, deterring reporting of violations. In **Ethiopia**, ethnic discrimination continues to affect humanitarian access and service delivery. In Southern Tigray, displaced groups faced exclusion based on perceived political affiliation, while in Oromia, humanitarian access was denied in conflict-affected areas of East Wellega and West Shewa.



DISINFORMATION AND DENIAL OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA)
4	AFGHANISTAN CHAD SUDAN SYRIA VENEZUELA OPT (WEST BANK)
3	BURKINA FASO CAR COLOMBIA DRC EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA GUATEMALA MALI MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR NIGERIA SOMALIA
2	CAMEROON HAITI NIGER SOUTH SUDAN UKRAINE
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Gaza**, communication blackouts and misinformation about safe corridors have led to population movements into areas of ongoing hostilities, especially in northern Gaza and Middle Area governorates. In **West Bank**, movement restrictions in the Seam Zone and Hebron H2 limited communication and access to services, with youth reporting difficulties accessing legal information and humanitarian assistance. In **Myanmar**, internet shutdowns in 10 states, including Sagaing and Chin, affected over 5 million people. Disinformation spread via military-linked media platforms and social networks, including allegations against aid workers, deepening mistrust and obstructing community-based protection. In **DRC**, misinformation about humanitarian aid and military operations heightened mistrust and community tensions in Karuba and Munigi. In **Mali**, disinformation campaigns by armed actors in Menaka and Kidal discouraged civilians from accessing state services, affecting vaccination, health and registration activities. In **Ethiopia**, misinformation on aid eligibility in Amhara and Afar spurred tensions between communities and local authorities, while in Wag Hemra, lack of reliable communication channels left populations unaware of available services. In **South Sudan**, conflict-affected communities in rural Jonglei and Upper Nile lacked reliable information on services and movements, while misinformation about aid distribution or the presence of armed actors fuelled tensions and disrupted delivery.



FORCED RECRUITMENT AND ASSOCIATION OF CHILDREN IN ARMED FORCES AND GROUPS

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	
4	COLOMBIA MALI MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR SOMALIA SUDAN SYRIA
3	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CAMEROON CAR DRC ETHIOPIA NIGERIA OPT (GAZA) VENEZUELA
2	EL SALVADOR HAITI NIGER SOUTH SUDAN
1	CHAD GUATEMALA UKRAINE OPT (WEST BANK)

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Colombia**, children in Santander have been forcibly recruited or threatened with recruitment by non-state

actors involved in illicit mining and armed control. In one municipality, community leaders documented at least 12 cases in early 2025. Children in rural Arauca remain at risk of being forcibly recruited or associated with armed groups due to high militarization and lack of protective services. In **Myanmar**, child recruitment is reported in Sagaing, Kachin, and Shan. In conflict hotspots, children are used as porters, human shields, and spies. In 2024, protection actors verified 139 new cases of child recruitment, though underreporting is assumed to be significant due to access constraints and fear of reprisal. In **Somalia**, Al-Shabaab has recruited children from minority clans in Luuq, with documented tactics including retaliation against families, indoctrination, and use in armed attacks. In **Cameroon**, there are verified cases of children being recruited by armed separatist groups in the North West and South West, often under coercion or in exchange for protection. Boys are used in logistical support or for direct participation in hostilities. Some girls are also reportedly exploited as cooks or for sexual purposes. Children in **CAR** remain at high risk of recruitment by armed groups. In 2024, the UN verified 232 new cases of recruitment and use of children, primarily in Ouaka, Vakaga, and Haute-Kotto. Boys are used as combatants, messengers, or porters, while girls face sexual exploitation, with weak demobilization and reintegration efforts leading to repeated recruitment. In **North Kivu**, armed groups, including M23, are reportedly recruiting children, particularly in Masisi and Rutshuru territories. Boys are forcibly conscripted for military tasks, while girls are subjected to sexual slavery or used as domestic labour. Protection actors have verified new cases of child association with armed forces in early 2025. In **Ethiopia**, forced recruitment of children was reported in Oromia and Tigray, with protection actors documenting at least 56 cases in the first half of 2025. In Amhara, children were reportedly pressured by community leaders to join militia groups as part of local defence efforts. In **Nigeria**, cases of forced recruitment by Boko Haram factions were reported in southern Borno, with teenage boys taken from farming communities near Gwoza and Bama.



GENDER BASED VIOLENCE⁴

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK)
4	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CAMEROON CHAD COLOMBIA DRC EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA MALI MOZAMBIQUE NIGER NIGERIA SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN UKRAINE
3	CAR GUATEMALA HAITI MYANMAR SOMALIA SYRIA VENEZUELA
2	
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **West Bank**, GBV is primarily affecting women and girls in Hebron, Ramallah, and refugee camps, including intimate partner violence, harassment at checkpoints, and denial of services, with elevated risks in emergency shelters, especially in overcrowded conditions. In **Gaza**, displaced women and girls in Gaza City, Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah continue to be exposed to multiple forms of GBV, including sexual violence, exploitation and increasing rates of intimate partner violence with limited access to safe reporting and psychosocial care. In **Sudan**, 12.1 million women and girls are at risk of GBV, with widespread conflict-related sexual violence in Darfur, Kordofan and Khartoum—including in besieged El Fasher and Zamzam—and a collapse of services limiting safe care for displaced pregnant women. In **Cameroon**, over 6,500 cases of GBV were reported in 2024, with incidents of rape, sexual exploitation, intimate partner violence, and early marriage, especially in Far North, South West, and North West. Displacement, lack of access to health services, and social stigma are key barriers to GBV prevention and response. In **Chad**, GBV remains pervasive in displacement settings, with survivors facing stigma and limited access to medical, legal, and psychosocial services. Reports highlight increased incidents of sexual exploitation, especially in exchange for basic needs like food and water, with adolescent girls being particularly targeted. In **North Kivu**, GBV remains endemic, with rape, sexual exploitation, and domestic violence

⁴ Reported GBV figures reflect only the cases that have been disclosed and documented, while the true scale is undoubtedly far higher. Reporting of GBV remains exceptionally challenging, as survivors face intersecting barriers including stigma, fear of retaliation, restricted movement, and limited access to or awareness of available services. In every context of conflict and displacement—whether active, protracted, or post-crisis—GBV increases sharply, often manifesting through multiple and overlapping forms of violence.

sharply increasing in and around IDP sites in Goma, Kanyaruchinya, and Bulengo. Limited lighting, overcrowded shelters, and lack of WASH facilities exacerbate risks, with insufficient medical and psychosocial support for survivors. In **Ethiopia**, 2,700 GBV cases were documented across Afar, Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray in the first six months of 2025, mainly rape, intimate partner violence, and sexual exploitation. In South Gondar, women reported being assaulted during displacement, while Metekel saw a rise in survival sex among adolescent girls in IDP sites. In **Niger**, over 300 cases were documented in the first half of 2025, mostly sexual violence against adolescent girls. In **Nigeria**, GBV is concentrated in IDP camps in Borno, where overcrowding, inadequate lighting, and the absence of protective infrastructure exacerbate the risks. In **South Sudan**, GBV including rape, sexual assault, and intimate partner violence is reported in Unity, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Eastern Equatoria, with spike during population movements and intercommunal conflict. Access to services remains limited, with only 35% of survivors reportedly receiving any form of support. In **CAR**, GBV remains widespread, particularly in areas controlled by armed groups. Survivors are mostly women and girls, often attacked during displacement or while collecting firewood and water. Cases of sexual slavery were also recorded, with women held for prolonged periods by armed elements. In **Myanmar**, GBV is severely underreported; displacement, militarization, and economic collapse have increased intimate partner violence, sexual exploitation, and conflict-related sexual violence, notably in Rakhine and Chin. Adolescent girls in IDP sites report being coerced into sex in exchange for protection or food. In **Somalia**, 6,500 GBV cases were reported in 2024, including rape and intimate partner violence, concentrated in IDP sites in Luuq. Health centers reported limited post-rape care, and mobile teams have withdrawn due to insecurity.




IMPEDIMENTS AND/OR RESTRICTIONS TO ACCESS TO LEGAL IDENTITY, REMEDIES,
AND JUSTICE

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK)
4	AFGHANISTAN CAMEROON EL SALVADOR MALI MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN VENEZUELA
3	BURKINA FASO CAR COLOMBIA DRC ETHIOPIA GUATEMALA NIGER NIGERIA SYRIA UKRAINE
2	HAITI
1	CHAD

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **West Bank**, Palestinians in East Jerusalem and Area C faced major restrictions in registering births, deaths, or residency changes. Families from **Gaza** living in the West Bank without residency permits were denied access to public services. Legal redress for violations committed by settlers or soldiers was nearly non-existent. In **Cameroon**, displaced and host communities in the Far North face challenges obtaining birth certificates and IDs due to costs, distances to administrative centres, and lack of documentation, particularly affecting displaced children and limiting access to education and services. In **Myanmar**, many individuals, especially the Rohingya and ethnic minorities, lack identity documents, which are often confiscated or destroyed during raids. Access to justice is impossible in areas under military control, where impunity prevails and where parallel justice systems by armed groups offer limited and inconsistent remedies. In **Somalia**, displaced children in Luuq lack documentation after registration centres were destroyed and mobile teams withdrew. In **South Sudan**, the absence of functional civil registries in rural areas and displacement sites hinders access to IDs and birth certificates, while returnees and displaced persons in Malakal and Rubkona face barriers in accessing services and justice mechanisms. In **Venezuela**, post-election period saw a surge in violations including arrests during protests, group trials, hearings without legal representation, terrorism charges against minors, and detentions in non-specialized courts, closure of civil registry offices further restricting documentation. In **Colombia**, Afro-descendant youth in border towns are unable to obtain documentation, limiting access to schools and health care, as administrative backlog and security threats prevent mobile registration. In **North Kivu**, displaced persons lack identity documents, limiting their access to services, legal remedies, or aid registration, while judicial services in Rutshuru and Nyiragongo are nearly absent. In **Ethiopia**, displaced persons in Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz reported barriers in accessing civil documentation, affecting access to justice and schools. Legal services remain almost non-existent in rural Oromia, particularly in areas under contested control. In **Nigeria**, many in Yobe and Adamawa lack birth certificates or IDs, restricting access to services.



PRESENCE OF MINES AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK) UKRAINE
4	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CAMEROON COLOMBIA NIGERIA SUDAN SYRIA VENEZUELA
3	MALI MYANMAR SOMALIA
2	CAR DRC ETHIOPIA MOZAMBIQUE NIGER SOUTH SUDAN
1	CHAD GUATEMALA HAITI

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Gaza**, unexploded ordnance remains widespread, especially in urban ruins across Gaza City and Rafah, leading to daily casualties among civilians returning to their homes. In **Nigeria**, explosive remnants of war have been reported in southern Borno, especially in recently de-occupied villages, posing risks to returning populations and children. **Afghanistan** remains a massively contaminated country where ~8 in 10 ERW accidents involve children. In **Mali**, explosive contamination is increasing in central and northern regions, particularly around Douentza and Tessalit, where armed groups laid IEDs near water points and along key roads. In **Myanmar**, landmines and unexploded ordnance are a major protection threat in Shan, Kachin, Chin, and Karen states. Displacement routes and farmland are commonly mined. Clearance efforts are minimal, and risk education is hindered by access restrictions. In **Ethiopia**, remnants of war including unexploded ordnance were reported in Western Tigray, Benishangul-Gumuz, and border areas of Afar, posing a major risk for civilians returning to previously contested zones. In **CAR**, the presence of UXO and IEDs was confirmed in Ouaka and Ouham-Pendé, notably on return routes used by displaced persons. Humanitarian access to these zones is restricted, and community members have been injured due to tampering with unknown objects. In **Mozambique**, returnees to areas such as Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia report fear of mines and unexploded ordnance, particularly on farmland and footpaths. **Yemen** sees near daily deaths and injuries by landmines, ERW, and the use of other explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA). In **South Sudan**, the risk of ERW remains present, particularly in Western Bahr el Ghazal, Central Equatoria, and along return corridors. Incidents involving children handling unexploded ordnance have been reported, prompting protection actors to expand risk education activities. In **North Kivu**, remnants of explosive ordnance in Sake and Kibumba have left dangerous areas around civilian dwellings and roads. Community members, especially children, are exposed to these hazards with limited access to mine risk education.



PSYCHOLOGICAL/EMOTIONAL ABUSE OR INFLICTED DISTRESS

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK)
4	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CHAD EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA MALI MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN SYRIA UKRAINE
3	CAMEROON CAR COLOMBIA DRC NIGER NIGERIA VENEZUELA
2	HAITI
1	GUATEMALA

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Gaza**, prolonged exposure to explosive weapons in populated areas, bombardments and displacement has led to widespread psychological distress, particularly in children from Rafah and Gaza City, with signs of trauma, fear, and detachment. In **West Bank**, children in areas such as Hebron H2, Jenin, and Nablus were reported to suffer high levels of trauma due to daily exposure to military raids, home demolitions, and violence. Only 25% of children in these affected areas received psychosocial support. In **Chad**, women and children report high levels of stress, anxiety, and emotional fatigue. The lack of mental health and psychosocial support services contributes

to untreated trauma. In overcrowded displacement sites, children show signs of distress such as withdrawal, aggression, or developmental regression. Older persons and people with disabilities are also at risk of isolation and psychological harm due to lack of tailored support. In **Ethiopia**, widespread trauma and emotional distress have been reported among children and women in Afar, Tigray, and Amhara, where communities were repeatedly displaced and exposed to violence. In Metekel Zone, IDPs reported signs of acute psychological distress, including withdrawal and anxiety. In **Myanmar**, children express signs of chronic distress—nightmares, mutism, and withdrawal—especially in Sagaing, Kayah, and IDP camps in Rakhine. Adults report feelings of hopelessness and fear of arbitrary violence or re-arrest. Protection partners highlight an alarming lack of psychosocial support services, with less than 5% of affected communities having access to mental health care. In **Somalia**, children in Luuq are suffering psychological trauma linked to conflict exposure and displacement, with 63% of respondents ranking mental health support as their top priority. However, safe spaces have closed and MHPSS services are unavailable locally. In Bulengo and Kanyaruchinya in **DRC**, protection actors report high level of anxiety, PTSD, and depression yet mental health services are extremely limited or non-existent. In **Nigeria**, psychological support remains limited in Yobe and Borno, where women and children suffer long-term effects from violence and loss. Years of conflict and displacement in **CAR** have left deep psychological scars, including sleep disorders, isolation, and anxiety. In Bria, Alindao, and Kaga-Bandoro, repeated displacements and exposure to violence have particularly affected children, who show signs of withdrawal and aggression. Access to mental health services remains extremely limited. In **Venezuela**, arbitrary arrests, state surveillance, and restrictions on civil liberties have instilled a climate of fear. Arbitrary cell phone checks and the spread of false information via social media have compounded anxiety. Children and adolescents have been particularly affected—some families resort to confining them indoors out of fear of arbitrary arrest. According to the Observatorio de Violencia, suicide rates have risen sharply, particularly in Mérida, followed by Aragua, Zulia, Barinas, and others.



THEFT, EXTORTION, FORCED EVICTION OR DESTRUCTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK)
4	ETHIOPIA MALI MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR NIGER NIGERIA SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN SYRIA
3	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CAR CHAD COLOMBIA DRC GUATEMALA SOMALIA UKRAINE
2	CAMEROON HAITI
1	EL SALVADOR VENEZUELA

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Gaza**, families returning to Gaza City and Beit Hanoun found their homes looted or destroyed, with few legal avenues for restitution. In **West Bank**, more than 1,150 Palestinian structures were demolished, mostly in Area C, East Jerusalem, and Hebron, displacing hundreds of people. These demolitions were often carried out without warning, forcing families to abandon their possessions. Settler violence damaged agricultural land and water infrastructure, particularly in Nablus, Salfit, and the South Hebron Hills. In **Ethiopia**, West Oromia, civilians fleeing conflict had their homes looted and livestock stolen by armed actors. In North Gondar, families returning to their villages found shelters destroyed or occupied by other displaced groups. In **Myanmar**, looting and destruction of civilian property are reported across Chin, Magway, and Sagaing. Homes are burned during military raids, and civilians are often forced to abandon belongings under threat of violence. Markets, schools, and entire villages are razed in retaliation for perceived opposition activity. In **Mali**, displaced persons in Menaka and Gao reported theft and extortion at unofficial checkpoints while attempting to return to their places of origin. In **Mozambique**, civilians have reported looting and burning of homes and markets during armed attacks, particularly in Quissanga and Macomia districts. In **South Sudan**, looting of homes and aid supplies was reported in Leer, Fangak, and Yei, often during militia incursions or armed clashes. In IDP sites, some residents reported being evicted or having shelters dismantled without consent, while arbitrary taxation or extortion by local authorities remains common. In **North Kivu**, looting of homes and destruction of property were reported in abandoned villages in Masisi and Rutshuru, often committed by armed actors during offensives. Displaced populations arriving in Goma have described extortion at checkpoints and the loss of shelter and belongings due to military attacks. In **Colombia**, in Arauca, affected populations reported destruction of homes and threats of

extortion by armed groups controlling rural routes and illegal economies. In **Cameroon**, attacks by armed groups in the Far North and Anglophone regions often involve looting of villages, destruction of homes, and forced evictions. Displaced persons also report theft and extortion at informal checkpoints or by host community demanding rent for temporary shelter. In **Venezuela**, communities in Zulia, Barinas, and Apure report forced evictions, looting and destruction of informal settlements during military operations. In some areas, families had property seized arbitrarily on suspicion of political opposition ties.



TORTURE OR CRUEL, INHUMAN, DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK)
4	AFGHANISTAN EL SALVADOR HONDURAS SOMALIA SYRIA
3	CAMEROON CAR DRC ETHIOPIA MALI MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR NIGER NIGERIA SUDAN VENEZUELA
2	BURKINA FASO COLOMBIA GUATEMALA HAITI SOUTH SUDAN UKRAINE
1	CHAD

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **West Bank**, arrested individuals, including children, reported being subjected to beatings, verbal abuse, stress positions, and threats during interrogations by Israeli forces. Human rights actors documented detainees being denied medical treatment and held in degrading conditions, especially in Jenin and Ramallah. In **North Kivu**, survivors in Nyiragongo and Masisi recounted being subjected to torture, including beatings and forced confessions by armed groups. Detained civilians reported degrading treatment during interrogations, with no judicial oversight or possibility of recourse. In **Venezuela**, credible allegations of torture and inhumane treatment were reported in detention centres, especially involving political detainees. Detainees were subjected to prolonged isolation, physical violence, and threats of rape. In **Nigeria**, survivors from Konduga and Gwoza shared testimonies of ill-treatment by armed actors during detention, including physical abuse and denial of food. In **Ethiopia**, reports from Amhara and Oromia indicate that civilians detained during military operations were subjected to beatings, threats, and extended detention. In Wag Hemra, several detainees shared accounts of degrading treatment in informal detention centres.



TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, FORCED LABOUR, OR SLAVERY-LIKE PRACTICES

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK)
4	HONDURAS SYRIA VENEZUELA
3	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CHAD COLOMBIA DRC EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA GUATEMALA MALI MYANMAR NIGER
2	CAR HAITI NIGERIA SOMALIA SUDAN UKRAINE
1	CAMEROON MOZAMBIQUE SOUTH SUDAN OPT (WEST BANK)

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Venezuela**, non-state armed groups traffic adolescent girls and women for sexual exploitation along Sucre's maritime routes to Trinidad and Tobago, as well as within Bolívar's Orinoco Mining Arc. Forced recruitment has been reported in 12% of surveyed communities across Sucre, Táchira, and Zulia. Border states—particularly Sucre, Delta Amacuro, Apure, Táchira, and Zulia—are experiencing a rise in trafficking, as NSAGs operate cross-border networks, coerce residents into hosting victims in transit, and increasingly target adolescents for sexual exploitation. In **North Kivu**, increased reports of girls trafficked for sexual exploitation and domestic labour has been documented in Goma and Rutshuru. Armed groups also force

men and boys to transport weapons and loot, especially in areas cut off from humanitarian access. In **Ethiopia**, trafficking risks remain high in border areas of Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz, with women and adolescent girls trafficked for labour and sexual exploitation. In Afar, adolescent boys were reportedly recruited under false pretences into exploitative work in urban centres. In Shan and Kachin in **Myanmar**, trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation has increased. Women and children are particularly at risk of being trafficked across borders into China and Thailand, while traffickers operate with impunity, exploiting displacement and economic desperation. In **Niger**, adolescent girls in border zones of Tillabéri are reportedly trafficked across to Mali and Burkina Faso for domestic work and exploitative labour, often under coercion. In **CAR**, there are accounts of women and girls abducted and held in captivity by armed groups in Haute-Kotto and Mbomou, subjected to sexual slavery and forced domestic labour. These practices often occur in remote areas beyond the reach of humanitarian actors, with survivors rarely receiving assistance. In **South Sudan**, cases of women and girls trafficked internally for forced domestic labour or sexual exploitation were documented, notably in transit areas such as Juba, Bor, and Bentiu. Armed groups and informal recruiters also expose boys to exploitative labour under the guise of "community service".



UNLAWFUL IMPEDIMENTS OR RESTRICTIONS TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, SIEGE,
AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT

NATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW

5	OPT (GAZA and WEST BANK)
4	AFGHANISTAN BURKINA FASO CAMEROON COLOMBIA DRC EL SALVADOR ETHIOPIA HONDURAS MALI MOZAMBIQUE SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN VENEZUELA
3	CAR CHAD GUATEMALA MYANMAR NIGER SUDAN SYRIA UKRAINE
2	HAITI NIGERIA
1	

SUBNATIONAL RISK SEVERITY OVERVIEW | Number of subnational areas across countries per severity levels



In **Gaza**, the population continues to face near-total restrictions on movement, particularly between Rafah and northern governorates, with thousands trapped in conflict areas without humanitarian access. In **West Bank**, forced displacement increased due to home demolitions, settler violence, and military operations, particularly in Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron. Some communities in Area C were fully evacuated due to prolonged harassment and lack of infrastructure. In **North Kivu**, the resurgence of violence has displaced over a million people from Masisi, Rutshuru, and Sake, with many trapped in encircled zones or unable to return due to M23 occupation. Road access to Goma is frequently cut off, and populations face arbitrary checkpoints, extortion, and denial of movement by armed actors. In **Ethiopia**, displacement has been reported across Amhara, Oromia, Afar, and Tigray. In West Wellega, populations face restrictions on movement due to checkpoints and roadblocks by armed actors. In Tigray, some areas remain inaccessible due to road insecurity and military presence, limiting return or relocation options. In **Cameroon**, movement is restricted by insecurity, roadblocks, and curfews in the North West and South West, impacting access to markets, education, and humanitarian aid. In **Venezuela**, movement has been severely restricted through the deployment of military and intelligence units (SEBIN, DGCIM), especially at borders. Internal displacement and cross-border movements, particularly to Colombia and Brazil, increased sharply due to fears of persecution. Local communities have self-imposed curfews, and humanitarian access is severely limited, especially in Amazonas, where roadblocks prevent the delivery of assistance. In **Myanmar**, military checkpoints, curfews, and road closures impede movement between villages and regions, with besieged towns in Karenni, Magway, and Chin, cut off from food, water, and medical supplies. In **Niger**, displaced populations in Tillabéri are unable to return to their areas of origin due to persistent insecurity and road closures imposed by armed groups. In **Nigeria**, access to rural Borno remains limited due to military-permitted movement zones and insecurity, preventing return of displaced persons and access to farmland.

CRISIS WATCH

GAZA	Fighting and displacement orders expanded again from March 18, 2025, pushing people into ever-smaller areas, with repeated displacement movements in July–August and severe access impediments for aid convoys. Food insecurity has tipped into famine in Gaza governorate, with IPC projecting spread to Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis by end-September. At least 2,200 people have been killed while seeking aid in the past three months. Health, water and sanitation systems continue to collapse under bombardment, explosive ordnance contamination and access constraints. Overall fatalities reported by Gaza’s MoH surpassed 60,000 by early August, with weekly increases amid ongoing strikes. The humanitarian community continues to call for a permanent ceasefire, sustained access, and protection of civilians and aid operations.
SUDAN	Since January 2025, Sudan’s conflict has escalated into one of the world’s most severe protection crisis. Attacks on civilians and infrastructure – including a drone strike on El Fasher’s Hospital, shelling on Sabrin market in Omdurman, and assaults on Zamzam, on Abu Shouk IDP camps, and encirclement of Kadugli town have left hundreds injured, killed, and traumatized, with the resulting explosive contamination preventing prompt humanitarian interventions. Attacks on aid convoys have further stalled emergency response to populations cut off from basic food, nutrition, water, and protection services. Coordinated RSF operations in North Kordofan in July killed over 300 civilians making it one of the conflict’s deadliest episodes to date. Meanwhile, million people face increased protection risks such as forced displacement, rampant sexual violence, forced recruitment and denial of access to basic services.
DRC	Since January 2025, the M23 offensive in North Kivu has escalated into a major humanitarian and protection crisis, culminating in the capture of Goma and then Bukavu just three weeks later. The violence has left an estimated 3,000 people dead and displaced over a million people in just weeks, adding to nearly 6.4 million IDPs in DRC. Civilians face grave protection risks, including killings, mass rape, forced recruitment, and family separation. Humanitarian access has been crippled by insecurity, looting, the destruction of Goma and Bukavu/Kavumu airports, and major funding shortfalls, leaving protection actors unable to meet soaring needs. Despite international appeals and emergency funding, the population in North and South Kivu remains trapped in a worsening crisis marked by violence, deprivation, and restricted humanitarian assistance.

OVERVIEW OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS UPDATES

28 Protection Clusters have produced **117** Protection Analysis Updates, including **74** national, **38** sub-national and **5** thematic since the 1st of January 2022. The PAUs are produced on a regular basis with the aim of informing the protection response – including in terms of identifying pressing gaps, needed programmatic and advocacy actions and protection priorities. They are grounded in the Protection Analytical Framework. The following 24 PAUs were produced thus far in 2025. Click on the country to access the latest PAU (if public).

CHAD	JANUARY	CAMEROON	APRIL	ETHIOPIA	SEPTEMBER
oPt (GAZA)	JANUARY	COLOMBIA (N.SAN)	JUNE	COLOMBIA (S.NEV.)	SEPTEMBER
AFGHANISTAN	FEBRUARY	MALI	JUNE	CAR	SEPTEMBER
MYANMAR	FEBRUARY	SOMALIA	JUNE	HAITI	SEPTEMBER
MOZAMBIQUE	FEBRUARY	NIGER	JULY	UKRAINE	SEPTEMBER
oPt (WEST BANK)	MARCH	oPt (GAZA)	JULY	SUDAN	OCTOBER
SOUTH SUDAN	APRIL	NIGERIA	JULY	SOUTH SUDAN	OCTOBER
DRC	APRIL	COLOMBIA (ARAU.)	JULY	VENEZUELA	OCTOBER

3. Protection amidst the Humanitarian Reset in 2025



In March 2025, the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Tom Fletcher, announced the launch of the *Humanitarian Reset* – a system-wide process aimed at increasing the efficiency, agility, and impact of humanitarian action. Outlined in a letter to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals, the initiative addresses a range of reform priorities, including localisation, Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) prioritisation, and enhanced focus on life-saving actions. It also called for cluster simplification and streamlining, and broader IASC reform. Central to this effort is the reduction of inefficiency, duplication, and bureaucracy, as captured in [A Vision for a Simplified and More Efficient Humanitarian System](#).

Within this context, the Global Protection Cluster (GPC) has actively positioned protection as a central pillar of humanitarian action. Most humanitarian crises are fundamentally protection crises, driven by violations of international law and patterns of abuse, violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation, exploitation, and exclusion. These factors not only generate immediate protection needs but also exacerbate other humanitarian challenges, making protection considerations indispensable for any effective humanitarian response. Recognising this, the GPC issued a global [statement](#) and [key advocacy messages](#) to reinforce protection as a priority within the Reset process.

FUNDING CONSTRAINTS AND OPERATIONAL IMPACT

The Humanitarian Reset is unfolding against the backdrop of severe funding constraints for protection. In 2024, the Protection Cluster received \$1.7 billion in humanitarian financing – just 49% of the US \$3.5 billion required – leaving a funding gap of 51%. Projections for 2025 indicate an even sharper decline, with average shortfalls expected to reach 67% across major humanitarian crises.

In response, the GPC conducted a detailed [funding analysis](#) to model the operational consequences of two scenarios: a 30% reduction compared to 2024 levels, and a 50% reduction. The results highlight significant potential disruption to country-level operations, including the scaling back or suspension of critical protection services, community-led interventions and early-warning/prevention mechanisms. This analysis provides an evidence base for advocacy and decision-making. The GPC continues to consult global partners to assess the real-time impact of these cuts on programming and to inform operational planning for 2025 and 2026.

In this context, the global response to GBV is being severely undermined by a combination of funding cuts and [intensifying backlash](#) against women's rights. Across regions and contexts, hard-won progress on gender equality and survivor protection is being reversed. Shrinking civic space and increasing restrictions on feminist and women-led organizations have forced many women's rights groups and service providers to scale back or close essential services (including Women and Girls Safe Spaces), putting them at [breaking point](#). These pressures not only weaken policy advocacy and accountability but also jeopardize the delivery of life-saving support to survivors at a time when risks of violence are heightened. Despite these setbacks, local organizations, global advocates, and humanitarian actors continue to adapt, often developing creative and context-specific strategies to sustain critical GBV services in an increasingly hostile environment.

A HYPER-PRIORITISED HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

The magnitude, gravity and suddenness of funding cuts in the first quarter of 2025 have forced the humanitarian community to “hyper-prioritize” its response efforts. The reprioritization of 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRP) was based on two main criteria: (1) focusing humanitarian action on the people and places that need it most, using intersectoral severity 4 and 5 as the starting point; (2) prioritizing life-saving activities, including protection, based on work already undertaken for the Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2025. The GPC developed guidance for Cluster coordination teams to navigate the prioritisation exercise, notably through the [Guidance on Prioritisation of Protection Response Activities at Country Level](#).

In June 2025, OCHA launched an [hyper-prioritized](#) humanitarian response plan to address the most urgent life-saving needs in acute crises. Overall, protection was incorporated in every country hyper-prioritization response plans, alongside the delivery of life-saving assistance. The Protection Cluster identified 24.7 million people to be most urgently targeted with assistance and protection. This represents just 14,7% of the 168 million people in need of protection globally – leaving 143,3 million people behind. To reach these people, US \$ 1,2 billion need to be urgently mobilized for the protection response. As of 31 August 2025, the Protection Cluster is only funded at 23% out of the initial US \$3.2 billion requested.

Key observations related to the prioritisation exercise included:

- **Recalling that protection interventions are lifesaving:** Hyper-prioritization puts the entire humanitarian response and its various sectors under pressure to define and deliver life-saving assistance. In this context, it has been – and continues to be – critical to re-emphasize the life-saving nature of protection interventions (as highlighted for example in the CERF life-saving criteria) and continuously advocate for humanitarian leadership’s commitment to protection, especially as most humanitarian crises are protection crises.
- **Protection risks analysis must continue to support the definition of the scope of humanitarian responses and priority settings across sectors,** including by considering the context-specific nature of protection risks that have an effect on humanitarian needs. At a time of constrained resources and capacity to deliver the most effective humanitarian response, it is more critical than ever that protection risks sit at the core of humanitarian planning and decision-making and inform collective outcomes.
- **Balancing intersectoral severity with safe service provision.** Some operations highlighted concerns around the stricter focus of response plans on intersectoral severity 4 and 5 areas (e.g. frontline locations in Ukraine, hard-to-reach areas in Burkina Faso, areas inaccessible or under-siege in Sudan). While reaching affected populations in these areas is indeed a high priority, this geographical focus risks overlooking the importance of safe and accessible service provision. Certain critical protection services – such as GBV survivor support and legal assistance – are often best located where people can safely access them (e.g. in severity 3 areas).
- **Losing gains on prevention and longer-term response.** While the hyper-prioritization privilege immediate/basic emergency response, less attention is paid to prevention and to sustaining essential humanitarian services over time. The reduced capacity of humanitarian actors coupled with limited engagement with development actors have raised the question of who will be able to address gaps and the needs of people not prioritized under the HNRP. How those needs will be met, and what role donors and Member States envisage beyond the HNRP, and its funding streams remain important questions to be addressed.

MANAGING TRANSITIONS AND PROGRAMME CLOSURES

Reform processes, coupled with reduced foreign aid, are forcing Protection Clusters and their partners to navigate complex and accelerated operational transitions, including potential programme closures. These changes demand careful coordination to minimise harm to affected populations and preserve access to essential protection services wherever possible. In 2025, transitions are further shaped by the localisation agenda and shifting donor priorities, requiring clusters to adapt their coordination models to match evolving operational realities.

In addition, the IASC Emergency Directors Group (EDG) through their ‘prioritization plan’ identified eight countries for accelerated transition of the IASC humanitarian coordination architecture (Cameroon, Colombia, Eritrea, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe). This accelerated transition will be done through the reconfiguration of the humanitarian coordination architecture, including as it pertains to HC designations, continuation of HCTs, the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) and related cluster coordination.

To guide these processes, the GPC developed targeted tools for field teams, including the [Guidance on Sudden Programme Closure](#) and the [Practice Note on Protection in Humanitarian Coordination Transitions](#). These

resources provide structured approaches for engaging partners in programme exit strategies, safeguarding continuity where feasible, and ensuring that coordination mechanisms remain responsive to the needs of affected communities.

COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION


Colombia

In Colombia, protection needs are a daily and pressing reality for millions of people—this is not a crisis that has been overcome. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has warned that 2025 could be one of the worst years of the past decade in terms of humanitarian impact. Five of the eight ongoing non-international armed conflicts involve non-state armed actors, reflecting the transformation of the conflict and the changing nature of confrontations in the country. This is a crisis marked by the convergence of armed conflict, the refugee and migration crisis, and the impacts of climate change, illustrating the scale of protection challenges in a context of multiple, overlapping dynamics of human mobility.

The Protection Cluster estimates that more than 6 million people will be in need of protection in 2026. Ongoing armed conflict across several regions has led to a sharp increase in the recruitment and use of children and adolescents, gender-based violence, contamination by explosive devices, forced displacement, and confinement, further deteriorating living conditions, particularly in rural and marginalized urban areas. Numerous indigenous groups continue to be disproportionately affected, facing a growing risk of physical and cultural extermination as their territories, leadership, and traditional ways of life are systematically attacked and dismantled. Humanitarian access is increasingly restricted due to deteriorating security conditions, political violence, and the presence of armed actors. In many areas, governance structures persist without real control or legitimacy, and the erosion of community resilience is compounded by the repeated disregard for International Humanitarian Law.

The crisis in **Catatumbo** has escalated into the country's most severe humanitarian emergency in recent years. Since January 2025, the violent clashes between ELN and FARC dissidents have displaced over 70,000 people and confined nearly 20,000 more, affecting roughly half of the region's population. The conflict has disproportionately impacted vulnerable groups, including indigenous communities amid widespread recruitment of children, sexual violence, and land dispossession. **Arauca**, a department bordering Venezuela, is engulfed in a severe humanitarian crisis driven by armed conflict, migration, and disasters. Territorial disputes between non state armed groups like the ELN and FARC-EP dissidents have led to forced displacement, confinement, and widespread violence, severely impacting civilians. Venezuelan refugees and migrants, who make up a significant portion of the population, face discrimination, lack of documentation, and restricted access to essential services. Gender-based violence has surged, disproportionately affecting women and minors, while child recruitment by armed groups remains a critical issue. Additionally, chronic stress and limited mental health services exacerbate the population's vulnerability. The **Sierra Nevada** region in northern Colombia faces a severe humanitarian crisis fueled by violent disputes between non state armed groups. These conflicts have caused mass displacement, homicides, and human rights violations, disproportionately affecting indigenous communities such as the Kogui, Wiwa, Arhuacos, and Kankuamos. Armed groups exploit the region's strategic location for narcotrafficking, intensifying violence and targeting civilians through forced displacement, gender-based violence, and child recruitment.

These overlapping crises demand urgent, coordinated responses to address the protection risks and restore the rights and dignity of affected communities. In Colombia, the Protection Cluster has long been characterized by a decentralized structure led by a team of national staff, organized around geographic hubs and marked by



strong engagement with national organizations. This approach has fostered inclusive coordination and enhanced responsiveness to local protection needs. The Protection Cluster works in an integrated manner with the refugees and migrant's platform (GIFFM), ensuring coherent inter-agency coordination in the context of mixed migration. As part of the Flagship Initiative, Colombia has prioritized localisation, area-based approach, community-based protection, and the triple nexus approach, with a particular emphasis on strengthening both institutional and community leadership. These elements have positioned Colombia as a model for locally driven protection coordination and strategic alignment across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts.

Nigeria

Nigeria continues to face a complex and multifaceted protection crisis, driven by protracted armed conflict, and climate-related shocks, including major floods early in the raining season. The situation is most acute in the north-east, particularly in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) States, where the Boko Haram insurgency and its offshoots, including ISWAP, have perpetuated violence and displacement for more than 15 years.

As of early 2025, 2.3 million people remain internally displaced in the BAY states, while an additional 2.1 million returnees struggle with reintegration amid insecurity and limited access to essential services. Armed groups continue to target civilians through killings, kidnappings, and widespread use of improvised explosive devices, with civilian fatalities rising by 15 percent in the first half of 2025. Explosive ordnance contamination has also increased in return areas, further undermining safety and restricting freedom of movement.

Protection risks remain severe across multiple fronts. Gender-based violence is widespread, with over 2,300 incidents reported between January and June 2025 in the BAY states alone, most frequently intimate partner violence and sexual exploitation (IPV dominates 59%, denial of resources 29.8%, physical assault 22.4%, rape 13.8%, and child sexual abuse 9.8%). Adolescent girls face heightened exposure to forced marriage and survival sex. Nigeria also continues to register some of the highest levels of grave violations against children globally: in 2024, 974 cases of child recruitment were verified, with many more likely unreported. Girls associated with armed groups are disproportionately affected by sexual violence and forced exploitation.

Despite state-level action plans and relocation strategies, insecurity, unresolved housing, land and property disputes, and limited access to basic services hinder sustainable returns and durable solutions. Many returnees face secondary displacement due to continued violence and inadequate support systems. In this context, the most urgent protection priorities include persistent attacks on civilians and violations of physical integrity, pervasive gender-based violence, forced recruitment and association of children with armed groups, and state-led relocations conducted in conditions of insecurity and unsafe tenure.

The Protection Cluster has continued to play a central role in coordinating protection responses, closing critical gaps, and advocating for the rights of affected populations. Looking forward, its vision for transition is anchored in progressively shifting leadership and ownership to national and local actors. This involves strengthening state-level protection coordination platforms, embedding protection capacities within government and civil society structures, and fostering stronger collaboration with development actors to address the structural drivers of displacement and protection risks. By reinforcing national systems, investing in local service providers, and aligning with broader peacebuilding and development frameworks, the Cluster aims to ensure that protection outcomes are sustained beyond the cluster system and that affected communities can access durable solutions in safety and dignity.

Cameroon

The protection environment in Cameroon's North-West, South-West (NWSW) and Far North regions remains volatile, with civilians facing persistent threats to safety and dignity. Armed conflict and insecurity continue to fuel violence, including attacks, abductions, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions, and destruction of property, severely disrupting daily life and livelihoods. Restrictions on movement and recurrent lockdowns further erode coping mechanisms, while climate shocks such as severe flooding compound displacement and exacerbate already fragile humanitarian conditions.

Protection risks remain severe and multi-dimensional, with little improvement in the past two years. Civilians continue to face threats to life, dignity, and access to services, while infrastructure is repeatedly damaged. In the NWSW, insecurity has left many schools unsafe or non-functional, exposing children to increased risks of violence, abuse, and exploitation.


The crisis has distinct impacts on different groups. In the Far North, women and girls face heightened vulnerability due to entrenched gender inequality, with increasing reports of gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate partner violence. In the NWSW, men and boys are disproportionately exposed to arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and other violations of physical integrity. Across all regions, repeated displacement deepens risks of exploitation, abuse, and loss of livelihoods.

Protection response and coordination capacities have been severely weakened by funding cuts. Critical gaps persist in legal aid, mental health and psychosocial support, child protection, and GBV services, leaving many survivors without access to assistance. Fear of retaliation and restricted humanitarian access further limit the ability of affected populations to seek support.

Despite these challenges, the Protection Cluster and partners continue to strengthen coordination, address critical gaps, and lay the groundwork for transition and sustainability. Looking ahead, the vision for transition is to progressively shift leadership and ownership to national actors, reinforcing institutional structures and building long-term protection capacities. This will involve closer alignment with government frameworks, stronger collaboration with civil society, and greater investment in local service providers – ensuring that protection outcomes are sustained beyond the cluster system.

4. Field Coordination and Operations

The GPC provides interagency field support through a system of regional focal points (Field Support Unit), who provide day-to-day country level support to cluster operations. Additionally, the GPC hosts dedicated capacity to support field advocacy, analysis and information management, as well cross-cutting issues such as inclusion.⁵ Interagency field support capacity is provided by UNHCR, NRC, Help-Age, SIDA and SDC. The GPC hosted additional IM capacity provided by IMMAP, but this was ended due to the foreign aid cuts.



⁵ At present, the GPC does not track IM support requests.

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