



PROTECTION LANDSCAPE IN SYRIA

A SNAPSHOT | MARCH 2025

This document provides a snapshot of the continuity and evolution of protection risks in Syria since the events of 8 December. It does not aim to present a comprehensive analysis of the current protection landscape, nor to establish a hierarchy of risks. Rather, it offers an account of specific situations that are either driving existing protection risks, exacerbating them, or have the potential to generate new risks—particularly in light of the shifting context and heightened vulnerabilities affecting parts of the population.

Shafak Organization, IDPs camp in Salajin, Idlib Governorate, 2023

OVERVIEW

Syria's political landscape transformed on **8 December 2024** with the fall of the former regime. A new **transitional government** is now in place, but the country remains **fragmented** among various armed actors: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and groups formed under the umbrella of the Syrian Nation al Army (SNA) now dominate most of the west and north (including Damascus, Aleppo, Idlib), while the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) retain parts of the northeast. In the South, various armed groups under a separate 'operational command' exercise territorial control. Other foreign influences persist – Russia holds bases on the coast and Israel has expanded the areas under its territorial control. Despite recent agreements (with the SDF and OAGs in Sweida) security is **volatile**; the various groups are not all fully united and sporadic clashes continue (for e.g. SNA vs SDF skirmishes in the northeast) while new conflict dynamics are also emerging (for e.g. Coastal and Central areas).

Humanitarian needs in Syria are **staggering**. An estimated **16.5 million people** – out of which 6.5 million are children – the highest since the crisis began – are projected to require some form of assistance in 2025 (Humanitarian Response Priorities 2025). Years of conflict have decimated infrastructure nationwide, leaving millions without adequate housing, reliable water, electricity and healthcare. Over **7.4 million Syrians** remain internally displaced inside the country, with many displaced multiple times, and neighboring countries host millions of Syrian refugees. With the former Government's fall, **returns** have begun. According to OCHA, 885,000 IDPs have returned to their areas of origin since November 27. Furthermore, and according to UNHCR, some 300,000 Syrians from abroad have returned since after December 8th, with many host states now urging Syrians to go back. However, conditions in Syria are far from fully stable or conducive, raising concerns about premature returns and secondary displacement. **Protection needs** are still immense: Syrians face threats from conflict, unexploded ordnances, housing, land and property related disputes, lack of access to civil documentation (including birth certificates for children), forced labor, kidnappings, ethnic and sectarian related violence, gender-based violence, grave child rights violations and exploitation, among others.

NATIONWIDE PROTECTION RISKS OUTLOOK

Syria's transition is impacting protection risks nationally and regionally. Some threats have receded, while new dangers and chronic issues persist. In this unpredictable environment, persecution, and retaliatory violence have recently been on the rise. The absence of rule of law and transitional justice mechanisms threatens social cohesion, fueling tensions. All 15 protection risks¹ identified by the Protection Cluster remain relevant in Syria's post-Assad

¹ More information on the 15 protection risks monitored by protection clusters is available [here](#)

regime context, though their severity varies. While large-scale hostilities have subsided, **violence and lawlessness persist particularly across Homs, the Coastal region, and Northeast and Northwest Syria**. Targeted attacks, kidnappings, and opposition-loyalist clashes are on the rise. NES remains particularly vulnerable due to ongoing armed clashes between the SDF and SNA, as well as the presence of ISIS cells in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. Recent mine action reports also indicate that NES has some of the highest levels of unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination, with active clearance efforts needing scale-up in Raqqa, Qamishli, and Deir ez-Zor ([Mine Action Syria Update No. 1, 2025](#)).

The absence of rule of law has also fueled criminal activity, while the lack of fully functional courts and weak governance leave civilians with no access to justice. Meanwhile, cross-border military operations continue, with recent strikes reaching deeper into Deir-ez-Zor and other areas previously less affected, while in Manbij, ongoing airstrikes, movement restrictions, and limited access to food and basic services continue to threaten civilians. While mass releases of detainees in December reduced regime-era arbitrary detentions affecting especially political prisoners, they also freed individuals without due process or monitoring and irrespective of the reason for their detention. Nor has the risk *vanished*: **Kidnappings, abductions, and disappearances persist**, with civilians increasingly caught in security operations and criminal activity. The new authorities have detained some former regime members and others perceived as threats, raising due-process concerns. Many thousands remain missing from past years, and clarifying their fate remains a **top priority** for families. The Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA)^[4] indicated in 2024 escalating child protection concerns across all governorates with approximately 73 per cent of surveyed household heads reporting at least one family member exhibiting signs of psychological distress, and 28 per cent specifically noting distress among children. Without adequate mental health and psychosocial support, children's capacity to cope with adversity is severely compromised **Child and family separation** saw a paradoxical trend: many families reunited as borders and front lines opened and prisoners were freed, yet the late-2024 chaos also created new separations (children lost in displacement, families split fleeing combat, separated children in closed institutional care). **Discrimination and stigmatization** are also on the increase for certain groups, with risks of denial of resources, opportunities and services, especially for women and girls who continue to be disproportionately affected by the changing but continuing crises. Humanitarian access, while improved, remains impacted by security constraints and bureaucratic impediments and interference, negatively impacting communities' access to assistance and services.

Several **protection risks remain extremely acute** in the current period. **Impediments to legal identity and civil documentation** including birth certificates for children risk denying millions of access to services, freedom of movement, and legal rights, as fragmented registries, non-operational civil affairs offices and unrecognized documents obstruct justice, governance, and social inclusion. **Housing, land, and property violations**—including looting, destruction, forced evictions, and property occupation—spiked immediately after the transition, particularly in Damascus, Afrin, and Tell Rifaat, where minorities faced discrimination and persecution when reclaiming land and properties. In northwest Syria, returnees in former frontline areas encountered high levels of explosive ordnance contamination, injuries, and destroyed or occupied homes, fueling confrontations, and risks of renewed violence and displacement. **Psychosocial distress** remains widespread after 14 years of conflict, yet mental health support remains insufficient to address the complexity of needs. In Northeast and Northwest Syria, inadequate services have contributed to rising drug dependency, while suicide rates have sharply increased (NWS MHPSS WG). **Gender-based violence (GBV)** remains pervasive, with domestic violence, sexual exploitation, and shifting socio-cultural norms increasingly restricting women's safety, independence and opportunities. This is particularly the case for female-headed households such as widows or those who are divorced. Despite a decline in some conflict-related sexual violence, recent developments have disproportionately impacted women and girls and have increased their risk of being exposed to violence, especially in areas where the security situation has deteriorated. This is compounded by the economic crisis, forced and voluntary returns, limited access to essential goods, basic services, and opportunities, multiple displacements, overcrowding and poor living conditions in camps and temporary shelters. **Explosive hazards** contaminate large swaths of Syria; landmines, IEDs, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are claiming lives every


day. Syrian children continue to endure the devastating effects of unexploded ordnance (UXO) at a distressing rate – one third of casualties are children. In December 2024 alone, MA AoR reported 66 child casualties killed from unexploded ordnance.

The UXO contamination endangers lives, disrupts livelihoods and income sources, exacerbating vulnerabilities. **Forced and child marriage** remains a harmful coping mechanism for some families, and **child recruitment** by armed groups persists. **Trafficking and forced labor** risks may be rising as vulnerable populations (widows, unaccompanied children, youth and IDPs) are exploited by criminal networks in the post-war chaos and lack of socio-economic stability. In summary, some risks have diminished, but many others remain **severe and life-threatening**.

EACH REGION IN SYRIA HAS A UNIQUE RISK PROFILE, BUT NO PART OF SYRIA IS ENTIRELY SPARED FROM PROTECTION RISKS IN THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

The **geographic distribution** of protection risks in Syria is uneven. Areas that saw intense combat and shifting control in late 2024 now face the highest levels of **physical threats** and damage. Other previously ‘stable’ areas are seeing increasing risks of violence and insecurity.

Across all regions, the **destruction of infrastructure, including housing, and lack or limited access to basic services** (health services, education, electricity, running water, social services) is a unifying challenge that exacerbates protection risks for all. Communities emerging from sieges or heavy fighting, such as Eastern Ghouta near Damascus or parts of Aleppo, have barely any services thus civilians there have a higher vulnerability to health risks, exploitation, negative coping mechanisms and further displacement.



SIX AREAS OF CONCERN THAT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED

As Syria enters a complex transitional phase, protection concerns remain diverse and deeply embedded across regions. While it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the most critical protection risks, initial 2024 analyses—combined with recent developments—point to six situations of concern that may produce harm or exacerbate existing protection risks and related needs across the country.

This section introduces these six situations as early signals requiring close monitoring. A dedicated protection analysis will be conducted in the coming months to examine how these evolving dynamics relate to actual protection risks faced by the population, and to ensure they are appropriately addressed in the transition planning and humanitarian response



RETURNS AND EX FRONTLINE AREAS Destruction, displacement and uncertainty

According to the intentions surveys conducted with IDPs, as well as with refugees in neighbouring countries, large numbers of returnees are expected in Syria between 2025 and 2026. The intentions survey conducted by the CCCM Cluster, REACH and UNHCR between January and February 2025 covering the camps in Northwest Syria, for example, shows that 1 million IDPs intend to return in the next 12 months; almost 600,000 of them before early 2026. Most intended areas of return are within northwest Syria and former frontline areas. Former frontline areas, including parts of Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib, remain devastated from the effects of conflict and many returnees find their homes destroyed or occupied, and essential services such as water, healthcare, and electricity remain largely non-operational. As ex-frontline areas, partners faced challenges to access them, leading to low presence and response protection capacity. Unexploded ordnances and landmines continue to pose lethal risks, with dozens of returnees killed while attempting to re-enter homes or resume farming. In some regions, lawlessness persists, with rising crime rates as well sporadic attacks from regime remnants and local power struggles leading to outbreaks of violence. Thousands of IDPs attempting to return to Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hassakeh also face movement restrictions, extensive EO contamination, unresolved HLP disputes, and social re-integration challenges.

Economically, returning Syrians face bleak prospects, as businesses, markets, and industries remain gutted, financial resources are exhausted, liquidity shortages and environmental destruction prevent the effective resumption of economic activities including agricultural livelihoods. Destroyed housing and the lack of alternatives may force families into overcrowded or makeshift shelters and collective centers, increasing risks of GBV, while a lack of employment opportunities exacerbates exposure to abuse and exploitation, especially for women and girls. Humanitarian agencies are working to provide essential support, but the scale of needs far exceeds available resources, further exacerbated by constrained humanitarian funding.

Ensuring safe and sustainable returns requires comprehensive measures, including de-mining, rehabilitating housing and infrastructure, stabilizing security, resolving housing, land, and property (HLP) issues, and providing access to civil documentation and legal services (e.g. birth, marriage, and HLP registration), mental health and psychosocial support services as well as concrete measures to promote social cohesion and access to justice. Without adequate support, large-scale returns may lead to rising social and community tensions, intimate partner and family violence, sexual and other types of exploitation as well as secondary displacement, threatening the fragile gains made in the early months of Syria's transition. There is a critical need for sustained aid to ensure safe and dignified reintegration, thereby maintaining stability and supporting Syria's recovery.



VULNERABLE GROUPS & RISK OF EXCLUSION

Exclusion, exploitation and discrimination

With the change in context, shifts in vulnerabilities and profiles of those at heightened risk are emerging. The risk of exclusion is high with female-headed households, widows and children in camps, child headed households, destitute persons with disabilities and the elderly, UASC, women and children under detention, child-headed households, children formerly associated with armed groups, minorities and youth, all of whom face particular barriers to aid, protection, and basic services (*NWS PC Inclusion technical working group, 2024*). Women-headed households—often widows, wives of the missing or those who returned without their husbands—struggle to meet basic needs, facing economic exclusion, stigma, increased GBV risks, legal and HLP constraints, exploitation and abuse. Many lack documentation and are vulnerable to sexual exploitation, while humanitarian aid remains difficult to access. Some areas have also seen a shift in socio-cultural attitudes toward women and girls, limiting their independence, freedom of movement and access to opportunities. Domestic violence, child marriage, child trafficking, child labour, and sexual exploitation are rising, particularly in IDP camps and shelters, where women and girls face heightened risks of survival sex and forced marriage. Children, particularly boys separated from their families, face child labor, and recruitment into armed groups, while education access remains limited in war-damaged areas. Persons with disabilities (PwDs) make up over 28% of Syria's population, yet many are unable to access healthcare, assistive devices, or safe infrastructure (*Humanity & Inclusion, 2025*). The destruction of 60% of hospitals has further reduced support, while stigma and isolation exacerbate exclusion (*Humanity & Inclusion, 2025*). Similarly, elderly Syrians, many of whom remain alone due to displacement, face mobility issues, food insecurity, and chronic illnesses without adequate medical care (*HNWS ITWG 2024*). LGBTQ+ individuals are at increasing risk of severe discrimination, legal persecution, and threats of violence, and their future remains uncertain.

Ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Alawites, Kurds, Shi'ite Muslims, the Druze, and Christians, now find themselves in a more fragile position. Many have fled or relocated to parts of the country deemed safe. Increasing numbers of targeted attacks and severe human rights violations, including killings, against minority communities have been documented. To date these have largely been concentrated in the Coastal and Central areas. The new leadership has made efforts to reassure communities. However fears persist, with reports of Alawite and Christian families in Homs and Hama facing discrimination in aid distribution or being pressured to leave their homes, while harassment is increasingly common including in urban areas. Beyond sectarian tensions, historic ethnic divisions also pose risks. Violations against Kurds have also been documented in connection with house, land and property, denial of access to civil documentation and to basic services, and there are concerns of potential tensions with host communities while returning to northern Aleppo. Meanwhile Arab residents in the Kurdish-led northeast fear marginalization. The greatest threat to minorities remains psychological and indirect—fear and uncertainty are driving preventive displacement, even in the absence of widespread persecution. Moving forward, the key

challenge is restoring trust, ensuring legal protections, and fostering inclusive governance through consultation, rights restitution, social cohesion efforts, and rule of law.



DETENTION AND FORMER DETAINEES

Justice, security and unresolved risks

Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and closed camps have marked the Syria context for many years. Recently, some dramatic changes have been seen. Thousands of detainees have been released from regime facilities, including political dissidents and human rights activists long held under brutal conditions. The torture practices the former regime's prisons have largely ceased, marking a positive step for human rights. However, with the lack of an organized prisoners release process, those facing criminal charges were also freed increasing risks of delinquency and security across the country. New instances of arbitrary detentions have occurred, with the caretaker authorities detaining ex-regime officials, intelligence officers, and militia leaders, often holding them in incommunicado detention, raising concerns about transparency and due process. Limited access to legal representation and the fact that many courts are either not functioning or only partially functional inhibits access to effective remedies. Arbitrary detentions and arrests also continue to take place in the Northeast, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqqa. The arbitrary detention of children remains a serious and under-addressed protection concern, especially in the Northeast. According to the UN Secretary-General's Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict, over 1,000 children have been arbitrarily detained in Northeast Syria, underscoring the absence of safeguards and due process.

Across Syria, detention conditions remain dire. Many former regime prisons were looted or abandoned, and new makeshift facilities have overcrowded cells and inadequate sanitation. There is a lack of independent monitoring on detention conditions and to protect detainee rights. Humanitarian agencies have limited access to detention sites which hinders justice, reparation, and security, while destroyed records weaken transitional justice, increase exposure to violence and fuel instability (*IIIM, 2024*). A particularly complex detention crisis persists in Al-Hol and Roj camps, which still hold around 40,000 people, including 16,000 Syrians—94% of whom are women and children, with 88% of households headed by females—many with perceived or real links to ISIS. With Assad gone, efforts have begun to repatriate Syrian detainees, though security risks and the uncertain future of relations between Kurdish authorities and the new Damascus government complicate the process (*Reuters, 2025*). Makeshift prisons holding 10,000 suspected ISIS fighters remain a major unresolved issue, with Western governments pushing for repatriation of foreign detainees (*Reuters, 2025*).

The release of former detainees presents further challenges. Many lack identification papers, face stigma in their communities, or struggle with severe trauma while access to specialist mental health and healthcare is a challenge. Specific concerns – such as stigma and rejection – are faced by females many of whom have been subjected to GBV and for those children born in detention. The fate of tens of thousands of forcibly disappeared individuals remains unknown, with human rights groups demanding investigations into mass graves and secret prisons. Addressing past human rights abuses while ensuring humane treatment under the new authorities is crucial for Syria's long-term stability. Absence of coordinated efforts along with the existing mechanisms and the current lack of effective national mechanisms that address war crimes and other human rights violations might hinder future rights restitution and accountability processes, fueling the risks of increased social tension and confrontation, particularly in absence of rule of law. Unattended demands of justice, truth and reparation could lead to new cycles of violence and forced displacement.



HOUSE, LAND & PROPERTY

Displacement, disputes and barriers to return

Syria's mass displacement, shifting front lines and inconsistent and detrimental legal framework have created a complex housing, land, and property (HLP) crisis, with returning IDPs and refugees often finding their homes occupied, appropriated, or destroyed, posing huge barriers to return and creating risks for future tensions if competing claims are left unresolved. There is an absence of needed HLP legal frameworks that address war related impacts on properties as well as restitution processes that address secondary occupation whilst preserving the rights of both households. The Assad government previously used legal mechanisms such as Law 10 (2018) to confiscate properties, while opposition groups and militias also occupied abandoned homes. Since its fall, tensions over property rights have escalated. Some returning families face disputes with current occupants, while others report forced evictions and retributive property seizures, particularly in Afrin, Azaz, Jandiris, Saraqeb, Hama, Damascus countryside, and Latakia, where sectarian revenge evictions have been reported.

A major barrier to restitution is documentation—many returnees lack property deeds due to lost records, regime-era legal decrees, or multiple competing land registries issued by different authorities (e.g., de facto authorities administration vs. Damascus). House, land and property related violations included hampering, grabbing, looting, confiscation, forced sales, changes in agricultural dedication, many of them reinforced through legal developments implemented as early as 2011 by the regime. Women, particularly widows and divorced women, are particularly exposed to HLP vulnerabilities, which can, in turn, exacerbate their psycho-social distress and risks of GBV. Absence of civil documentation (including birth registration, marital status, IDs) also poses significant challenges to properly assess needs, monitor access to basic services and guarantee efficient response. 1 of 2 households aiming to return to Syria within one year, lack civil documentation (*CCCM cluster 2025*). Registration systems at the national level, concrete public policies as well as IDP-related legal frameworks will be needed to ensure structured and rights based access to services and protection mechanisms.

The magnitude and complexity of these violations in a context of massive returns and absence of judicial capacity or adjusted legal frameworks, poses a significant threat to peaceful coexistence and the effective prevention of additional violations. Specialized and properly capacitated administrative and judicial systems, legal frameworks promoting restitution, compensation and indemniation as well as mediation and arbitration mechanisms that incorporate transitional justice approaches are required to prevent additional violence at the community level.



MINES & UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

EO contamination, casualties and barrier to clearance

Syria remains one of the world's most explosive hazards-contaminated countries, with landmines, IEDs, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) posing a daily threat in areas of return in particular. Since 2011, it is estimated that more than 1 million explosive munitions have been used in Syria. Mine Action (MA) experts consider that 10-30% of explosive munitions fail to detonate, leaving a highly volatile explosive ordnance (EO) contamination for years. Based on the extent of conflict activities over the years, EO contamination is widespread, however its full extent remains unknown, as no Syria-wide non-technical survey to identify and map all hazardous areas has ever been conducted.

In Syria, EO are found in agricultural fields, roads, irrigation systems, in water and electricity infrastructure in hospitals, schools, bridges, riverbeds, residential areas and on commercial properties. In December 2024, at least 75 unexploded ordnance (UXOs) accidents were recorded, with at least 64 deaths and 105 injuries - three times as much as in the previous three months combined. January proved to be even deadlier, with at least 85 people killed and 152 injured. Dire economic situation, movement across former front lines and accessing destroyed property exponentially increase risks from death and injury, particularly for men and children. The majority of accidents since December 2024 took place in agricultural settings as people were trying to cultivate land or graze animals. This is particularly the case in places where mine action actors had limited access, like in Deir ez-Zor, Menbij, rural Idleb and Aleppo, Ras il-Ain and Tel Abiad pocket, Kobane, Dara'a, As-Sweida and Rural Damascus. .

Despite chronic underfunding, clearance efforts continue in 2025. Northwest Syria partners alone removed more than 1,800 explosive devices and identified 138 minefields and points of presence of mines along the former front lines ([Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report no.3](#)) . In other parts of Syria, partners continue their clearance efforts in Raqqa, Tabqa, Hassake Idleb, Rural Damascus and parts of Deir ez-Zor. Explosive ordnance risk education is scaling up as the first preventive measure to reduce risks. However, funding to scale up response and assist survivors, their families and communities remain insufficient, leaving EO contamination in critical areas unaddressed and preventing survivors from accessing trauma care, physical rehabilitation and psychosocial care. To prevent further casualties, as well as to enable safe returns and the much needed reconstruction, all pillars of mine action must be urgently scaled up.



PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS & IDPS

Insecurity, displacement and impact on civilians

Civilians in Syria continue to be impacted by the effects of conflict and insecurity. Persistent military operations and armed activities in northern and northeastern rural Aleppo continue to exacerbate insecurity. Fighting has continued to impact areas near the Tishreen Dam, which has been non-functional since it was damaged in conflict on 10 December. Consequently, 410,000 people in Menbij and Ain Al-Arab, eastern Aleppo, have been deprived of pumped water and electricity for over eight weeks. Meanwhile Israeli operations have expanded in the South and airstrikes in Damascus, Rural Damascus and other areas continue to take place. Furthermore, the central and coastal regions are witnessing an alarming rise in crimes and abuses motivated by sectarian divisions or affiliations with the former regime.

According to INSO data, over 1,100 persons have been killed and over 1,500 injured in conflict and security-related incidents in Syria since December 8th (till 28th February). Of particular concern is the situation in NES. Recent agreements between the SDF and Caretaker Authorities provide hope for the future, but the region remains in a fragile state. This region faces ongoing conflict, governance disputes, and humanitarian fragility, complicating Syria's transition (Washington Institute, 2025). Security challenges persist, with clashes in Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, causing civilian casualties and displacement. Additionally, ISIS sleeper cells continue to exploit instability, staging attacks in Deir ez-Zor and targeting local tribal forces (Washington Institute, 2025). Humanitarian conditions are mixed: basic services remain intact, but 700,000 IDPs, including many displaced Kurds and Arabs, live in camps with limited resources (Washington Institute, 2025). Al-Hol camp, housing 40,000 residents linked to ISIS, remains a security and humanitarian concern, with efforts underway to repatriate Syrians (Reuters, 2025). Aid access remains complex, as the AANES resists Damascus' control over humanitarian operations, complicating coordination. Access remains particularly challenging east of the Euphrates due to complex local political and military dynamics.

In this context the recruitment and use of children also remains a serious protection concern, particularly in areas of instability and displacement. The UN Secretary-General’s Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict documented 1,073 children—some as young as 12—recruited by armed groups for combat and support roles, 475 children killed or maimed, and 52 schools affected during the reporting period.

Despite the renewed focus on returns, some 7 million Syrians remain in a situation of internal displacement, particularly in northwest and northeastern Syria, often in a protracted situation. Currently, 2.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) live in 1,736 camps in northwest Syria and northeast Syria (CCCM cluster, 2025). Many of these IDPs face movement restrictions, while access to basic services and adequate shelter has remained an ongoing concern. Northeastern Syria has also seen newly arriving IDPs since late November 2024, mainly from Aleppo following shifts in territorial control. More than 20,000 were displaced due to intensified clashes near Tishreen Dam. Many of those displaced to NES are hosted in emergency collective centres (mainly in Raqqa). IDPs here face severe challenges. As of December 2024, approximately 25,800 IDPs resided in 193 ECCs, with 38 schools repurposed as shelters, disrupting education and straining resources. The dire conditions in these centers necessitate continued humanitarian assistance, including protection, GBV and CP services, to prevent further exacerbation and are facing overcrowded conditions, with limited access to essential services such as food, water, and healthcare. The lack of privacy and adequate sanitation facilities in these sites has heightened protection risks, particularly for women and children. Movement restrictions, denial of access to basic services, lack of access to highly impacted areas by humanitarian actors continue to hinder the protection of civilians.

REFERENCES

- [UNHCR Reports Mass Returns, Displacement in Syria](#)
- [Regional Flash Update 14, UNHCR, February 2025](#)
- [Syrian Arab Republic: Flash Update No. 9 on the Recent ... - OCHA](#)
- [Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, 9 December 2024](#)
- [Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, 26 February 2025](#)
- [Syrian returnees facing enormous struggles and in need of support, Islamic Relief, 19 December 2024](#)
- [Syria: Destruction, lack of services delay safe returns within country, NRC, 13 February 2025](#)
- [Caretaker Authorities Should Extend Hand of Reassurance, Trust to All Communities in Syria, Special Envoy Tells Security Council", January 8, 2025](#)
- [Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Response Priorities \(January-March 2025\)", OCHA, January 2025.](#)
- [Unpacking the Effects of Thirteen Years of Crisis: A Snapshot of Humanitarian Needs in Post-Assad Syria \(January 2025 | Whole of Syria\)", REACH, January 2025.](#)
- [UNHCR Regional Flash Update #15 - Syria Situation Crisis \(20 February 2025\)", UNHCR, February 2025.](#)
- [Syria Global Appeal 2025 Situation Overview, UNHCR, November 2024.](#)
- [Syria: Briefing and Consultations, Security Council Report, February 2025.](#)
- [Syria after Assad 2024/25: Consequences and Next Steps, UK House of Commons Library, December 2024.](#)
- [The Status of Syria's Transition After Two Months", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2025.](#)
- [While International Support is Crucial, Syrians Must Lead Their Country's Political Transition", Chatham House, December 2024.](#)
- [Syria: Inter-Cluster Rapid Needs Assessment | Aleppo and Idleb, OCHA, January 2025](#)
- [Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Response Priorities, OCHA, January-March 2025](#)
- [Cash and Voucher Assistance Feasibility Analysis for Syria, NORCAP, UNICEF and other organizations, February 2025](#)
- [Rapid Needs Assessment: Intentions of Syrian Communities in Türkiye to Return to Their Hometowns in Syria, MDM-T DDD, February 2025](#)
- [MA AoR Situation Update No.1 \(December 2024-January 2025\): Unprecedented Threat of Explosive Ordnance Across Syria, January 2025](#)
- [Syria governorates IDPs and IDP returnee's overview 26 February 2025](#)
- [Syria governorates of return overview- 06 March 2025](#)
- [UNICEF Syria Humanitarian Situation Report No. 3, 29 December 2024](#)
- [IOM, Responding to Syria at a Time of Need; Statement by IOM Chief, 20 December 2024](#)
- [Older Persons Protection Barriers Report, North-West Syria \(July 2024\) \[EN/AR\] - Syrian Arab Republic | ReliefWeb](#)
- [Persons with Disabilities Protection Barriers Report in North-West Syria \(August 2024\) \[EN/AR\] - Syrian Arab Republic | ReliefWeb](#)
- [Youth report: Protection barriers and risks, North-West Syria | Nov 2024 \[EN/AR\] - Syrian Arab Republic | ReliefWeb](#)
- [Rapid Protection Assessment Dashboard 2024 | ReliefWeb Response Protection monitoring dashboard 2024](#)
- [Trafficking dashboard 2024](#)
- [Eviction Monitoring Dashboard 2024- EN](#)
- [Escalation of hostilities dashboard - 2024](#)
- [Syria Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, 2024](#)
- [Focus Group Discussions on the Intentions of IDPs on Return, Al-Hol Camp, 24 January 2025](#)

This analysis is based on inputs from protection partners, including risk assessments (December 2024), secondary data, and existing assessments, supplemented by observations and direct insights from field partners. While access constraints and data gaps in hard-to-reach areas pose challenges, the findings reflect the best available information, given the fluid context and security risks

For further information please contact:

Gavin Dhira Lim, limg@unhcr.org or Samira Tika Bavand, samira.bavand@rescue.org

