



*Families displace from their homes in Jenin, Occupied West Bank (Photo: Wahaj Bani Mufleh)*

# OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY (OPT): WEST BANK

## Protection Analysis Update

Update on protection risks and trends

MARCH 2025

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

Against the backdrop of 16 months of active hostilities and a fragile situation in Gaza, protection actors note a steady deterioration of the protection environment in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Operations by the Israeli military in the northern West Bank, conducted in a manner that violates international law, are exposing Palestinians to unprecedented mass displacement, dispossession and violence. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in its July 2024 Advisory Opinion that Israeli practices, including the confiscation or requisition of land, the forcible transfer of the Palestinian population, the transfer by Israel of settlers to and maintenance of their presence in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, constitute violations of international law. Nevertheless, Israel has expanded these practices, moving towards consolidation of its annexation of the West Bank while reducing viability of a two-State solution and violating the Palestinian peoples' right to self-determination.

### PROTECTION DRIVERS AND RISKS

---

Since the March 2024 Protection Analysis Update (PAU), state and settler violence against Palestinians has surged in the West Bank. This is exposing Palestinian communities to record levels of violence and abuse. The expanding movement and access restrictions severely limit Palestinians' access to critical services including education, health and water, as well as farmland and roads, is increasingly rendering livelihoods unsustainable and deepening economic deprivation, while also serving as a flashpoint for gender-based violence. These drivers are converging to entrench the long-standing coercive environment, triggering displacement, and increasing the severity of protection risks. The protection risks requiring immediate attention in the period covered by this analysis are:

1. **Use of force violations and attacks against protected persons**
2. **Forcible transfer**
3. **Enforced disappearance, arbitrary or unlawful arrest and detention**
4. **Psychological/emotional abuse and inflicted distress**
5. **Gender-based violence**

### URGENT ACTIONS NEEDED

---

The rapid escalation in multiple forms of violence and abuse against Palestinians in the West Bank has severely limited Palestinians' enjoyment of basic rights and is creating a steady deterioration in the protection environment.

As the occupying Power, Israel has a range of obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, to ensure that the essential needs of the population are met. All efforts should be made to ensure enjoyment of rights and access to services for the affected population. This includes ending the occupation, immediate cessation of unlawful practices including settler expansion, housing and infrastructure demolitions, excessive use of force including during unlawfully militarized operations leading to unlawful killings, widespread use of often arbitrary administrative detention, use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including gender-based violence, and severe movement restrictions limiting freedom of movement for people and access to humanitarian services.

In addition to ensuring that all duty bearers adhere to their responsibilities under international law, urgent action is needed to prevent and address the growing protection risks highlighted in this analysis.

1. Donors should expand funding for critical protection response services in the West Bank, including support **to local and women-led organizations and community-led initiatives to boost community self-protection capacity.**
2. **The diplomatic community should ensure a protective presence in the West Bank**, including through diplomatic missions and supporting the continued presence and improved access of operational actors in high-risk communities.
3. Humanitarian actors should ensure that coordination and programmatic approaches fully adhere to principles of do no harm and reduce exposure of Palestinian partners and staff facing heightened risks operating in the West Bank.



## CONTEXT

The humanitarian context in the occupied West Bank,<sup>1</sup> including East Jerusalem, is characterized by heightened volatility and a severe increase in protection risks. The human rights environment was deteriorating prior to 7 October 2023, and this has accelerated since with reverberations from the escalation of hostilities in Gaza. Between 7 October 2023 and 31 December 2024, the following figures<sup>2</sup> were recorded:<sup>3 4</sup>

PALESTINIANS KILLED BY ISRAELI FORCES OR SETTLERS	CHILDREN KILLED BY ISRAELI FORCES OR SETTLERS	PALESTINIANS ARRESTED BY ISRAELI FORCES <sup>5</sup>	PERSONS DISPLACED BY DEMOLITIONS AND FORCED EVICTION
804	173	10,154	5,375
Per cent change compared to preceding period			
+ 179%	+ 184%	+ 100%	- 32%

Protection risk severities and resulting needs continue to be driven by the ongoing occupation which exposes Palestinians in the West Bank to multiple forms of violence and abuse. Incidents of settler violence are increasing in intensity and frequency across the West Bank. These are linked closely with Israeli state-sponsored arms proliferation and mobilization campaigns and include growing involvement of Israeli forces (IF).

These developments have triggered a convergence between state and settler violence, particularly in Area C, where systemic discrimination, discriminatory zoning and planning laws, and violence against Palestinian agricultural and herding communities exacerbate displacement and dispossession. The imposition of expanded movement and access constraints by Israeli authorities since 7 October 2023 and a harsh permit regime severely restrict freedom of movement of Palestinians, limit access to humanitarian services, and disproportionately harm at-risk groups. These particularly affect access to main road arteries, to East Jerusalem, the H2 area in Hebron and the Seam Zone. Practices of arbitrary arrest and detention – including expanding application by IF of indefinite administrative detention without legal protection – use of unlawful, including unnecessary and disproportionate lethal force by Israeli forces, and further land seizure and expropriation in violation of international law<sup>6</sup> have contributed to the entrenchment of a coercive environment. This has steadily reduced safety and meaningful access to services and livelihoods for the population and drives their displacement while reducing feasibility for return.

In parallel, the imposition of increasingly restrictive conditions for humanitarian response actors through targeted measures such as denying visas, permits, and access, has contributed to a repressive environment and constricting humanitarian and civil society space, with significant ramifications for communities in urgent need of protection. Cases of killing, arrests and deportations of protective presence and human rights defenders has led to a chilling effect on access.

In the context of rising levels of state and settler violence against Palestinians across the West Bank, addressing the drivers of violence and resulting protection risks remains urgent as ever to ensure protection. This PAU will discuss five risks in more detail: exposure to violence from excessive and other unlawful use of force and attacks against protected persons; forcible transfer; enforced disappearance, arbitrary or unlawful arrest and detention accompanied by torture and ill-treatment; psychological/emotional abuse and inflicted distress; and gender-based violence, all with considerable impacts on children.

## SETTLER VIOLENCE

Settler presence and violence have increased to record levels across the West Bank. Israeli settlements have steadily expanded across the West Bank with the objective of interrupting the demographic contiguity of Palestinian communities.<sup>7</sup> Despite the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirming in its Advisory Opinion that the establishment of settlements, the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Israel's maintenance of its presence across the OPT violates

international law, there has been a record increase in settlement growth including infrastructure developments that physically reinforce the system of separation and segregation. This is in violation of Article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and reduces practical possibility of a Palestinian State.<sup>8</sup> As of December 2024, an estimated 700,000 Israelis reside in 350 settlements<sup>9</sup> and 224 outposts in Area C of the West Bank,<sup>10</sup> and this expansion is expected to continue into 2025.<sup>11</sup> Policies of the current Government of Israel (GOI) demonstrate unprecedented and growing alignment with the expansionist goals of the settler movement to extend Israeli control over the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and integrate it into the State of Israel.<sup>12</sup>

While settler violence targeting Palestinians has risen in tandem with the growing settler presence, incidents of settler violence in the West Bank surged to record levels in 2024.<sup>13</sup> In the aftermath of 7 October 2023, multiple Israeli officials made public statements inciting discrimination and violence,<sup>14</sup> and authorities distributed over 7,000 military-grade weapons<sup>15</sup> to and mobilized over 5,500 settler reservists into the army territorial defence units<sup>16</sup> while simultaneously relaxing rules granting gun licenses.<sup>17</sup> Many more settlers serve in armed civilian paramilitary groups. These groups are formally mandated to operate in “self-defence” within settlement boundaries, under army command, but in practice they operate under direct supervision of the resident officer overseeing settlement security including outside of settlements.<sup>18</sup> The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) soldiers are increasingly recruited from West Bank settlements, deployed to the Gaza Strip, and frequently engage in intimidation, harassment, and armed violence against Palestinians upon their return to the settlements. These developments have led to a significant rise in violence by armed settlers and soldiers, including against children. As settler violence frequently takes place with the direct presence or participation of IF,<sup>19 20</sup> and given the increased overlap between soldiers and settlers (so-called “settler-soldiers”), the distinction between state and settler violence is increasingly blurred. In parallel, while Israel as the occupying Power is bound to protect persons residing in the territory under its control, Israel has consistently failed to prevent or punish attacks by settlers,<sup>21 22</sup> exposing Palestinians to risk of harm without means of protection or recourse.

Bedouin and herding communities in Area C have been highly targeted by settlers and Israeli authorities, forcing unprecedented numbers of them to leave their homes and lands. Many more communities remain at particular risk of displacement due to settlement expansion and designation of firing zones, pushing these communities towards Areas A and B. Settler cattle farmers have seized large grazing land to establish settler outposts, severely restricting Bedouin movement and access to land and often provoking violent confrontations.<sup>23</sup> Settlers have routinely engaged in attacks on Palestinian agricultural communities, physically attacking farmers, stealing cattle, uprooting trees, and damaging farming equipment, inflicting significant economic losses and negative environmental impact. After any incident of settler destruction, planning legislation by the Israeli Civil Administration typically prohibits displaced communities from rebuilding. The increasingly severe settler violence combined with the application of discriminatory zoning and planning laws contribute to a coercive environment compelling persons to leave their homes, land and communities, and preventing them from returning, raising concerns of forcible transfer, while also exposing persons to multiple risks of violence and abuse.

## MOVEMENT AND ACCESS RESTRICTIONS

In the days immediately following 7 October 2023, Israel imposed additional movement restrictions across the West Bank, particularly affecting East Jerusalem, H2 area of Hebron and areas close to settlements and around the Seam Zone. Israel also blocked access of most Palestinian villages and towns to main arteries, with only settlers able to use these roads. IF, with settlers, have closed pre-existing checkpoints, established new checkpoints at the entrance to villages, and installed approximately 120 new roadblocks with cement blocks, dirt mounds, iron gates and dykes to block entrance to entire villages.<sup>24</sup> As of November 2024, 793 physical access impediments were reported across the West Bank,<sup>25</sup> severely limiting Palestinians’ access to lifesaving services including education, health and ambulatory services, water, as well as farmland and roads, increasingly rendering livelihoods unsustainable.<sup>26</sup> New checkpoints are more likely to be staffed by IF reservists living in settlements and recruited after 7 October 2023. This is a subset of soldiers more likely to engage in violence and harassment, including gender-based violence and psychological/emotional abuse.<sup>27</sup> Extended waits at checkpoints - that lack basic amenities and WASH facilities - is particularly challenging for persons with disabilities or chronic illness, elderly persons and pregnant women. The imposition of curfews is applicable only to Palestinian residents. Entry bans for non-residents,

particularly in the H2 area of Hebron and in response to security incidents, has resulted in discrimination and increased protection risks for vulnerable groups.<sup>28</sup>

Particular at-risk groups include Seam Zone residents and Bedouin herder communities. The implementation of a harsh permit regime in the Seam Zone that requires entry and exit permits for Palestinians has severely restricted freedom of movement of Seam Zone residents. Since 7 October 2023, thousands of Palestinians have been denied access to their agricultural land located inside the Seam Zone, preventing crop ploughing and harvesting.<sup>29</sup> Movement restrictions combined with settler violence is additionally devastating for Bedouin herder communities whose livelihoods have been based for generations on access to grazing land, forcing herder communities to buy fodder and water and locking them into negative cycles of debt.<sup>30</sup>

Movement restrictions and closures prevent access to essential and basic services, including medical treatment, education, and livelihoods and are driving an economic downturn. This in turn is increasing child protection risks linked to child labour and child marriage. Delays at checkpoints, permit requirements, and transportation issues prevent gender-based violence survivors from accessing shelters, medical care and support, and further isolate survivors, heightening their risk of ongoing abuse while hindering their ability to seek justice or protection. Erratic staffing and opening hours of checkpoints prevents the predictable delivery of commercial goods and services, raises transportation costs, restricts farmers from cultivating their land, and limits access to workplaces and schools.<sup>31</sup> As a consequence to the discriminatory regime restricting movement throughout the West Bank, Palestinians are limited in their enjoyment of their rights to safety, work, health, education, family life, and an adequate standard of living,<sup>32</sup> exacerbating the coercive environment and exposing them to significant risk of forcible transfer.

## ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION

---

While the West Bank economy has experienced arrested development due to the administrative and physical impediments that control and limit movement, trade, and investment, the 2024-2025 Israeli military operations in Gaza and parallel imposition of severe measures in the West Bank have inflicted the greatest damage to the Palestinian economy in recent years. This surpasses the impact of military confrontations since tracking started in OPT in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021.<sup>33</sup> Violence and settlement expansion - including the demolition and confiscation of Palestinian assets and limited access to productive resources - has severely constricted economic activity, while policy measures by the GOI suspending work permits and withholding tax revenues has resulted in rising unemployment and collapsing incomes.

Within hours of the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel, the GOI announced the suspension of work permits for approximately 150,000 West Bank Palestinians.<sup>34</sup> The permit suspension and ban on the entry of Palestinian labourers has crippled the West Bank economy, leading to an estimated economic loss of USD 370 million including a 27 per cent reduction in private sector production value, and bringing unemployment to 32 per cent.<sup>35</sup> One year of the suspension is estimated to have reduced the West Bank's GDP by 29 per cent.<sup>36</sup> In May 2024, the GOI further announced the withholding of tax revenues constituting between 60 and 65 per cent of the public budget from the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank.<sup>37</sup>

Loss of formal employment has increased the reliance of families on small scale agriculture production, namely olive crops. Meanwhile, violent obstruction by Israeli settlers has resulted in significant disruptions in olive harvesting; 25,991 trees and saplings have been damaged by violent settler attacks during the 2024 harvest period.<sup>38</sup> In 2024, IF played a greater role in obstructing olive harvest activities, with soldiers and border police officers in many cases directly and arbitrarily preventing Palestinians from accessing and harvesting their lands.<sup>39</sup> The resulting loss of assets and access to land has steadily eroded sustainable livelihoods for Palestinians and contributed to displacement.

## PROTECTION RISKS

### RISK 1 Use of Force Violations and Attacks Against Protected Persons

As the occupying Power in the West Bank, Israel is required to take steps to ensure the security of the Palestinian population while complying with international human rights standards applicable to law enforcement. However, Israel has routinely violated these standards including by using military weapons and tactics during operations.<sup>40</sup> Since the escalation of hostilities in Gaza, **Israel has increased the excessive and unlawful use of force and used airstrikes from attack helicopters, Israeli Air Force fighter jets and Unmanned Air Vehicles/Systems (UAV/S), anti-tank missiles, shoulder-fired explosive projectiles, and live ammunition in the West Bank**, including in densely populated urban areas and refugee camps. This results in the destruction of critical infrastructure, displacement, and killing of hundreds of Palestinians, including children. IF ground and air operations have significantly increased in frequency, intensity, and length throughout 2024,<sup>41</sup> and the tactics and weapons employed suggest Israel's increasing reliance on methods and means more appropriate for hostilities to security operations and law enforcement in the West Bank, leading to unlawful killings and the war crime of wilful killings.<sup>42</sup> In 2024, **484 Palestinian deaths<sup>43</sup> by IF and 2,426 injuries<sup>44</sup> were recorded in the West Bank**, the majority in Tulkarm and Jenin and their refugee camps, due to unlawful use of force by IF.<sup>45</sup>

Protection partners are particularly concerned by grave violations against children. According to OHCHR, between 7 October 2023 and 31 December 2024, **170<sup>46</sup> children were killed by IF** compared with 61 in the 15 months preceding, an increase of 180 per cent. Among those children killed with live ammunition, the vast majority were shot in the upper body, suggesting the deliberate and unlawful use of lethal force. Of the 170 total child fatalities, around 22 per cent (38 fatalities) were the result of IF air strikes, particularly UAV/S, in the northern West Bank. Militarized operations have also resulted in repeated incidents of children being separated from their caregivers for extended periods, as IF routinely seal off communities and access routes during such operations.



*Journalists observe a drone flying over the Tulkarem refugee camp during a raid in the Occupied West Bank city (Photo: Wahaj Bani Mufleh)*

Militarized raids in the West Bank have significantly disrupted health, education, electricity and water services.<sup>47</sup> During incursions in Jenin and Tulkarem, health partners observed a pattern of **systematic attacks on healthcare workers** and blocking of ambulances, resulting in higher casualty rates as community members are unable to reach emergency medical services in time.<sup>48</sup> Operations involved destruction of roads using bulldozers, causing extensive damage to critical infrastructure, including electricity, telecommunication, sewage and irrigation networks,<sup>49</sup> leading to environmental hazards and further movement barriers. This impacts access to services for persons with disabilities and mobility challenges.<sup>50</sup> Reduced access to electricity and WASH services drives increased exposure to protection risks, in particular gender-based violence.

Movement restrictions and damage to roads during militarized raids have severely limited access to schools for children, while electricity and network outages made remote education impossible. In other cases, children have been trapped inside schools due to ongoing operations. Militarized raids have a notable impact on men and boys. When disaggregated by age and gender, males accounted for over 75 per cent of fatalities in 2024, and 94% of child fatalities by IF were boys.<sup>51</sup>

Since the March 2024 update, Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) have also intensified operations and use of force tactics across the West Bank, particularly in Jenin, where PSF used rocket-propelled grenades in the camp for the first time during a six-week operation and siege, starting on 5 December 2024.<sup>52</sup> In addition to death and injury, PSF operations have significantly limited movement and access to services for affected communities, led to the suspension of key humanitarian services, and have resulted in damage to WASH infrastructure and electricity grids, leading to blackouts across Jenin camp.

Operations by IF and growing engagement in operations by the PSF indicate a worrying trend of escalating violence in the Occupied West Bank and increased likelihood of a wider outbreak of the conflict. While Protection partners have worked closely with communities to expand self-protection capacity, additional support is required to respond to the effects of militarized violence.

#### EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES IN THE WEST BANK

Explosive ordnance (EO), including landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), continue to pose risks to civilians, especially children, long after conflicts have ended. EO can cause death and severe injuries, particularly among persons on the move, and can remain active beneath the ground surface for decades. The West Bank has been significantly affected by EO contamination, and UXOs and landmines pose an ongoing threat. The situation has worsened since October 2023 due to escalating militarized operations and movement restrictions. According to the Palestinian Mine Action Authority, **85 civilians have been affected by EO incidents** since the start of 2024, resulting in **4 fatalities (including a six-year-old boy) and 81 injuries**. This marks an increase compared to the 21 EO-related injuries reported in 2022 by the Landmine Monitor.<sup>53</sup> According to the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) rapid assessment presented in January 2025, 83% of respondents indicated a perceived increase in the presence of EO in the West Bank since October 2023. This increase has been particularly noted in Area C (46%), followed by Area A (35%).

Estimates of EO-affected populations are likely to be higher than those recorded, as various barriers to reporting prevent an accurate reflection of needs. Factors which contribute to under-reporting of EO accidents and incidents include access constraints in Areas B and C, which also limit Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) outreach, and unsafe conditions to report about EO. Despite data limitations, statistics indicate an **upward trend in accidents and incidents**, highlighting the urgent need for enhanced Mine Action activities to mitigate EO risks.

## RISK 2 Forcible Transfer

Forcible transfer in the West Bank takes place, including through the creation of a coercive environment effectively forcing the displacement of Palestinians. It is implemented through a variety of Israeli practices and policies. The use of force violations, including militarized operations and settler violence, as well as arbitrary arrests and detention and torture and ill-treatment, reduce the safety of the population and create an environment in which it is increasingly unsafe for people to remain where they are. Forcible transfer is also facilitated through the following practices: restrictions on movement and humanitarian access, housing and infrastructure demolitions, land and natural resource expropriation, bureaucratic impediments, discriminatory housing and permit policies, and impunity for state and settler violence.

Since the March 2024 PAU, Israel has intensified the implementation of the above practices and policies. Israel has accelerated the consolidation of the annexation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, appropriating Palestinian lands and demolishing homes and infrastructure, and replacing Palestinian communities with settlers in violation of international law. **1,773 Palestinian structures have been demolished in 2024 compared to 1,175 in 2023 and 954 in 2022.**<sup>54</sup> Of the total demolished structures, 44 per cent were inhabited residential homes and 23 per cent were agricultural structures.<sup>55</sup> Between 7 October 2023 and 31 December 2024, 2,193 structures were demolished (fully/partially) by IF. 69% of structures demolished were due to lack of permits, and 28% were due to military operations.<sup>56</sup> Most structures demolished by Israeli authorities since 7 October 2023 were in East Jerusalem, followed by Tulkarem, Jenin, Hebron, Jericho, Nablus, Ramallah, and Bethlehem



governorates.<sup>57</sup> This practice takes place in parallel to consolidation of contiguous territory by the GOI - declaring portions of Area C as “State Land.” During 2024, the GOI declared state ownership of 23,700 dunams (approximately 6,000 acres) of West Bank land. This is the **largest land seizure in the OPT in 30 years**.<sup>58</sup> Meanwhile, between 31 October 2023 and 1 November 2024, nine new settlements and 49 outposts were established, a 193 per cent increase compared to the same period in the previous year.

A restrictive permit regime is used by the GOI to prevent construction and Palestinian properties that are “illegal” are demolished. In December 2024, IF carried out mass demolitions of Palestinian property in East Jerusalem and Hebron governorate citing the lack of Israeli building permits, despite these permits being almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain due to discriminatory planning and zoning laws.<sup>59</sup> **No building permits for Palestinians in the West Bank were approved in 2024**,<sup>60</sup> and no permits were issued for Palestinians in East Jerusalem in 2023.<sup>61</sup> Between 2016 and 2023, less than 1 per cent of construction permits were approved in Area C.<sup>62</sup> Responsive measures, including court petitions to halt the demolitions and applications for building permits, are routinely denied by Israeli courts.<sup>63</sup> Illustrative of this is the Al Bustan area of Al Silwan neighbourhood in East Jerusalem. Since 7 October 2023, 25 Palestinian homes were demolished in Al Bustan, with 100 additional buildings (home to 1,500 families) placed under immediate threat. The entirety of Al Bustan is slated for demolition as the GOI advances a plan to replace it with a new settlement. The rise in parallel demolitions and settlement expansion is expected to continue into 2025.



#### Forcible Transfer Risks

**58,000 +**

Palestinians at direct risk  
Including

**39,000+**

at high or imminent risk

As the ICJ reaffirmed in its Advisory Opinion in July 2024, the GOI’s policies and practices, including forcible evictions, house demolitions, the confiscation of land and its reallocation to Israeli settlements, and restrictions on residence and movement, amount to the crime of forcible transfer<sup>64</sup> and have significant negative implications on the protection environment for affected communities. 1,773 demolitions in 2024 led to the displacement of 4,293 persons in the West Bank, including 1,735 children.<sup>65</sup> Protection partners estimate that **more than 58,000 Palestinians remain at direct risk of forcible transfer**, including more than 39,000 at high or imminent risk.<sup>66</sup> Women and girls are particularly affected, as

demolitions and forced evictions expose them to additional risk of gender-based violence through lack of access to privacy and safe shelter, limited options for adequate menstrual hygiene and pregnancy care, and increase burdens for unpaid care and support work.<sup>67</sup> Children affected by demolition and displacement face additional risks of lack of access to basic needs, and increased risks of child labour, death or injury. Children’s access to education is highly affected, as some 59 schools serving approximately 6,600 students face partial or full demolition orders.<sup>68</sup>

### RISK 3 Enforced Disappearance, Arbitrary or Unlawful Arrest and Detention


The prohibition of arbitrary detention is a fundamental human right, applicable to all forms of detention, and is considered non-derogable under international human rights law.<sup>69</sup> Administrative detention is permitted only in exceptional circumstances and subject to stringent safeguards to prevent arbitrariness, and the way it is practiced in the OPT does not comply with these safeguards, making it arbitrary. Concerns include the mass detention of Palestinians in the absence of individualized assessments for “imperative reasons of security,” the absence of procedural safeguards, as well as the effectively indefinite detention of Palestinians without due process or access to legal assistance.<sup>70</sup>

Since the escalation of hostilities in Gaza, **IF has expanded the use of often arbitrary arrest and detention**, conducted daily raids and detained over 10,000 residents of the West Bank and East Jerusalem.<sup>71</sup> Widespread reliance on the *Combat Detention Clause* (Section 33 of the Order on Security Provisions) which allows for an extended period of administrative detention for any person arrested during “an operational activity to combat terrorism,”<sup>72</sup> has resulted in routine application to adults and children anywhere in the West Bank without full due process, suggesting a blanket application.<sup>73</sup> **As of January 2025, the Israeli Prison Service (IPS) was holding 10,221 Palestinian prisoners on “security charges.” This includes 3,376 administrative detainees with limited legal protection.** An additional 1,886 detainees are held under Israel’s *Incarceration of Unlawful*



*Combatants Law*, a further military detention regime which deviates in respect from protections for detainees under international human rights law.<sup>747576</sup> According to UN OHCHR, many of those detained have reported that they were subject to forms of torture or other ill-treatment including severe beatings, electrocution, being forced into stress positions for prolonged periods, waterboarding, and sexual violence and abuse against both men and women.<sup>77</sup>

Children have been notably affected. While the IPS adopted new policies restricting the release of detention statistics, quarterly analysis indicates that in 2024 there were 230 children in detention in the West Bank on average at the end of each quarter compared to 158 in 2023.<sup>78</sup> **The number of children who have been placed under administrative detention - with limited access to family communication and legal assistance - is unprecedented**, including 112 children by the end of 2024. Children as young as 7 have been reportedly detained for shorter periods, outside the military court system.<sup>79</sup> Children have reported deteriorating conditions inside detention centres, including limited quantity and poor nutritional value of food, few blankets in cold weather, and limited access to hygiene products for personal care and cell cleaning.<sup>80</sup>



A growing number of arrests and detentions take place in the context of an increasingly restrictive environment for freedom of expression. According to UN OHCHR, Israeli authorities have targeted Palestinian activists, political figures, journalists, and human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, for activities including social media statements related to the hostilities in Gaza.<sup>81</sup> On 29 December, the PA in Nablus and Hebron released administrative decisions threatening legal consequences for social media posts that “disturb public security”, and the PSF have arrested Palestinians that have criticized the PA through social media and other public statements. The crackdown on freedom of expression has contributed to a **climate of fear, reduced civic space and access to information** for affected communities.

#### RISK 4 Psychological/Emotional Abuse and Inflicted Distress

The everyday experience of the occupation, with its multiple forms of escalating violence and deteriorating social conditions, generates significant mental health consequences and negative outcomes for Palestinians in the West Bank, with a particular impact on children. Psychological/emotional abuse and distress takes place in the context of arrest and detention, militarized raids and settler violence, and in the home. While incidents of violence can result in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), long-term stressors and repeated exposure to violence, including ongoing threat of future violence in the West Bank, increases residents’ risk of continuous traumatic stress disorder (CTSD) and other negative mental health outcomes. The *Child and Adolescent Mental Health National Strategy 2023 to 2028* led by the PA Ministry of Health recognizes that children and adolescents are among the most vulnerable groups. In the West Bank, **children ages 7-12 are the group with the highest incidence of reporting of traumatic events and suffering from heightened adverse mental health impacts**, including anxiety, depression, PTSD, and negative coping mechanisms including self-isolation.

Psychological and emotional abuse and inflicted distress frequently take place during arrest and detention, where detainees have been subjected to various forms of violence considered **torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment**.<sup>82</sup> IF have used psychological violence such as threats of murder and rape to inflict abuse and distress.<sup>83</sup> Children detained are at particular risk of abuse. They are separated from, and denied communication with, their families. Children face uncertainty around the length of administrative detention, causing significant emotional and psychological harm and distress.

Abuse takes place during militarized raids. IF have used practices such as using Palestinians to shield them from armed Palestinian attacks/fire.<sup>84</sup> In some cases where a person who is wanted by IF is not present during a raid, the IF abducts a family member and holds them until the wanted individual surrenders themselves to Israeli authorities. In one case, IF detained a 3-year-old Palestinian boy for at least two hours to force his father to surrender.<sup>85</sup> Meanwhile, violence and threats of violence including intimidation and harassment directed towards Palestinian communities by settlers has a cumulative effect of instilling distress and fear within the population.<sup>86</sup>

In the context of the protracted occupation and deteriorating security and economic situation, Palestinians across the West Bank also face the risk of psychological/emotional abuse at the household level. Groups at particular risk include children, persons with disabilities, women and girls and persons in refugee camps. Across the OPT, children face high levels of violence at home, with 90 per cent of children facing some form of violent discipline.<sup>87</sup> According to Child Protection case management analysis from November 2024, girls are more likely to report exposure to psychological abuse and distress.

Expanding levels of psychological/emotional abuse and distress are driving Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) needs and underscore the urgency to expand access to services for survivors and those at risk of violence and abuse.

#### IMPACT OF THE PROTECTION ENVIRONMENT ON PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

Recurrent exposure to violence in the West Bank through militarized operations and settler violence results in new injuries, long-term impairments and disabilities, and mental health challenges. During 2024, **3,135 Palestinian injuries were recorded, the majority due to live ammunition (1,086) followed by physical assault (815) and tear gas inhalation (737).**<sup>88</sup> 159 Israeli injuries were recorded during the same period. While access to healthcare, rehabilitation and MHPSS services is crucial for recovery and prevention of long-term impairments, the myriad challenges faced by persons with disabilities in accessing recovery services have increased due to ongoing violence and displacement.

Persons with disabilities in the West Bank face both physical and social barriers in accessing critical rehabilitation services that have grown in tandem with escalating violence. The expansion of movement restrictions and damage to infrastructure through militarized operations limit access to critical medical and rehabilitation services for people with disabilities. The use of bulldozing, trenches and earth mounds are physical impediments that add additional challenges for persons with limited mobility to navigate. Further, increased poverty and vulnerability due to economic deprivation particularly impact on persons with disabilities already facing intersectional discrimination and challenges in accessing livelihoods, while displacement interrupts continuity of care and can lead to loss of access to essential services and disruption to recovery processes. Loss of homes and communities through demolitions and land expropriation has a profound and long-term impact on mental health wellbeing and recovery capacity. Meaningful access to comprehensive services, necessitating a lifting of movement barriers and cessation in violence, is essential to ensure women, men, girls, and boys with injury and disability in the West Bank receive appropriate care.

#### RISK 5 Gender-Based Violence (GBV)

GBV remains a prevalent protection risk in the West Bank, where women, girls, men, and boys face widespread and severe risks of gendered violence by different actors in both public and private spheres due to overlapping drivers of insecurity, displacement, destruction of property, movement restrictions and constricted economic conditions. Women and girls are at heightened risk during and after military incursions, detention or arrest, and when passing through military checkpoints. There is also an increasing pattern of GBV perpetrated by settlers as a means to forcibly displace Palestinian communities. GBV against women and girls takes multiple forms in the West Bank, including conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)<sup>89</sup>, sexual harassment, rape, early and forced marriage, psychological abuse, sexual exploitation and abuse, intimate partner violence, denial of resources, and technology-facilitated violence. As a result of the deepening economic crisis and reducing access to alternative livelihoods, men are more likely to perpetrate domestic violence and/or engage in violence during confrontations with IF and armed settlers, exposing them to greater risk of injury, killing, detention, torture and ill-treatment, including **growing reports of rape and other sexual violence against male detainees.**<sup>90</sup> The deteriorating security situation only compounds the existing risks for all groups, exacerbating the underlying drivers and placing serious barriers to existing mechanisms in place to prevent and respond to GBV.


Women and girls are at heightened risk of CRSV during militarized operations, with rises in GBV risks documented during IF operations in refugee camps in the northern West Bank, including Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nablus. Partners have reported cases

of Israeli soldiers with body cameras forcibly strip-searching and filming women, in violation of their rights and dignity.<sup>91</sup> According to UN OHCHR, settler violence against Palestinian women and girls has escalated, with targeted attacks on homes occurring when male family members are absent. Women subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention face heightened risk of sexual violence and abuse. Survivors of such violence not only endure psychological trauma but often experience community stigma upon release, further limiting their ability to seek support and reintegrate into their social environment.

Women and girls also face increased risk of GBV during their travel to access essential services and employment. In tandem with the expansion of military checkpoints across the West Bank, reports of CRSV and sexual harassment at checkpoints have risen, such as cases of invasive body searches and forced removal of clothing, which causes psychological and physical trauma. Due to the risk of sexual violence at checkpoints, families frequently restrict women's movement, confining them to domestic spaces as a risk mitigation strategy, thus compounding negative aspects of traditional gender roles. Adolescent girls are particularly affected, as families remove girls from school, impacting their access to education and prompting additional exposure of girls to child labour and early marriage.<sup>92</sup>

Women have also highlighted instances of digital blackmail by IF, who use video footage taken during strip searches at checkpoints as a coercive means to extract information about other community or family members. **Technology-facilitated GBV** has also been reported directed against women at the community level. After the IF shares checkpoint footage to other community members, the affected women are at heightened vulnerability to further violence.

Since the March 2024 PAU, focus group discussions have indicated a rise in economic violence against women within the household, including withholding of finances within households and limiting the expenditure on items needed by women and children. GBV service providers have noted a rise in begging and survival sex among women who are in dire financial circumstances. Women engaged in sex work are not protected by formal mechanisms in the West Bank and are therefore inherently at increased risk of GBV and discrimination.



Direct and structural violence that targets Palestinian communities has an important impact on men and boys. Men and boys face heightened risk of violence by IF and settlers. According to UN OHCHR, **of the 804 Palestinians killed in the West Bank since 7 October 2023, 76 per cent (616) were men and 21 per cent (168) were boys.**<sup>93</sup> Physical violence against communities and homes during Israeli operations, demolitions and settler violence, as well as the policy conditions constricting viable livelihoods, challenge the ability of Palestinian men to uphold performance of traditional gender roles within the prevailing cultural framework. In lieu of meaningful alternatives, such experiences are leading to rising levels of shame and driving Palestinian men to engage

in self-isolation and/or domestic violence.<sup>94</sup> Self-isolation contributes to reduced social cohesion and poor mental health outcomes. According to GBV safety audit findings, women in Nablus, Ramallah and Salfit reported household financial strain and chronic insecurity were increasing psychological distress of men, who in turn used physical violence, verbal abuse, and restricted movement against women and children at home.

While access to protection services addressing GBV and other forms of violence is extremely limited due to movement restrictions across the West Bank, particularly in Area C and H2, the complex drivers rooted in the occupation, state violence and cultural performances of gender necessitate a multi-layered and sustained response. Strengthening GBV prevention and response efforts, enhancing access to survivor-centred services, and ensuring targeted interventions for men, women, and children are critical to mitigating the growing risks of GBV in the current crisis.

## RESPONSE

### PROGRESS MADE ON PROTECTION

As of February 2025, 80 protection partners are actively addressing the protection needs of over 1.2 million people in the West Bank. In 2024, approximately **800,000 individuals (40% women, 25% men, 20% girls, 15% boys, 15% persons with disabilities, and 3% elderly)** received protection services. Catchment reflects the heightened protection risks and resulting needs in five at-risk groups across the West Bank – namely residents of **refugee camps, herding communities, agricultural villages, Seam Zone and East Jerusalem/H2 area of Hebron**. Among those reached, 15 per cent are residents of refugee camps impacted by militarized operations, while at least 35 per cent live in Area C, where coercive measures are significantly heightening protection risks. 60 per cent of protection interventions focused on GBV prevention and risk mitigation, child protection, legal aid, MHPSS, and awareness-raising on protection and preventative measures.

In response to escalating protection risks and resulting needs across each of the five at-risk groups, protection partners strengthened **community-led protection efforts, including proactive approaches to protection, reinforcing localized referral pathways, early warning mechanisms, and direct engagement with community-based organizations**. Legal aid interventions have expanded to address movement restrictions and ensure protection for communities at risk of settler violence and land confiscation. A **Legal Aid Emergency Relief Package** was introduced to provide urgent support for communities facing forced eviction. In September 2024, the first **EORE technical working group** was launched to raise awareness on EO in high-risk areas.

### ACCESS-RELATED CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS

Movement and access restrictions in the West Bank are a key challenge as many partners face growing constraints reaching high-risk areas, undermining access to critical protection services due to both physical and administrative measures. Access is particularly affected in **Area C, H2 area of Hebron, and the Seam Zone area between the Wall and the Green Line**. For protection workers to travel from Bethlehem to Ramallah, a journey which should take less than one hour instead takes six. Movement restriction measures prevent partners from responding with emergency assistance, and limit in-person service delivery.

Additional Israeli bureaucratic and administrative impediments have been implemented by authorities, including a December 2024 announcement by the GOI further restricting visas and registrations for INGOs.<sup>95</sup> The new measure is expected to have significant ramifications on INGO operability in OPT, leading to critical staffing gaps, reduced footprint, programmatic disruption, quality and monitoring challenges, and cost increases.

With restricted access to many high-risk areas, partners have **scaled up remote protection services**, including MHPSS, support through helplines, remote case management, and awareness messaging on protection risk mitigation. The Protection Cluster has enhanced coordination on **cash-for-protection responses**, ensuring that emergency cash assistance is integrated into case management for those affected by displacement, eviction, and protection-related shocks. Concerns remain about reaching survivors of violence, including vulnerable children exposed to grave violations. Access to children in their homes and to children detained in IPS prisons remains a key challenge. Safety and security for frontline field staff remains a growing concern amid escalating violence.

### CRITICAL GAPS AND POPULATION REACHED

Severe funding shortfalls have critically impacted protection service delivery in the West Bank. **Women-led organizations** that provide frontline GBV services in particular are underfunded and lack financial resources to respond to the needs of GBV survivors, leading to a shortage of skilled staff and less GBV service coverage across the West Bank. Further funding is needed to provide **specialised MHPSS for children** and to expand support to children who have experienced arbitrary detention and violence. **EO risk mitigation** remains critically underfunded, limiting outreach and preparedness activities.

Access restrictions, legal barriers, and recurrent violence continue to undermine response efforts, with limited safe spaces,



case management, and psychosocial support for GBV survivors. Children face increasing risks due to displacement, settler violence, and military operations, while education disruptions push families toward negative coping mechanisms such as child labour and early marriage. Legal aid services are constrained, with new administrative restrictions limiting support for communities facing forced displacement and arbitrary detention. MHPSS services remain overstretched, as **continuous violence and prolonged trauma affect both vulnerable populations and frontline responders**, many of whom face burnout and secondary trauma. **Specialized services for persons with disabilities and the elderly** remain severely limited, further compounding intersectional protection risks. The deteriorating economic situation and movement restrictions continue to hinder access to essential services, healthcare, and education, particularly in refugee camps. Without sustained financial support and strengthened community-led protection mechanisms, vulnerable populations will face growing risks with little access to essential services and legal safeguards. Strengthening community-led initiatives, securing sustained financial support, and improving humanitarian access remain key priorities for the protection response in the West Bank.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Israel, as the occupying Power, has a range of obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, including to ensure that the essential needs of the population are met. All efforts should be made to ensure enjoyment of rights and access to services for the affected population. The Palestinian Authority as a duty bearer in the West Bank and third States are likewise called on to ensure protection of the Palestinian people through key actions and dialogue.

In the period covered by this analysis, urgent action is required to address the escalating risks of violence and abuse. Worrying trends in GBV and violence against children require attention, as well as an increase of efforts to stop use of force violations and attacks against protected persons, forcible transfer, arbitrary or unlawful arrest and detention, and psychological/emotional abuse. The Protection Cluster and partners consider the here listed actions necessary to avoid further harmful consequences for Palestinians across the West Bank.

1. Donors should expand funding for critical protection response services in the West Bank, including support to local and women-led organizations and community-led initiatives to boost community self-protection capacity.
2. The diplomatic community should ensure a protective presence in the West Bank, including through diplomatic missions and supporting the continued presence and improved access of operational actors in high-risk communities.
3. Humanitarian actors should ensure that coordination and programmatic approaches fully adhere to principles of do no harm and reduce exposure of Palestinian partners and staff facing heightened risks operating in the West Bank.

### RISK 1 Use of Force Violations and Attacks Against Protected Persons

#### GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

- Ensure the IF immediately take steps to end all unlawful killing and injury of Palestinians, while complying with its obligations under the law of occupation and ensure full compliance with international human rights standards governing law enforcement.

#### HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY

- Increase proactive approaches to protection such as sustained protective presence for at-risk groups through assistance programmes and diplomatic presence.
- Scale-up of victim assistance activities to provide holistic support to individuals affected by explosive ordnance, and integration of EORE and conflict preparedness and protection (CPP) initiatives within broader humanitarian programming to maximize protective impact, particularly in hard-to-reach areas affected by violence.

## RISK 2 Forcible transfer

### GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

- Immediately cease all policies and practices that contribute to the coercive environment and forcible transfer, including ending and reversing settlement activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in line with Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016) and the ICJ 19 July 2024 Advisory Opinion, halting demolitions and forced evictions, lifting all restrictions on Palestinian movement and economic development, and ensuring the safe return and reintegration of those displaced.

### PROTECTION SECTOR AND PARTNERS

- Expand legal assistance programmes – including access to mobile legal aid services – and advocacy efforts to challenge policies contributing to forcible transfer, including principled petitions before the High Court of Israel to push for accountability for duty bearers and remedies for affected individuals and communities.
- Enhance community-led protection initiatives, early warning systems, and protective presence in high-risk areas, and enable MHPSS and strengthen housing, land, and property rights advocacy for displaced communities.
- Reinforce monitoring and documentation efforts, ensuring systematic tracking of displacement trends, settler violence, and land confiscation to inform international advocacy and accountability efforts, including engagement with UN mechanisms and legal avenues.

## RISK 3 Arbitrary or unlawful arrest and detention

### GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

- Immediately end administrative detention and other actions that amount to arbitrary arrest or detention. Release all Palestinians who have been arbitrarily detained and ensure due process and fair trial guarantees for persons in detention. Ensure the conditions and treatment of detainees meet basic minimum standards under international human rights law, including ensuring detainees are not subject to any forms of torture or ill-treatment.

### DONORS and MEMBER STATES

- Ensure sustained diplomatic advocacy to end practices that amount to arbitrary arrest, administrative detention, and enforced disappearance, and support legal interventions for victims of ill-treatment.

### HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY

- Ensure appropriate services are available for victims of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and ill-treatment, including MHPSS and other forms of victim support and targeted services for children.

## RISK 4 Psychological/emotional abuse and inflicted distress

### DONORS and MEMBER STATES

- Invest in strengthening the state system to respond to emergency needs, including for the provision of specialised case management services for children affected by violence and their families.

### HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY

- Expand community-based MHPSS support to improve access to MHPSS services when movement is constricted, including specialised MHPSS for children.
- Ensure sustainable mainstreaming and the integration of MHPSS services and support into the overall

humanitarian response framework and strategies. Provide inter-sectoral and institutional capacity to integrate MHPSS into all fields of humanitarian action.

- Invest in strengthening the state system to respond to emergencies, including provision of case management services for children and their families.

## RISK 5 Gender-Based Violence

### DONORS

- Enable GBV prevention and response localization through scaling support to national NGOs and women-led organizations to overcome challenges related to access restrictions, bureaucratic impediments, and funding.

### HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY

- Strengthen GBV prevention and risk mitigation, and PSEA, in all humanitarian interventions. Strengthen safe GBV disclosure and referral pathways through training of frontline workers across all sectors.
- Advocate for protection and justice mechanisms for GBV survivors, and documentation of conflict-related sexual violence cases for accountability purposes.

### Methodology

The analysis has been based on both quantitative and qualitative data from existing secondary data sources, protection assessments and reports covering events from March to December 2024 in the Occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. A 5W system for the OPT was launched in January 2023 to harmonise and standardize systems for the collection, management, analysis and use of data.

### Limitations

Due to spikes in violence, clashes, movement restrictions and deterioration in the coercive environment in certain parts of the West Bank, some partners have faced difficulties with consistent access and gathering in-depth and reliable data. Ongoing needs assessments, updated analysis of threats, impact and capacity will be used to regularly update the PAU.



For further information please contact the Protection Cluster: [ohchr-protectioncluster-opt@un.org](mailto:ohchr-protectioncluster-opt@un.org)

Child Protection AoR: Jessica Dixon | [jdixon@unicef.org](mailto:jdixon@unicef.org)

GBV AoR: Anna Stone | [stone@unfpa.org](mailto:stone@unfpa.org)

Legal Task Force: Nader Muaddi | [nader.muaddi@nrc.no](mailto:nader.muaddi@nrc.no)

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The State of Palestine is divided into two physically separated geographic regions, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The Oslo Accords signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel between 1993 and 1999 recognized the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit and divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions – Areas A, B and C - with different jurisdictional arrangements: Area A (around 18 percent), is administered autonomously by the Palestinian Authority (PA), Area B (22 per cent) is under PA civil control and Israeli security control while Area C (60 percent) is under full Israeli administrative and military control. Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions including UNGA Resolution 58/292 have reaffirmed the status of the Occupied Territory.
- <sup>2</sup> Given the rapidly evolving situation, up to date figures on casualties, demolitions, displacement, and settler violence can be found at <https://www.ochaopt.org/data>, and by contacting the Protection Cluster Coordinator relevant Areas of Responsibility (see end for contact information). Recent analysis of the human rights situation in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, is also available here.
- <sup>3</sup> OCHA, data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank. [Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory](#)
- <sup>4</sup> OHCHR fatality tracking
- <sup>5</sup> Hamoked, detention tracking. <https://hamoked.org/prisoners-charts.php>.
- <sup>6</sup> ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 19 July 2024. [Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem](#)
- <sup>7</sup> Crisis Group, Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at its Root, 06 September 2024. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena-israel/palestine/246-stemming-israeli-settler-violence>
- <sup>8</sup> OHCHR, A/79/347: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan - Report of the Secretary-General, 12 September 2024. [A/79/347: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan - Report of the Secretary-General | OHCHR](#)
- <sup>9</sup> OCHA, West Bank Access Restrictions, November 2024. [Westbank 2010](#)
- <sup>10</sup> Peace Now, West Bank population tracking. [Population - Peace Now](#)
- <sup>11</sup> The Times of Israel, West Bank settler population grew by nearly 3% in 2023 – report, 12 February 2024. [West Bank settler population grew by nearly 3% in 2023 – report | The Times of Israel](#)
- <sup>12</sup> A/HRC/55/72: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, 1 February 2024. [A/HRC/55/72](#)
- <sup>13</sup> ACLED, Civilians or Soldiers? SETTLER VIOLENCE in the West Bank, 2024. [Civilians-or-Soldiers -Settler-Violence-in-the-West-Bank.pdf](#)
- <sup>14</sup> Times of Israel, Visiting Elyatar, Ben Gvir tells settlers to 'head for the hilltops', expand outposts, 23 June 2023; and The New York Times, The unpunished: how extremists took over Israel, 16 May 2024.
- <sup>15</sup> Haaretz, Israel's Army Drafted and Armed Thousands of Settlers. Accounts of Their Violence Are Piling Up, 17 January 2024. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-17/ty-article-magazine/.premium/israels-army-drafted-thousands-of-settlers-accounts-of-their-violence-are-piling-up/0000018d-12e7-d260-aded-b7efddbe0000>
- <sup>16</sup> ACLED, Civilians or Soldiers? SETTLER VIOLENCE in the West Bank, 2024. [Civilians-or-Soldiers -Settler-Violence-in-the-West-Bank.pdf](#)
- <sup>17</sup> The Times of Israel, Shocked by Oct. 7 failures, Israelis rush to buy guns, with government encouragement, 30 December 2023. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/shocked-by-oct-7-failures-israelis-rush-to-buy-guns-with-government-encouragement/#:~:text=A%20record%20of%202024%20C279%20israelis%20have,Israelis%20requested%20a%20handgun%20license>.
- <sup>18</sup> Crisis Group, Israel's Religious Right and the Question of Settlements, 20 July 2009. [Israel's Religious Right and the Question of Settlements](#)
- <sup>19</sup> OHCHR, A/79/347: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan - Report of the Secretary-General, 12 September 2024. [A/79/347: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan - Report of the Secretary-General | OHCHR](#)
- <sup>20</sup> Crisis Group, Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root, 06 September 2024. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena-israel/palestine/246-stemming-israeli-settler-violence>
- <sup>21</sup> ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 19 July 2024. [Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem](#)
- <sup>22</sup> Crisis Group, Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root, 06 September 2024. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena-israel/palestine/246-stemming-israeli-settler-violence>
- <sup>23</sup> Crisis Group, The Rise of Israeli Settler Violence in the West Bank, 14 November 2024. [Video | The Rise of Israeli Settler Violence in the West Bank | Crisis Group](#)
- <sup>24</sup> Yesh Din, Family under Siege Israel's restrictions on Palestinians' freedom of movement in the West Bank since 2023: The case of the Abu Awwad family, November 2024. [YeshDin](#). Since October 2023, many Palestinian communities, including a-Lubban a-Sharqiyah, al-Mughayir, Duma, Kafr Malik and Qusrah were completely cut off from the main roads located nearby.
- <sup>25</sup> OCHA, West Bank Access Restrictions, November 2024. [Westbank 2010](#)



- <sup>26</sup> OHCHR, A/79/347: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan - Report of the Secretary-General, 12 September 2024. [A/79/347: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan - Report of the Secretary-General | OHCHR](#)
- <sup>27</sup> ACAPS, Palestine: Recent Developments in the West Bank, 04 July 2024. [20240704 ACAPS Thematic report Palestine - Recent developments in the West Bank.pdf](#)
- <sup>28</sup> OHCHR, The UN Human Rights Office in the Occupied Palestinian Territory calls on Israel to immediately lift discriminatory movement restrictions and ensure Palestinians' access to basic services in the H2 area of Hebron, 26 August 2024. [UN Human Rights Office - OPT: The UN Human Rights Office in the Occupied Palestinian Territory calls on Israel to immediately lift discriminatory movement restrictions and ensure Palestinians' access to basic services in the H2 area of Hebron - occupied Palestinian territory | ReliefWeb](#)
- <sup>29</sup> HaMoked, Statement to the High Court of Justice, 23 May 2024. [Center for the Defence of the Individual - HaMoked to the High Court of Justice: Allow Palestinian farmers to cultivate their West Bank lands trapped beyond the Separation Barrier](#)
- <sup>30</sup> Crisis Group, Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root, 06 September 2024. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena-israel/palestine/246-stemming-israeli-settler-violence>
- <sup>31</sup> ACAPS, Palestine: Recent Developments in the West Bank, 04 July 2024. [20240704 ACAPS Thematic report Palestine - Recent developments in the West Bank.pdf](#)
- <sup>32</sup> ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 19 July 2024. [Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem](#)
- <sup>33</sup> UNCTAD, Unemployment in the West Bank nearly tripled in six months, 17 September 2024. [Unemployment in the West Bank nearly tripled in six months | UN Trade and Development \(UNCTAD\)](#)
- <sup>34</sup> The Washington Institute, West Bank Economics Are Key to Stabilizing the Palestinian Authority, 31 May 2024. [West Bank Economics Are Key to Stabilizing the Palestinian Authority—or Forcing Its Collapse | The Washington Institute](#)
- <sup>35</sup> The Times of Israel, West Bank Palestinian laborers in despair after eight months without jobs in Israel, 22 June 2024. [West Bank Palestinian laborers in despair after eight months without jobs in Israel | The Times of Israel](#)
- <sup>36</sup> UNCTAD, Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 July 2024. [Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#)
- <sup>37</sup> The Conversation, How Israel uses financial control as a tool of collective punishment against Palestinians, 29 May 2024. [How Israel uses financial control as a tool of collective punishment against Palestine](#)
- <sup>38</sup> OCHA, data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank. [Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory](#)
- <sup>39</sup> Yesh Din, Summary of the 2024 Olive Harvest, 15 December 2024. [Summary of the 2024 Olive Harvest Season - Yesh Din](#)
- <sup>40</sup> OHCHR, OHCHR calls for the end of militarized operations in Jenin, 31 August 2024. [UN Human Rights Office - OPT: OHCHR calls for the end of militarized operations in Jenin - occupied Palestinian territory | ReliefWeb](#)
- <sup>41</sup> MSF, Treating Open Wounds in Tulkarem, West Bank, 4 November 2024. <https://msf.lu/en/articles/face-la-violence-des-colons-et-de-larmee-israelienne-msf-dispense-des-formations-aux>
- <sup>42</sup> Diakonia, Overkill: A Critical Appraisal of the Use of Force by Israel in the West Bank, 6 January 2025. [Overkill-A-Critical-Appraisal-of-the-Use-of-Force-by-Israel-in-the-West-Bank.pdf](#)
- <sup>43</sup> OHCHR fatality tracking
- <sup>44</sup> OCHA, Data on casualties. [Data on casualties | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory](#)
- <sup>45</sup> Al Jazeera, How Israel's raids on Jenin only fuel Palestinian resistance, 2 June 2024. [How Israel's raids on Jenin only fuel Palestinian resistance | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera](#)
- <sup>46</sup> An additional 3 were killed by settlers, compared to 0 in the same period preceding.
- <sup>47</sup> MSF, In the West Bank, Israeli forces render healthcare inaccessible when it's needed most, 13 June 2024. [In the West Bank, Israeli forces render healthcare inaccessible when needed most | MSF](#)
- <sup>48</sup> MSF, West Bank: Medical staff targeted and killed in brutal incursions, 14 June 2024. [https://msf.org.uk/article/west-bank-medical-staff-targeted-and-killed-brutal-incursions?page=select\\_amount](https://msf.org.uk/article/west-bank-medical-staff-targeted-and-killed-brutal-incursions?page=select_amount)
- <sup>49</sup> UNRWA, Situation Report #110, 29 May 2024. [UNRWA Situation Report #110 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem - All information from 23-26 May 2024, is valid as of 26 May 2024 \[EN/AR\] - occupied Palestinian territory | ReliefWeb](#)
- <sup>50</sup> PSEA Network, PSEA Risk Mitigation Assessment Report to Prevent SEA in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, April 2024
- <sup>51</sup> OCHA, Data on casualties. [Data on casualties | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory](#)
- <sup>52</sup> Haaretz, Second Police Officer Killed in Jenin Refugee Camp as Palestinian Authority Cracks Down on Militants, 24 December 2024. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-12-24/ty-article/.premium/policeman-killed-in-jenin-refugee-camp-as-palestinian-authority-cracks-down-on-militants/00000193-f51a-d354-a59f-ff7f8f930000>
- <sup>53</sup> Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Country Profile: Palestine. [the-monitor.org/country-profile/palestine/impact?year=2023#anc3\\_0\\_1](https://the-monitor.org/country-profile/palestine/impact?year=2023#anc3_0_1)

- <sup>54</sup> OCHA, data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank. [Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory](#)
- <sup>55</sup> OCHA, West Bank Monthly Snapshot: Casualties, Property Damage, and Displacement, 30 November 2024. [West Bank info-graphic 09 December 2024 final](#)
- <sup>56</sup> OCHA, Demolitions database
- <sup>57</sup> OCHA, West Bank Monthly Snapshot: Casualties, Property Damage, and Displacement, 30 November 2024. [West Bank info-graphic 09 December 2024 final](#)
- <sup>58</sup> Peace Now, The Government Declares 12,000 Dunams in the Jordan Valley as State Lands, 03 July 2024. <https://peacenow.org.il/en/state-land-declaration-12000-dunams>
- <sup>59</sup> OHCHR, Israel must stop the demolition of Palestinian homes in the Occupied West Bank, 18 December 2024. [UN Human Rights Office - OPT: Israel must stop the demolition of Palestinian homes in the Occupied West Bank \[EN/AR\] - occupied Palestinian territory | ReliefWeb](#)
- <sup>60</sup> Peace Now, 2024 in the West Bank – The Year of Annexation and Expulsion, February 2025. [SW-Report-Summary-2024-Peace-Now-February-2025.pdf](#)
- <sup>61</sup> Ir Amim and Bimkom, [www.ir-amim.org.il](http://www.ir-amim.org.il)
- <sup>62</sup> UNCTAD, UNCTAD report exposes economic strain on Palestinian welfare in West Bank due to Israeli restrictions, 28 November 2023. [UNCTAD report exposes economic strain on Palestinian welfare in West Bank due to Israeli restrictions | UN Trade and Development \(UNCTAD\)](#)
- <sup>63</sup> Knesset hearings transcripts, on file with the office for the Occupied Palestinian Territory of OHCHR. See also, Times of Israel staff, “Smotrich said pushing for demolishing Palestinian construction in W. Bank areas A, B”, The Times of Israel, 20 July 2023.
- <sup>64</sup> Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons, constitutes a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and is a war crime.
- <sup>65</sup> OCHA, Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank. [Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory](#)
- <sup>66</sup> West Bank Protection Consortium, Update on the Risk of Forcible Transfers in the West Bank, November 2024.
- <sup>67</sup> OHCHR, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, 30 January 2020. [A/HRC/43/67](#)
- <sup>68</sup> OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Update #248, 19 December 2024. [Humanitarian Situation Update #248 | West Bank | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory](#)
- <sup>69</sup> Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), 16 December 2014.
- <sup>70</sup> B’tselem, Administrative Detention. [https://www.btselem.org/administrative\\_detention](https://www.btselem.org/administrative_detention). The Israeli military is authorized to issue administrative detention orders against Palestinian civilians on the basis of Military Order No. 1651. Article 285 empowers military commanders to detain an individual for renewable periods of up to six months if they have reasonable grounds to presume that regional security or public security require the detention. Detention orders are frequently renewed immediately prior to their expiration, and this process can be continued indefinitely, as there is no limit to the maximum amount of time an individual may be held in administrative detention.
- <sup>71</sup> Human Rights Council, A/HRC/57/NGO/116, 11 October 2024.
- <sup>72</sup> ACRI, Sweeping Use of “Combat Detention” in the West Bank, 05 November 2024. <https://www.english.acri.org.il/post/sweeping-use-of-combat-detention-in-the-west-bank>
- <sup>73</sup> Democracy Now, Israel Detains 100 in West Bank; Palestinian Authority Clashes with Palestinian Fighters in Jenin, 24 December 2024. [https://www.democracynow.org/2024/12/24/headlines/israel\\_detains\\_100\\_in\\_west\\_bank\\_palestinian\\_authority\\_clashes\\_with\\_palestinian\\_fighters\\_in\\_jenin](https://www.democracynow.org/2024/12/24/headlines/israel_detains_100_in_west_bank_palestinian_authority_clashes_with_palestinian_fighters_in_jenin)
- <sup>74</sup> Hamoked, Detention tracking. [hamoked.org.il/api/prisoners.php?start\\_year=2022&start\\_month=1&end\\_year=2024&end\\_month=9](https://hamoked.org.il/api/prisoners.php?start_year=2022&start_month=1&end_year=2024&end_month=9)
- <sup>75</sup> B’tselem, Administrative detention statistics. [https://www.btselem.org/administrative\\_detention/statistics](https://www.btselem.org/administrative_detention/statistics)
- <sup>76</sup> UA ISR 9/2023, 22 November 2023. [UA ISR \(9.2023\)](#)
- <sup>77</sup> OHCHR, Thematic Report: Detention in the context of the escalation of hostilities in Gaza (October 2023-June 2024), 31 July 2024. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/opt/20240731-Thematic-report-Detention-context-Gaza-hostilities.pdf>
- <sup>78</sup> Defense for Children International Palestine, Number of Palestinian Children in Israeli detention, 30 June 2024. [Number of Palestinian Children in Israeli detention | Defense for Children Palestine](#)
- <sup>79</sup> Defense for Children International, Detention statistics. <https://www.dci-palestine.org/>
- <sup>80</sup> Associated Press, Underage, Under Fire: As war rages in Gaza, Israel’s crackdown on West Bank insurgency is killing Palestinian youths, 12 September 2024. <https://apnews.com/projects/west-bank-palestinian-teenagers-israel/>
- <sup>81</sup> OHCHR, Thematic Report: Detention in the context of the escalation of hostilities in Gaza (October 2023-June 2024), 31 July 2024. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/opt/20240731-Thematic-report-Detention-context-Gaza-hostilities.pdf>
- <sup>82</sup> UA ISR 9/2023, 22 November 2023. [UA ISR \(9.2023\)](#)
- <sup>83</sup> UA ISR 9/2023, 22 November 2023. [UA ISR \(9.2023\)](#)
- <sup>84</sup> UA ISR 9/2023, 22 November 2023. [UA ISR \(9.2023\)](#)
- <sup>85</sup> UA ISR 9/2023, 22 November 2023. [UA ISR \(9.2023\)](#)

<sup>86</sup> Crisis Group, Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root, 06 September 2024. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena-israel/palestine/246-stemming-israeli-settler-violence>

<sup>87</sup> Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey 2019-2020 (MICS), Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, 2021, Chapter 9.2. The figure includes any form of physical discipline as well as psychological aggression.

<sup>88</sup> OCHA, Data on casualties. [Data on casualties | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory](#)

<sup>89</sup> According to the Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Report of the United Nations Secretary-General (S/2019/280) CRSV refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict. That link may be evident in the profile of the perpetrator, who is often affiliated with a State or non-State armed group; the profile of the victim, who is frequently an actual or perceived member of a political, ethnic or religious minority group or targeted on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity; the climate of impunity, which is generally associated with State collapse, cross-border consequences such as displacement or trafficking, and/or violations of a ceasefire agreement. CRSV is a serious violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, which under international criminal law can amount to a war crime, crime against humanity, or a constituent element of genocide.

<sup>90</sup> OHCHR, Palestinian detainees held in arbitrarily and secretly, subjected to torture and mistreatment, 31 July 2024. [UN report: Palestinian detainees held arbitrarily and secretly, subjected to torture and mistreatment | OHCHR](#)

<sup>91</sup> OHCHR, OPT/24/0093.

<sup>92</sup> PSEA Network, PSEA Risk Mitigation Assessment Report to Prevent SEA in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, April 2024

<sup>93</sup> OHCHR fatality tracking. 15 killed were women and 5 killed were girls.

<sup>94</sup> Harvard Kennedy School, (Un)Making Masculinities: Tracing How Men's Responses to Violence Impact the Home in the Occupied West Bank, 31 March 2023. [\(Un\)Making Masculinities: Tracing How Men's Responses to Violence Impact the Home in the Occupied West Bank - HKS Student Policy Review](#)

<sup>95</sup> The Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combatting Anti-Semitism, International Non-Governmental Organizations Primarily Engaged in Activities with Palestinian Residents for the Purpose of Humanitarian Aid: Guidelines for the Registration of Organizations and Issuance of Recommendations for Their Foreign Employees. [International Non-Governmental Organizations Primarily Engaged in Activities with Palestinian Residents for the Purpose of Humanitarian Aid The Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism](#)