



## Protection Analysis Update

April 2022

# Borno State, North-East Nigeria



## 1. REPORT SUMMARY

As the conflict between the Government of Nigeria (GoN) and Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in **North-East Nigeria** enters its 12<sup>th</sup> year, the people in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (referred to as the BAY states) continue to face **widespread insecurity and ongoing military operations, damaged infrastructure, tattered local economies, loss of livelihoods and gross violations of their human rights by all parties to the conflict**. The COVID-19 pandemic and ever deteriorating global food security have exacerbated already precarious conditions, leaving a projected 8.4 million people across the BAY states in need of humanitarian assistance and protection in 2022. **Among them, 4.2 million people live in Borno state alone with around 1.6 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) out of the 2.2 million persons displaced across the three North-Eastern BAY states.**<sup>1</sup> Insecurity and resultant restrictions imposed by the Borno State Government (BSG) on movements make humanitarian operations both dangerous and difficult. Humanitarian actors cannot reach an estimated **1.1 million people in need who reside in inaccessible areas**, while humanitarian operations mostly focus on the state capital, Maiduguri, and garrison towns in Local Government Areas (LGAs). As displaced, returning and host communities are all experiencing critical needs across all sectors, the inaccessible areas in Northern Borno, where food security levels are likely to have reached famine levels, are of highest concern. **This Protection Analysis Update (PAU) focuses on Borno state**, as it hosts the majority of conflict-affected and displaced persons across the BAY states and remains the hotspot of the crisis in North-East Nigeria. **It sheds light on three concerning developments and their protection**

<sup>1</sup> Nigeria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022

### a. Severity Scale of the covered geographical area

Out of the 27 LGAs of Borno state, 7 fall under severity phase 2, 8 under severity phase 3, and 8 under severity phase 4 (making a total of 23, as 4 fall under severity phase 0)

### b. Key Protection Figures

#### *Civilian casualties over the past 6 months*

Between September 2021 and March 2022, ACLED recorded 139 events of violence against civilians in Nigeria with 247 fatalities.

#### *Damage to civilian infrastructure*

Worth of damage to services and infrastructure in Borno state: \$6.9 billion.

#### *Displacement trends*

1,613,019 persons are displaced in Borno state out of whom 49% live in host communities and 51% in camps and camp-like settings.

#### *Protection Persons in Need (PIN): 4.3 million*

Protection:	4,255,958
Child Protection:	2,045,461
Gender-Based Violence:	1,362,447
House Land and Property:	970,133
Mine Action:	1,173,232

**implications for the civilian population in Borno. These include camp closures in Maiduguri Metropolitan Centre (MMC) and Jere LGAs with enforced relocations and returns to various areas across Borno, food insecurity and restrictions related to humanitarian food distributions, as well as the curtailment of the freedom of movement.**

## 2. CONTEXT OVERVIEW

**Borno state is considered as the epicentre of the crisis across the BAY states.** Since the beginning of 2022, Government Forces (GF) have considerably stepped up their operations against NSAGs under the “Desert Sanity” campaign, now deploying ground forces on a large scale in NSAG areas. During the first quarter of 2022, NSAGs increased their attacks, primarily due to an exacerbation of inter and intra-NSAG clashes. **A total of 679 NSAG incidents were recorded since January 2022, causing 340 civilian casualties and 270 GF casualties.** The widespread violence and insecurity, compounded by the closure of camps in MMC and Jere LGAs, food reduction and restrictions, and limited freedom of movement, have posed serious protection risks for the civilian population in Borno who continues to experience gross human rights violations with **a lack of adherence to key protection and humanitarian principles by all conflict parties in North-East Nigeria.** Protection monitoring reports highlighted violations of the right to life, liberty and personal security as well as the right of freedom from torture, cruel and degrading treatment with various forms of physical and psychological violence committed against the population in Borno. This included abductions, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, enforced disappearances, inhumane treatment of the elderly and the disabled (especially persons with mental illness), rape, sexual and physical assault, exploitation and abuse, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), child recruitment, the use of civilians as Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED) and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), and the destruction of critical services – such as health and education – and public and private infrastructure.


Protection monitoring reports as of 31 March 2022 estimate that **over 150,000 people were adversely affected by 453 reported protection incidents**, ranging from GBV, attacks by NSAGs, physical assault by the members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), abduction, fire outbreaks, looting, communal clashes and forced evictions by landlords. IDPs were disproportionately affected by these incidents, with over 60% of the victims being women and girls.

## 3. PRIORITY PROTECTION RISKS

### **RISK 1:** Camp closures and enforced relocations and returns

Pursuing its Return Agenda to relocate/return all displaced Nigerians to their ancestral homelands, the BSG started implementing its plan to close IDP camps in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere LGAs in 2021. In contravention of international law and binding frameworks, the BSG has not complied with minimum conditions that ensure returns and relocations are voluntary, safe, and dignified based on the informed consent and involvement of the displaced populations and members of the host community throughout all stages of the process. **In a non-consultative and uncoordinated manner, the BSG closed 6 camps so far, including Mocgolis camp and NYSC camp in May 2021, Farm Centre camp in September 2021, Bakasi camp in November 2021 as well as Stadium camp and Teachers Village camp in January 2022. A total of 22,872 households comprising 103,568 IDPs were affected by the camp closures and were either returned to their areas of origin or relocated to locations closer to their ancestral homes or moved elsewhere into**

**camp or non-camp settings.** According to community consultations conducted by protection partners in December 2021, only 56% of the interviewed persons who were affected by the enforced relocations and returns in Borno state indicated to have been fully informed by the BSG of its plan to close their camp, evidencing low awareness levels among IDPs. **As a result of the camp closures, over half of the affected population, estimated at 11,590 households of 60,074 individuals are now in a state of secondary or multiple displacement in locations uncondusive for return or relocation with limited access to services and livelihood opportunities that make their stay there unsustainable.** Relocation and return areas have also been unsafe and inaccessible to humanitarian actors due to insecurity and government-imposed restrictions of independent movements. Intensified attacks by NSAGs on the relocation and return sites – among them in Damasak, Gajiram, Kukawa, and Marte – have caused IDPs who had been relocated or returned there by the BSG to flee, with some of them returning to the locations they were initially moved away from.



The enforced relocations and returns are continuing despite the worsening security situation and protests from the humanitarian community: the camps of Dalori 1 and Dalori 2 received notice of closure in January 2022, and Gubio Road camp and Muna El-Badawee camp did so in February 2022, while the BSA did not communicate the actual date of closure yet. As Maiduguri and Jere LGAs host 144 formal and informal camps, a total of 44,603 households with a combined population of 225,425 IDPs are ultimately still at risk of camp closure and thereby enforced relocation and return. **The**

impending closures have severely impacted the humanitarian community's ability to plan for the longevity of their services, thus leading to serious gaps in service provision. This has created a negative push factor, indirectly incentivizing the IDPs to leave their current locations.




*Participants of a community consultation with male IDPs shared that "because of the planned closure of the camps, there has not been any food distribution in four months and this has pushed our community to the brink of survival".*

At the same time, according to community consultations conducted by protection partners, the majority of affected IDPs (93% of the interviewed persons) have received a token from the BSA which serves as a minimum support package to access cash and other government support upon their relocation or return, creating a negative pull factor for IDP movements away from their displacement locations. A significant minority (7% of the interviewed persons) has not received tokens given uncoordinated 'registration' processes and are therefore at risk of exclusion from even the minimum BSG return support package. This has caused some to resort to negative coping mechanisms such as child labour. In the IDPs' attempt to sustain themselves, others moved back to informal

camps out of concern that they would be found out by the authorities and forcefully returned to their relocation or return sites. This has put a strain on the existing IDP camps in the different LGAs and on host communities, exposing IDPs to exacerbating protection risks.

## **RISK 2:** Denial or impediments to resources, opportunities, services resulting in high levels of food insecurity

With the conflict in North-East Nigeria ongoing in its 12<sup>th</sup> year, the food insecurity and hunger situation has remained a major concern with grave protection implications for the civilian population. **Out of Borno state's 6.3 million people, 1.4 million persons (23%) across 18 LGAs find themselves in a state of critical acute food insecurity as of March 2022.** Borno's LGA Gubio even ranks under the emergency phase of food and nutrition insecurity. **Projections for the upcoming lean season show that 1.9 million people will be in an acute food insecurity situation (increase to 31%) across 23 LGAs by August 2022, with the three LGAs of Abadam, Gubio and Mobbar even in the emergency phase.** Out of the critically acute food insecure population as of March 2022, 380,000 people (27%) are estimated to be in inaccessible areas across 14 LGAs in Borno state, where they lack access to life saving assistance and protection, projected to even increase to 443,000 inaccessible persons by August 2022.



Source: Cadre Harmonise Analysis 2017 – 2022; Monthly 5Ws as submitted by Food Security Sector, government, and non-government partners.

Livelihoods across Borno state are seriously disrupted due to the ongoing conflict, with many households unable to access income generating activities to meet their basic food needs. **The majority of people depend on agricultural livelihoods – the mainstay of Borno’s economy – but cannot pursue farming and fishing, as they are frequently attacked by NSAGs, suffering different forms of violence such as exploitation and abuse, abductions, and killings at their hands.** Engendered by the global spike in food prices and reduced market stocks, food consumption levels in Borno state are expected to deteriorate even further throughout 2022.

While the majority of IDPs are fully dependent on food provided by humanitarian actors due to a lack of alternative livelihood opportunities and their limited freedom of movement to pursue agricultural activities outside of GFs controlled areas, the World Food Programme (WFP) reduced the number of beneficiaries and the

quantity of food rations in all major locations in Borno in January 2022 given a lack of funding.


**In December 2021, the BSG banned humanitarian food distributions across Borno state in areas where IDPs had been newly resettled to.** While stating that the aim was to make relocated communities self-sufficient and not dependent on aid, **the relocation sites do not provide the conditions for income generation and thereby food security, often being located in unsafe areas with an already high level of food insecurity.** The assistance provided by the BSA has generally proven not to be sustainable and adequate (one-off distributions, no needs assessments etc.). Information collected by protection partners in the relocation sites evidences this, for instance none of the IDPs relocated to Monguno had received any food assistance either prior or after arriving in Monguno, being left with no option but to adopt negative coping mechanisms for survival. **Partner reporting also highlights that a lack of fuel for cooking has driven up the threat of violence, as women and girls were forced to collect firewood and experienced GBV incidents while doing so.** Protection partners in Bama, Banki, and Ngala have furthermore documented abduction of men, women, boys and girls who fetched firewood.

### **RISK 3: Curtailment of freedom of movement**

Violence and insecurity continue to deeply impact the ability of civilians to enjoy freedom and safety of movement in Borno state. In some garrison towns, **IDPs cannot freely move out of the camps without obtaining clearance from the camp security and GFs and are expected to be back at the camp at specific times. This has negatively affected the IDPs’ ability to go about livelihood activities**

and become more self-sustainable. Depending on the IDP camp location, civilian movements require armed escorts for a number of roads given the high road insecurity. People sometimes need to wait for days for an armed escort, which has created barriers to their access to basic services such health facilities and at times has posed risks to their life. **Again, of particular concern is the relocation/return of displaced populations to areas where their movement is severely curtailed given both high levels of insecurity and related BSG-imposed movement restrictions, since this makes IDP self-sustainability impossible and artificially creates humanitarian needs in inaccessible areas unfit for the neutral and impartial delivery of humanitarian aid.**

Movements in areas that do not require armed escorts remain also restricted and unsafe for the civilian population. **The use of explosive ordnance in areas populated by civilians, in particular Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), is widespread across Borno state but witnessed a notable uptick between January and March 2022 with 163 casualties recorded.** The prominent use of IEDs by NSAGs is due in particular to the re-opening of the Maiduguri-Damboia road in February and the lifting of the requirement for armed escorts along the Dikwa-Ngala highway, where attacks intensified since the beginning of the year, as well as a prioritization of asymmetric tactics by NSAGs given BSG advances. **The limited freedom of movement and lack of access makes both a large-scale, comprehensive survey of the contamination and clearance impossible as well as not allowing for multi-sectoral needs assessments by humanitarian partners, which are likewise affected by the road insecurity with compromised operational capacity.**



## 4. EFFECT ON THE POPULATION

### Camp closures and enforced relocations and returns

The closure of camps has led camp residents to relocate to urban centres of MMC and Jere LGAs due to safety concerns within their areas of origin and a lack of basic services and relevant civilian infrastructure. When families have not been able to get hosted by other community members, they have had to pay rent for their private accommodation, putting an extra burden on households' already strained economic situation. In order to make ends meet, many IDPs were obliged to engage in negative coping mechanisms, thereby exposing them to further protection risks. **The camp closures and relocations have also led to overcrowding of IDP camps in LGAs where IDPs were returned to, as reportedly 41% of the IDPs who were relocated or returned moved into other IDP camps.** This has overstretched ongoing humanitarian service provision in support of the camp residents. Regardless of having been relocated or returned into camp or non-camp settings, many IDPs with protection concerns that received support by humanitarian actors **could not easily continue receiving protection interventions** due to the ad hoc manner in which the relocations took place without the involvement of humanitarian actors.

### Denial or impediments to resources, opportunities, services resulting in high levels of food insecurity

Considering their already precarious circumstances, the food reduction has further exacerbated the protection risks faced by the civilian population. **Many households adopted negative coping mechanism, amongst them child labour and begging to increase sources of income to buy food, which has exposed especially girls**

**and boys to sexual exploitation and abuse.** Other coping mechanisms have included borrowing food, relying on support from friends and relatives, reducing or skipping the number of meals per day, or relying on less preferred/expensive food options. **Furthermore, incidents of theft have increased, in Dikwa and Ngala to mention but a few, with daily break-ins into shelters recorded and people stripped of their food and non-food items.**

There has also been a series of protests by IDPs over the reduction of food assistance in several locations in Borno State. On 25<sup>th</sup> of January 2022, IDPs staged a peaceful protest in front of the office of the District Head of Dikwa LGA to register their displeasure with the reduction of beneficiaries from the general food distribution. In Monguno, IDPs stopped humanitarian activities in Waterboard extension camp on 15<sup>th</sup> of February 2022, insisting they would not allow humanitarian partners to work in the camp until they are provided with food. All pleas by the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and other stakeholders were ignored. The IDPs further went ahead to lock the offices of humanitarian actors in the vicinity. There was yet another protest in Dikwa on 25<sup>th</sup> of February 2022, where IDPs who had arrived from hard-to-reach areas had not benefitted from food assistance in three months. **These protests by the affected population are a sign of desperation in the face of the protection risks they face but also threaten the safety and security of humanitarian workers and the delivery of ongoing humanitarian services.**

### Curtailment of freedom of movement

The limited freedom of movement has led to desperation within the IDP communities in the camps and the undermining of existing gender roles, especially with men who are supposed to be



breadwinners losing their status within the society. Protection assessments by partners highlighted that men are frustrated that they cannot perform their traditional gender roles as fathers or husbands due to their inability to easily travel outside of the camps. **The populations living in areas potentially contaminated with explosive ordnances are unable to move freely to engage in any meaningful livelihood** and given that most of the affected population are farmers who are now required to depend on support from humanitarian organizations, life in the IDP camps **remains difficult**. In locations where leaving the camp required gate pass, **women and girls have reported sexual harassment by security guards and Civilian Joint Taskforce (CJTF) members guarding the gate.**

## 5. EXISTING CAPACITIES TO ADDRESS THE PROTECTION RISKS

**The closure of camps has obliged some of the IDPs to move into urban areas and strived to cater to their needs without humanitarian support.** Assessments conducted by protection partners revealed that some families combined resources to enable them to rent accommodation in MMC LGA because they did not want to relocate to their villages. Many of those who were relocated opted to move in the houses of relatives.

The reduction in food assistance saw many families engaging in petty trading to enable them to meet their basic needs, though families also had to sell their belongings to meet their food needs in some locations. **A large number of IDPs, including women and children in camps across the LGAs moved to cities like Gombe and Kano in**

**other parts of Nigeria and to neighbouring countries like Niger and Cameroun in search of jobs. IDPs have attributed their search for jobs to the fact that food supply was inadequate or non-existent,** and the need to earn money to meet the needs of their families. IDPs are made to work as bricklayers, builders, or farm workers for low wages in places far away from their camps, presenting new protection risks to them in areas without their existing support networks.

**The limited freedom of movement in camps led many IDPs to move in groups to ensure that when having the opportunity to be out of the camp to seek casual labour, they work together to be able to get more income.** In contaminated areas, in which movements are dangerous and limited, community leaders sought support from the GFs to provide escort for firewood collection.

## 6. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

### General recommendations

- The **Government of Nigeria (GoN)** to abide by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and frameworks, in particular complying to act in line with the *Kampala Convention*, the *IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (2010)*, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (2004)* and the *UN Durable Solutions Preliminary Operational Guide (2016)*, as well as the GoN's newly endorsed *IDP Policy* heeding the aforementioned documents.
- The **International Community** to exert pressure on all parties to the conflict to cease violations of IHL and IHRL.

### **RISK 1:** Camp closures and enforced relocations/returns

- The **Protection Sector** to advocate with the BSG/GoN on the principles and standards of voluntariness, safety, dignity, and sustainability to avoid premature camp closures, enforced relocation, return or secondary displacement.
- The **BSG/GoN** to immediately stop relocations and returns that are involuntary, unsafe, undignified, and unsustainable.
- The **GoN and humanitarian actors** not to reduce services in an area of displacement where there remains population needs, as a potential push factor, while ensuring that aid is not politicized or used to incentivize premature returns.
- The **Protection Sector and its partners**, along with **Camp Coordination** and **Camp Management (CCCM) Sector**, to ensure pre- and post-relocation/return monitoring to understand the impact of the relocation/return on the affected population, identify protection risks to prevent and mitigate any rights violations ensuing from the relocation/return, and advocate for the GoN's and other sectors' required interventions.
- The **GoN, humanitarian, development, peace and stabilization actors** to coordinate more closely with each other to identify locations that can be suggested to the displaced population to achieve durable solutions, understand the affected populations' intentions and plan accordingly.
- **Humanitarian partners** to distribute life-saving assistance to returnees to assist with the initial phase of survival following return.
- The **donor community** to provide political and diplomatic advocacy support to ensure the compliance of the BSG/GoN with international standards and best practices on relocations and returns, while also strategically aligning donor support to

stabilization actors to plan for and provide affected populations with safe, alternative relocation options.

### **RISK 2:** Denial or impediments to resources, opportunities, services resulting in high levels of food insecurity

- The **donor community** to increase financial support to accelerate the implementation of the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), particularly during the lean season, by provision of funds for multi-sectoral lifesaving, preventive and resilience activities for people in need. This needs to entail food support to the wider population beyond those in emergency or acute food insecurity situations, to prevent the exacerbation of vulnerabilities and negative coping mechanisms.
- **Humanitarian partners** to provide reliable and timely information to IDPs and other recipients of food assistance in advance of planned food reductions to allow them to plan their expenses and to reduce the risk of resorting to negative coping strategies. Using multiple mechanisms, especially through community leaders and other community-based structures, is vital.
- **Development and stabilization actors** to coordinate more closely with the humanitarian community to ensure links between short-term and medium-term interventions that can have a preventive and mitigating effect on food insecurity and its related protection concerns.
- **Humanitarian partners** to ensure that data on the impact of food reductions and restrictions is sufficiently disaggregated in terms of age, gender, and diversity given that ensuing protection risks manifest themselves differently among the

population. An intersectional and specifically gender-sensitive analysis is required to inform the design of the response and to identify possibilities to empower women, including through well-designed income-generating activities, where feasible.

### **RISK 3:** Curtailment of freedom of movement

- The **GoN** to ensure all Nigerians, regardless of their status as displaced or non-displaced individuals, enjoy full freedom of movement.
- **OCHA/CMCoord** to advocate the BSG and GFs for improved freedom of movement for the residents of IDP camps, including more flexible curfews to allow the IDPs to conduct livelihood and other activities outside the camps. Restriction of movement should be time-bound and gradually lifted, as the security situation improves.
- **The GFs**, with the support of **SEMA and the CCCM actors**, to sensitize community members on movement restrictions in order to help them understand the rationale for the restricted movement, movement times in and out of camps, and locations where movement is restricted.
- The **GoN**, with the support of **humanitarian actors**, to enhance Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) for increased understanding and safe behaviour of IDPs, returnees and host communities, including for safe relocation and resettlement.
- The **GoN**, with the support of **humanitarian actors**, to increase efforts to map contamination with explosive ordnance to identify safe areas for IDP, returnees and host community movements, and contaminated areas to be avoided.