

Returns / Relocation Strategy in the Context of Government-Led Camp Closures

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1. Context

Despite the relative peace obtained in some towns across Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States in Northeast Nigeria, the conflict continues with an estimated 2.2 million persons displaced. According to the latest Displacement Tracking Matrix (round 46), **Borno State** currently hosts around 885,940 IDPs, **Adamawa State** hosts 18,772 IDPs and **Yobe State** hosts a total of 19,353 IDPs.

Borno State	Adamawa State	Yobe State
885,940 IDPs in	18,772 IDPs in	19,353 IDPs in
62 formal camps 154 informal camps	3 formal camps 22 informal camps	19 informal camps

The agenda of the Borno State Government (BSG) to end displacement saw the closing of camps in Maiduguri in early 2023, as well as the announcement of plans to continue closing camps in the Local Government Areas (LGAs) and the informal camps within Maiduguri and Jere. Consequently, IDPs have been relocated to LGA headquarters and towns, some of which are in areas that are hard or extremely hard for humanitarian partners to reach due to insecurity. In many of these return / relocation areas the population also face limited freedom of movement and access to basic services, most importantly food and safe farming. On 20 January 2024, the BSG plan to close camps at the LGA level began with the closure of Ngala ISS Camp and the relocation of the population to Logumane community. Reportedly 448 households were registered, out of which 408 were relocated. The process was done without the involvement of the humanitarian actors in Ngala and with limited community participation and advance notice on date and time of the relocation, leading to some families being left behind in the camps. With this relocation having taken effect within the first month of 2024, further camp closures are anticipated in 2024 and beyond.

The Adamawa State Government's (ADSG) desire to end displacement started since 2018 with the announcement of plans to consolidate camps in the LGAs and the informal camps within the Fufore, Mubi, Yola South, Hong and Maiha LGAs. These camps provide temporary shelter, basic services, and humanitarian assistance to displaced individuals and are managed by various relief agencies, including the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS). The ADSG is currently planning the closure of the established camps in Adamawa State and the transition of displaced individuals to more permanent housing solutions. The exact date of the camp closure has not yet been announced.

Given that there are no formal camps in Yobe State, the closure of the informal camps is not on the State's agenda.

In order to support the government with principled, orderly, and smooth camp closures, it is imperative for humanitarian partners to develop a strategy to address protection concerns and maintain continuous protection services during and after camp closure.

2. Purpose and Scope

In Northeast Nigeria, government camp closures are taking place in Borno State and plans are in place to close camps in Adamawa State. This Strategy serves as a guide for Protection Actors involved in providing protection and assistance to the population residing in camps within Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) States and focuses on ensuring protection standards are adhered to, based on best practices and IASC guidelines. The Strategy will guide Protection partners working with populations affected by the closure of camps and provide protection responses to those who have relocated and those who opt to locally integrate.

Other sectors or actors may refer to this Strategy to guide the implementation of their activities.

To ensure a consultative process, this operational Strategy aims to ensure that camp closures take into consideration community participation and protection-sensitive solutions for the affected population.

This Strategy takes into consideration reports received from key protection partners, which culminated in a Strategy Development Workshop held on 30 - 31 January 2024, in which 49 Protection and Government counterparts participated in Borno State and on 20 - 21 February consisting of 35 Protection and Government actors in Adamawa State. Through group sessions, participants drafted the contents of this Strategy.

Given the evolving protection environment in the Northeast, the Strategy is subject to review and amendment, in consultation with the Protection Sector members. The Strategy may also be adapted for use regarding the situation in Yobe State.

3. Protection Considerations¹

Protection standards and considerations, including best practices, must be mainstreamed in camp closure decisions and procedures. All activities should ensure that displaced persons can enjoy physical, legal, and material security without discrimination.

In situations of abrupt camp closure, particular attention should be paid to designing protection-oriented actions and monitoring measures.

Protection considerations during camp closure include:

- Voluntariness: Return or relocation should be based on a free, fully informed, and voluntary decision by IDPs and should be devoid of any form of coercion or influence. IDPs should not be induced to return or relocate by indications of closing IDP camps and sites, withholding humanitarian assistance, reducing humanitarian assistance, confiscation of documentation, or expulsion / eviction from temporary accommodation or arbitrary arrest / detention. In the case that IDPs decide not to return and choose another durable solution, this should be respected, without negative consequences. Throughout the relocation process as of 2022, the voluntary nature of relocation and return in the BAY State has raised protection concerns. Displaced populations may be vulnerable to outside manipulation and a lack of information and access to basic services.
- **Meaningful participation:** IDPs must be consulted in the planning process and informed about the procedures. The Government is urged to provide adequate information to IDPs prior to the return / relocation to a specific area. Information on the conditions in the return area (e.g., security situation, status of infrastructure, availability of services), the overall return plan and the process of return should be provided as early as possible prior to an actual movement. The information should include an explanation of the return procedures, any registration required, assistance provided upon return, as well as an explanation of the rights of IDPs. The provision of information will ensure IDPs are able to make an informed choice and have an opportunity to prepare for the movement.
- Organization of return / relocation: Return / relocation movements should be well-organized and ensure family unity is maintained at all times. Once returned, IDPs should be guaranteed freedom of movement to rebuild relationships and carry out livelihood activities to ensure the sustainability of the return process.
- **Safety and dignity of return / relocation:** The core components of return in safety and dignity are conditions of physical, legal, and material safety.

Physical Safety: The Government in collaboration with other relevant actors has the responsibility to ensure that places of return / relocation are safe, including being free from any military activities, free of mines and unexploded ordnance, and ensuring the physical safety of IDPs is provided for by State security forces. This includes villages and houses, access roads, and areas where the populations are known to conduct their livelihoods. Mine risk education should be conducted for IDPs with a special focus on children's needs prior to any return movement.

¹ Excerpt from the Camp Closure Guidelines 2014, Protection Considerations.

Legal Safety: The Government has the responsibility to remove legal and administrative barriers to return / relocation, as well as ensure legal systems comply with international human rights standards to enable returning / relocating individuals to exercise their basic civil, political, and economic rights without prejudice.

Material Safety: Returning / relocating IDPs should have access to basic services and available public utilities without discrimination. Material safety implies notably access in the early phases of return / relocation to means of survival and basic services, such as potable water, health services and education. For a durable return / relocation, measures should be taken to favor sustainable reintegration. Voluntary return / relocation plans must take into consideration absorption capacity to avoid potential competition for scarce resources among returnees or between returnees and the community. Continued access to services for residual populations should be ensured.

- Persons with specific needs: Identification of key protection needs and risks for groups with specific needs should be ensured. Such groups include unaccompanied and separated children, unaccompanied older persons, persons with disabilities, chronically ill persons, persons with mental health needs, unaccompanied women and child / single heads of households. Particular attention should be paid to those unwilling or unable to choose to return. Moving groups of vulnerable community members together along with their families / community groups should be considered to reduce protection and security risks, as well as the likelihood of separation and trafficking.
- **Monitoring**: Protection monitoring and response is an integral part of the camp closure process, including during movement and arrival in areas of return / relocation; as the IDPs may become more vulnerable due to anxiety, fear, stress, and uncertainty. Monitoring is also key to ensure protection issues are identified and responded to, and to ensure targeted advocacy where needed.

4. Implementation of the Strategy

4.1 In camps before relocation / return / closure:

- Advocate with and support the government to conduct a Return Intension Survey to understand the intentions of the population to be relocated or returned. This could be done by protection partners or in coordination with other actors including CCCM, and in coordination with the Government. The tools should be standardized to incorporate protection questions.
- Mapping of the existing community in each camp to understand which potential areas they may be interested in returning / relocating to.
- Establish a coordination mechanism on the return / relocation process.
- Document individuals with ongoing protection needs that will require intervention upon relocation / return and provision of support to such individuals.
- Identify community workers / volunteers who will be relocated along with the population to support with communication and information sharing. At least 5 IDPs to act as key informants per camp should be found.
- Update hotline and contact details of all partners involved in monitoring during camp closures.
- Conduct capacity building for the focal points or a community-based protection structure to sustain protection monitoring.
- Before the closure / relocation, draft key messages, so humanitarian staff can answer questions from the community. All humanitarian partners should be informed and receive the same messages. Age-appropriate messages to be developed for children and child protection partners to target caregivers and children on best practices during the move to avoid family separation with a discussion with UNICEF / ICRC or available CP partners on their protection of family links services and to anticipate such disruption.
- Establish communication mechanisms to ensure consultation among the authorities, CCCM and other relevant stakeholders in each camp.

4.1.1 Sharing of information on services in areas of return / relocation

- To avoid spreading misinformation, humanitarian partners should NOT share information about assistance or services in areas of return that are not confirmed. This should rather be available through hotlines in case there is any emerging news.
- A protection monitoring emergency questionnaire should be drafted as soon as possible for KIs within the IDPs community to let protection partners know what the situation is like in return areas. This can be done along with community workers where possible.
- Focal points among protection partners that have a hotline number should be selected per camps where relocation is possible. Protection partners can follow / track the movements through these focal points, acting as Key Informants, to facilitate better understanding of the situation in the areas of relocation.
- Safe spaces / community centers / shelter contact details should be shared where there are active protection partners in LGA / wards / community of destination, to be able to potentially refer families to assistance.
- Referrals to assistance in destination locations should be discussed at the local level. Direct service referrals as well as case management file transfer for high-risk cases should be facilitated by the local protection working groups and thereafter conducted bilaterally between protection actors in camps and at the location of destination if feasible.
- Broader information sharing about the presence and services of protection actors in areas destined for relocation / return is recommended. Information about potential referrals to multi-sectoral assistance should be provided based on updated service mapping.
- Community engagement and information dissemination: there is a need for further coordination with humanitarian agencies and the BSG to have the information of the schedules of return to ensure continuous communication with community protection structures representatives throughout all phases of relocation and receive information about areas of relocation / origin and understanding the situation on the ground in areas of return, potential gaps to monitor protection risks including GBV related issues.
- Protection partners should engage in building capacity / assessing capacities that have been built to the community-based structures to be able to support monitoring upon their return / relocation.

4.1.2 Gathering intentions information & identification of families unable to return

- Usual intentions surveys should not be conducted when a camp is at risk of sudden closure / population relocation, as questions are not necessarily appropriate, and may be misunderstood as humanitarian involvement in decision-making on closure / relocation. Intention surveys should be considered for a population that is being planned for relocation.
- Identification of individual families with major obstacles to leaving the camp or the areas can be identified by actors involved in protection monitoring and case management. Within boundaries of confidentiality and do no harm, protection partners can help identify individuals / households facing specific obstacles, working with individual families on solutions and advocating on their behalf to authorities with the support of camp management and PSNE.
- Additional household-level assessment should not be conducted to avoid creating unnecessary expectations and additional confusion for the concerned individuals.

4.1.3 Support to persons with protection concerns

- Protection partners should ensure that they have an updated list of people with specific needs. If a partner does not have one, such a partner can contact the CCCM / SEMA to share information about households with generic vulnerabilities, e.g. persons with disabilities, female-headed households, child-headed households, older persons etc.
- Information should include numbers of households, their areas of origin (AoO) and their expected destinations (if known) as well as their contact details (if consent has been obtained).

- This could be complemented through an analysis of root cause of displacement to come up with resolutions or durable solutions or analysis of the appropriate needs of IDPs once they return to prepare for further transition between camps and areas of returns.
- Bilateral inter-agency referrals to take place thereafter between protection partners in camps and in areas of destination (if accessible and partners are present) especially for high risks cases. There should be emergency referral pathways related to camp closures. The tools related to this type of monitoring should be coordinated with the different AoR and the PSNE (i.e. for child protection cases, CP partners to transfer open cases to partners in expected locations of destination and GBV actors to identify safe shelter options for survivors upon departure from camp.)
- Psychological First Aid (PFA): Depending on the situation (timeline for departures, presence of humanitarian actors in camps, camp size, etc.), protection actors can provide PFA on an *ad hoc* basis to persons showing signs of distress.
- Mine Action partners suggested to carry out a safety and security assessments. This consists of listing likely areas of return to be shared by CCCM with PWG to share with Mine Action partners ahead of time so they can assess the level of possible contamination in AoO and provide relevant information in camp before departure (if possible) and follow-up with more comprehensive Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) in areas of return. For example, it is known that areas near Gwoza / Ngala and most recently in Adamawa may be affected by landmines and other items of explosive ordnance.
- The PSNE shall also inform of known pathways where farmers have been killed by explosive ordnance in recent months to avoid such pathways to relocation.
- In planning how to prevent protection risks such as GBV, sexual exploitation etc. protection agencies should include in the budget the distribution of torches, dignity kits or clean delivery kits, the setting up of mobile protection desks in the transit or return / relocation areas, and the setting up of mobile team during the return, etc.
- Planning of the continuity of protection services (especially CP and GBV) including turn over or transfer of assets in the camp and ensure capacity building of the government on protection principles and map existing stakeholders that received trainings over the years to be key focal points and first responders in the camp for protection actors to keep in contact with upon their return.

4.1.4 Departures tracking on relocation/return day

- Protection partners to coordinate with camp management to track the number of departing families and destinations. During sudden closures or evictions, departure figures and intended destinations are to be shared by camp management daily.
- If access is allowed, protection partners should track and monitor people during transit as well as the mobilization of partners in areas of destination to provide multi-sectoral assistance.
- Exit survey to be conducted by camp management or a protection partner (depending on the agreement in each camp), to track families' destination locations and receive consent for referral to humanitarian assistance if available and identify IDP focal points to ensure regular communication and keep track of the protection situation.
- If departures are threatened or coerced, exit surveys should be done by phone 1-2 weeks after departure, to avoid adding additional stress. For this reason, IDP focal points in each camp location should be identified. PSNE to identify 2-3 partners per location that could identify 1-2 FP each that would be willing to communicate regularly on the phone as KI to follow the transit during camp closures and the relocation itself.

4.1.5 Protection monitoring during camp closure/relocation day

- Ensure the presence of humanitarian organizations in the camp to provide on-site monitoring and deter acts of violence by authorities and security actors through dialogue, advocacy and visibility.
- Monitor protection issues and incidents occurring during camp closure or relocation including the presence of security actors, excessive use of force and other forms of abuse

and violence through observation tools and regular reports to the PSNE or local protection working groups to engage with relevant entities for further advocacy.

- Monitor the needs of the vulnerable population including those with serious medical condition, those with disability and older persons. Advocate with the camp management and those in charge of the camp closure and relocation to ensure that the needs of these individuals are addressed.
- Members of the protection team to be on standby during camp closures especially on weekends where there may be no presence of staff.
- Before transit, ensure that those relocated or to be relocated have legal identity documents before they are moved. Where not possible, alternative documents should be provided.
- Ensure that children have civil documents with them before movement and alternative care arranged for unaccompanied Children, street children (Almajiri's) where applicable.

4.2 Movement from camps to Local Government Areas and transit points

Service provision if allowed to escort the movement of the population:

- Interventions should be limited to life-saving assistance to address the most immediate needs.
- Provide limited material assistance (food, water etc.) at checkpoints, only if security actors and other authorities are unable or unwilling to provide it. This means that some humanitarian actors should be mobilized and have mobile teams to support this.
- If accessible, safe and feasible, ad hoc presence by protection actors at checkpoints to minimize the risk of civil documents confiscation, arbitrary arrest, detention, etc.
- Provide PFA throughout the process and / or at checkpoints to alleviate stress and anxiety. To be done in person if transit points are accessible and if contact with households is permitted, or remotely by phone while conducting remote protection monitoring. The consent should have been given by IDP FP beforehand.
- Based on the profiling of IDPs vulnerabilities, ensure provision of special consideration and specific assistance to persons with specific needs e.g. persons with disabilities, older persons, GBV survivors, victims of trafficking, persons with contagious illness or sickness, persons with mental illness, lactating mothers and children.
- Government authorities should provide clear information and orientation to the affected Persons of the relocation process (mode of transportation, basic packages like health kits, etc.). Protection partners can support with PFA and advise on how relocated persons should behave at checkpoints, how they should organize themselves, and provide hotline numbers.
- Maintain close contact with the responsible persons at the area of return to ensure adequate arrangement for their reception is in place.

Protection monitoring:

- Have a comprehensive list of those being returned / relocated to enable head counts on arrival and ensure no one is missing, especially during transit.
- Before departure, the protection partners in the camp to collect the phone numbers of Key Informants or focal points (this may be a small and limited number of households) and obtain their informed consent to conduct protection monitoring during transit and at areas of destination.
 - Protection partners to monitor protection incidents and concerns throughout the transit. Protection monitoring may be done at checkpoints or any other transit points if accessible and safe, either through observations or interviews if they can be conducted without exposing both the concerned individuals and staff to harm.
 - Alternatively, or in addition, monitoring can be done by maintaining regular phone contact with KIs or focal points among families relocated from camp throughout the transit and returns process to obtain details on transport, track movement and receive information about protection incidents and concerns.
 - Protection partners in camps should carry out monitoring interviews by phone during transit, considering the level of trust they have already established with KIs and focal

points. This monitoring should be brief and informal and thus does not require the use of any established data collection tool. It aims to complement but does not replace / duplicate other information management mechanisms, the PSNE shall provide a guideline of key questions to ask with inputs from the active protection monitoring partners. To the greatest extent possible, try to see the different service providers for mobile networks for protection monitoring and ensure follow up remotely.

 Report any immediate protection concern and issue to the local protection working group that will report to the PSNE for follow-up and advocacy. This includes family separation, risks of arrests, sexual violence in transit, and other violations by authorities / security forces / tensions emerging between different groups during transit.

4.3 Reception of relocated / returned IDPs: arrival of buses/trucks where protection partners are present

In locations where protection partners have access and are allowed to escort the convoy, the below should be considered:

- Upon arrival of the buses / trucks in the area of relocation, protection partners should verify those who arrived against the list of those who boarded the buses / trucks in the camp. This should be done in close consultation with the CCCM and camp management personnel and convoy leaders.
- Particular attention should be given to those with specific needs including older persons, those with serious medical conditions and child-headed households.
- Follow up with the convoy leaders to ensure that those with specific needs are assisted to disembark the buses and trucks.
- Monitoring of luggage allocation remains key to ensure that their belongings are not misplaced or stolen.

4.4 Reception of relocated / returned IDPs: arrival of buses/trucks where protection partners are not present

If escort is not feasible, the identified IDP Focal Point or KIs should be asked to take on the above functions in support of their fellow IDPs and the most vulnerable population. Additional focal points involved in the relocation can be considered, such as drivers/staff facilitating the movements of persons, giving consideration to the need for impartiality, medical expertise (first aid) as well as expertise in protection (e.g. child protection and victims of GBV).

4.5 Post relocation / return monitoring

- 4.4.1 Mapping of available specialized services
 - Mapping of protection specialized services including GBV, trafficking in persons, child protection services, services for EO victims and survivors, MHPSS services, case management services, reintegration services for CAFACs, protection safety nets).
 - Involve the government law enforcement and security agencies to ensure access to locations.

4.4.2 Community Based Protection

- Establishment and / or strengthening of existing community-based structures remains key.
- Raising awareness on the community-based structures and their importance in social cohesion and local integration through the identification of gatekeepers of the community.
- Identification and capacity development of the gatekeepers and community members as part of the structures to ensure inclusion and representation of all branches of the community.

- Whenever necessary, and to effectively coordinate protection response, local
 protection working group should be established / supported to conduct ad hoc and
 rapid services mappings in areas of return and / or anticipated secondary displacement
 to complement the service mapping tools. Information to include partner's presence
 (including community centers), type of services, capacities to respond (e.g. if external
 referrals are accepted, duration of partners' presence and services etc.) and contact
 details. Services mapping to be conducted at the community and ward level if possible.
- 4.4.3 Protection monitoring and assessment of protection responses
 - Involvement of key local protection partners under the PSNE in the monitoring process (incl, GBV, CP, TiP, MA partners) and ensuring harmonized guestionnaires/observations tools to be used throughout to avoid confusion.
 - Training of local partners on the use of the tools and on protection principles and data collection protocols.
 - Engagement of government counterpart to support the monitoring process.
- 4.4.4 Evaluation and learning of protection interventions
 - Conduct an inter-sectoral coordination group evaluation exercise in collaboration with government counterparts in the BAY States.
 - Training of ISCG members on the exercise to be led by the ISCG. Conduct a roundtable discussion for recommendations on the learnings of the interventions.
 - Establish coordination structures at federal, state and LGA level.

4.6 Protection Response

To avoid stigmatization, the response is targeted to people affected by the 2024 camp closures, whether as returnees or as newly secondarily displaced people, as well as other returnees and/or IDPs in the same geographic area who also have acute needs and who are not currently being assisted under normal programming.

All priority activities listed below are applicable in both areas of return and secondary displacement.

Protection Monitoring: Key to identifying protection risks and incidents (GBV, CP, TiP, MA) to be addressed through follow-up service provision, to provide evidence to adapt programming and to support advocacy. Area-based targeting, inclusive of host communities, but with a focus on recent returnees and IDPs. Protection partners to use the Protection Sector Northeast rapid assessment at the community level for strengthening monitoring movements from one camp to another area of location. This can be done by taking different phone numbers of IDPs who would be willing to talk about their experience while leaving one camp and relocating to another area. Some others may reach out to the hotline of different Protection partners and testify if they feel like it or be oriented through the proper services available in their areas of relocation/return. Specific incidents should be reported through the Protection Incident Reporting Form, key messages to be developed and disseminated for communities through different channels such as awareness raising sessions, hotlines, radio messages.

Case Management: Essential service to address the specific issues of persons identified as highpriority cases due to severe vulnerabilities and / or high-levels of risks. Targeting on an individual and case-by-case basis, with a focus on continuity of service for high-risk cases previously assisted in camps. Ensure existence of referral pathways to follow-up of high-priority cases between camps and areas of return or secondary displacement, including through bilateral referral or file transfer within or between case management agencies in the concerned locations. If in-person follow-up and comprehensive case management services is not feasible, regular follow-up by phone is recommended to ensure a minimum level of support and continuity in service provision.

Mental Health & Psychosocial Support: Immediate support to address issues of trauma, stress and anxiety compounded by sudden camp closure, involuntary returns and secondary displacement. Targeting on an individual and case-by-case basis. Individual counseling to be

integrated into a broader case management process. Group-based PSS activities to be conducted with/through community groups to support the PSS capacities of local communities, especially where direct implementation or regular presence of PSS providers is not possible. Mobile teams should be prioritized.

Cash for Protection or Individual Protection Assistance: Short-term support to address immediate protection and life-saving issues and risks, including the inability to rent shelter for physical safety and the use of emergency negative coping mechanisms. Targeting on an individual and case-by-case basis, with a focus on HHs with specific vulnerabilities and risks, etc. A careful analysis of the potential risks associated with providing cash for protection should be conducted for each case to avoid creating harm for the concerned individuals. Given the highly vulnerable and sensitive situation of recent returnees and secondarily displaced persons, the usual standards of adopting a discreet, low-visibility and case-by-case approach are of particular importance. Cash for GBV, CP and TiP case management to address issues like gaps in livelihood, CMR, MHPSS and access to legal and justice services for GBV services.,

Community-Based Protection: Essential to mitigate risks related to physical safety and social integration, including blocked returns. Area-based targeting, inclusive of host communities, but with a focus on recent IDP returnees with specific vulnerabilities and profiles. Existing community-based groups and CSOs may be mobilized to facilitate dialogue, community sensitization between community leaders, tribal leaders, returnees, IDPs and host communities to mitigate risks and support safe returns/relocations and reintegration and may be keys for NGO partners to monitor even remotely how the camp closures have impacted the different IDPs and get preliminary information on the situation.

Explosive Ordnance Risk Education: Essential to minimize the risk of death and injury caused by explosive ordnance. Area-based targeting, inclusive of host communities, but with focus on recent IDPs returnees. Sessions are be conducted remotely targeting at-risk populations both in return or secondary displacement areas affected by EO, until in-person sessions are authorized by the authorities. Safe pathways during transit should be identified before camps closures due to recent UXO/ERW found in some rural areas. Contact numbers of emergency EOD units to be distributed within the community for them to be able to report any item found.

Dignity Kits Distribution and MHM supplies, availability of PEP kits in each health center of potential relocations and safe spaces of partners: Essential to support the physical and psychological well-being of women and girls in the context of acute crisis and displacement, including in terms of personal and menstrual hygiene.

GBV Information Dissemination: Share guidance with humanitarian actors on how to support GBV survivors when there are no GBV actors in an area and share information with GBV survivors on specialized services where available. While the GBV AoR can provide orientations, non-GBV actors should also be informed, and protection actors could set up facilitation desks for women and girls to receive information on services available.

Trafficking in Persons Information Dissemination: Share guidance and information with humanitarian actors on support systems for victims of trafficking and existing specialized services. While Anti-trafficking taskforce should ensure orientation of the non-TiP actors on existing measures to protect victims of trafficking.

Access to Justice: Returnees should be provided information on access to justice including traditional and conventional justice system (ADR) local arbitration etc.

Meaningful Access and Protection Mainstreaming: Returnees irrespective of their status, gender, or sex should have equal access to services through the support from community-based structures.

HLP Rights: Ensure equal access to HLP rights for marginalized groups such as women headed households, child headed- households, persons with disabilities and older persons.

5 Roles and Responsibilities

In support of the Government's effort, protection actors have a role to ensure that the protection risk associated with the camp closure and relocation / return is minimized and that camp closure, return and relocation are done in a safe and dignified manner. The following roles and responsibilities were identified and agreed upon by protection actors to support the overall coordination and operationalization of the Protection Sector Camp Closure Strategy in support of the Government's efforts to ensure a durable solution is provided.

5.1 Protection Sector Leadership

- As informed by the Protection partners, consolidate information on protection issues affecting the population and ensure advocacy with key stakeholders.
- Convene meetings with protection actors were necessary to ensure a common position on camp closure.
- As informed by protection actors, advocate to ensure that protection and other issues faced by the community members are brought to the attention of the relevant actors including government and humanitarian leadership.

5.2 Protection Partners

- Conduct a return intention survey where applicable.
- Registration and documentation of returning populations especially those with specific needs and will need ongoing protection intervention.
- Put in place individual case plan to ensure continued protection response directly or indirectly upon arrival in the area of relocation.
- Identify and support the protection focal point of Key Informants among the relocated population and ensure information sharing in a safe and coordinated manner.
- Establish and/or support community-based groups / community workers in areas of return to ensure continued protection interventions.
- Conduct protection monitoring and information sharing with the PSNE and key actors.
- Within boundaries of confidentiality and do no harm, help identify individuals / households facing specific obstacles / unwilling to return. Partners to work with these individuals / families on solutions and advocate on their behalf with authorities.

5.3 Government Actors

- Put in place adequate security measures to ensure the safety and security of lives and properties in the return location.
- Ensure the relocation of the forcibly displaced population in a safe and dignified manner.
- Ensure the provision of basic needs and amenities (Health, Shelter, WASH, Livelihoods) in the return location.
- Put in place a structured mechanism for dispute resolution.
- Adopt and implement policies on camp closure, integration, and social cohesion of the returnees in the community.
- Champion communities' acceptance of ex-NSAG members, their families, and survivors towards integration.

5.4 Community Participation:

- Engage the community from the planning stages up to the implementation of the return to have their views and concerns heard and considered.
- Support partners in disseminating information to the larger population in their local languages
- Provide feedback on areas that relate to culture, traditions, and local coping mechanisms.
- Go and see visits to inform their communities on what to expect and how it may benefit them.
- Focal points identified by protection partners to support the process and perfume their role to share information and provide support where appropriate.

6 Annexes

- Annex 1: PSNE Protection Incident Reporting Tool
- Annex 2: Key Awareness Messages for Awareness and Sensitization
- Annex 3: Camp Phaseout and Closure Checklist
- Annex 4: Key Consideration (before, during and after camp closure)
- Annex 5: Return and Relocation Observation Form